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Abstract 
Referential coordination occurs when a thinker is rational in treating her thoughts as 
being about the same thing. This is manifested primarily in the thinker’s dispositions to 
make inferences, paradigmatically the disposition to infer an existential generalisation 
conjoining two or more properties without recourse to an additional premise concerning 
an identity. It therefore presents an indispensable way for identity to figure in thought. 
This topic is often addressed in the form of discussions of so-called Frege cases, identity 
judgements, or coreference de jure. I argue that referential coordination should be treated 
as an independent and prior explanatory problem. The problem referential coordination 
presents is to explain the rationality of the paradigmatic inferential dispositions. I discuss 
three prominent theories of thought in relation to this problem: the appeal to 
propositional contents akin to Frege’s notion of sense; the appeal to mental 
representations that can be typed in some way; and the appeal to mental files and their 
functional properties. Representatives of these theories fail to provide an explanation that 
is at once non-circular, psychologically realistic, and suﬃciently general. I propose an 
alternative coordination functions explanation. This uses an amended version of mental file 
theory that distinguishes between mental files and file predications, and combines this 
with an apparatus of defaults and defeaters familiar from entitlement epistemology. File 
predications, the associations of files with bits of information, serve as the basis of the 
paradigmatic inferential dispositions, and so have normative functional properties that 
provide a default indication of sameness of reference open to defeat by conflicting 
information. This relatively deflationary explanation is distinctive in dispensing with any 
explanatory notion of a concept. It can be extended to providing a similarly deflationary 
account of the rational role of identity judgements and thoughts about oneself and one’s 
immediate environment. 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Introduction
Introduction 
These are the things we may be said to have learned and to know. Yet, if I 
cease to recall them even for short intervals of time, they are again so 
submerged—and slide back, as it were, into the further reaches of memory
—that they must be drawn out again as if new from the same place (for 
there is nowhere else for them to have gone) and must be collected so that 
they can become known. In other words, they must be gathered up from 
their dispersion. This is where we get the word cogitate… [T]he mind has 
properly laid claim to this word so that not everything that is gathered 
together anywhere, but only what is collected and gathered together in the 
mind, is properly said to be ‘cogitated.’ 
   St. Augustine, Confessions X.xi.18 
The topic of this essay is a problem concerning thought. The problem is presented by the 
fact that someone, having encountered or heard about something, and so having come to 
know something about it, may be rational in being disposed to use what she knows to 
infer something further, either about that thing in particular or about things in general. I 
call this referential coordination. Referential coordination is a way for identity to figure in 
thought. As such, it is closely related to what are known as Frege cases. But whereas Frege 
cases involve thoughts that the thinker rationally treats as being about diﬀerent things, 
though they are in fact about the same thing, referential coordination involves a thinker 
having reason to treat her thoughts as being about the same thing. The problem of 
referential coordination is to explain what enables this that is absent in the other sort of 
case.  
The kind of ignorance of identity exemplified in Frege cases has been subject to a great 
deal of discussion, and the philosophical literature dedicated to solutions and criticisms 
of those solutions is extensive. Referential coordination, by contrast, has received 
somewhat less attention. When it has, it is generally under the guise of addressing what is 
known as coreference de jure, which has more to do with some combination of the 
epistemic properties of deductive inferences and the semantics of coreferring expressions, 
such as anaphoric pronouns. This essay is partly based on making the case for a reversal 
of this situation: referential coordination should be treated as an independent problem, 
and there are reasons for thinking that the solution to it is explanatorily prior, in the 
sense that it constrains how those other problems should be solved. The case for this can 
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be made in the first instance by considering the nature of the problems. It also gains force 
from how it provides a relatively tractable explanatory test for competing theories of 
thought. 
An exhaustive examination of such theories in relation to the problem of referential 
coordination is out of the question, so instead I will discuss three broad theoretical 
approaches prevalent in the contemporary philosophical literature: the appeal to Frege’s 
notion of sense, as part of a theory of the contents of thought; the appeal to mental 
representations and ways of typing them, as part of a theory of the vehicles of thought; 
and the appeal to mental files, as part of a theory of how a thinker’s information is 
organised. I will argue that representatives of each of these views face problems 
concerning the quality of the explanation of referential coordination that they can supply. 
In particular, I will show that they face problems with giving a non-circular explanation, 
deficits in psychological realism, and failure to cover a broad enough range of cases. 
In light of these diﬃculties, I propose an alternative explanation that appeals to the 
normative functional properties of entities making up a minimal information-processing 
structure. This is an amended version of mental file theory that uses a distinction 
between mental files and file predications. File predications are the associations of mental 
files with bits of information. This is combined with an apparatus of defaults and 
defeaters familiar from entitlement epistemology. On this explanation, file predications 
have coordination functions, as I call them, that provide a default indication of sameness 
of reference, which is open to defeat by conflicting information. The rationality of the 
inferential dispositions can be understood as their coherence with the rest of a thinker’s 
information, which is made available by the thinker’s sensitivity to the reliability of 
information employed in the course of carrying out her projects and pursuing her aims. 
The coordination functions explanation makes no use of a commitment common across 
all of the three views mentioned, also widely held in the background of much 
philosophical thinking about the mind. This is the idea that we should explain properties 
of thought by making use of concepts, understood in one way or another. At the same 
time, focusing on referential coordination can help make sense of what may be common 
ground between the many divergent theories of concepts. The coordination functions 
explanation is consistent with only some of the commitments made by these theories, 
and so also provides a way of evaluating the appeal to concepts to do theoretical work. It 
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also presents a way to reject anti-explanationism, the idea, associated with followers of 
Wittgenstein, that no substantive explanation of rationality is possible.  
Referential coordination can be illustrated with the following simple case: 
Lucy is introduced to Cicero at a party and is told that he is from Rome; 
after talking to Cicero for a while, she finds out various things, including 
that he is an orator; when asked later whether there are any Roman orators, 
she is able to answer ‘yes’. 
In this case, Lucy thinks that Cicero is Roman and that Cicero is an orator, and on that 
basis she infers that there is something such that it is both Roman and an orator. In making 
this inference, the thinker treats those thoughts as being about, or referring to, the same 
thing. Treating one’s thoughts as referring to the same thing is manifested primarily in 
being prepared to conjoin the properties and existentially generalise so as to come to 
think the thought that something exists that has both. Actually making this inference—
thinking the existentially general thought—is not so important, rather it is the 
disposition that is the mark of the thoughts being referentially coordinated. What makes 
it rational to be prepared to make this inference does not depend on the capacity to think 
general thoughts about what there is; when the disposition is present, it will engage this 
capacity, but what makes thoughts referentially coordinated is independent of it. 
That the inferential disposition obtains does not present any particularly pressing 
problem by itself. There is a question of what might be the cognitive basis for the 
preparedness to make the inference, but this is a question that permits of answers at 
many diﬀerent levels, almost all (though, crucially, not all) of which are well beyond the 
scope of this essay. The problem that the inferential disposition presents comes from the 
fact that the thoughts are treated as being about the same thing rationally. Talk of 
thoughts and inferences as rational can be understood in a few diﬀerent ways. I mean 
something quite specific: the thinker has a reason to make that sort of inference. The 
inferential disposition is rational in that it is not a matter of states, episodes, or changes 
that a thinker finds unintelligible, that merely happen to her. Rather, it makes sense to her 
that she is prepared to make the inference. The problem is to account for this. What 
provides the reason she has for treating her thoughts as being about the same thing? 
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When the disposition is present and rational, thoughts are coordinated because there is a 
link between them, and they are coordinated referentially because that link concerns their 
referential properties. Hence I call the feature of thought in question referential 
coordination. 
What is distinctive about referentially coordinated thoughts can be brought out by 
comparing the first case to a second, involving a slight change in the set up: 
Lucy is told that Cicero is at the party and is told that he is Roman; after 
talking to Cicero for a while she finds out that he is an orator; when asked 
whether there are any Roman orators, she does not answer ‘yes’, because 
she did not realise that the person she was told about is the person she was 
talking to. 
This sort of set up may be familiar from discussions of Frege cases. The similarity 
becomes more obvious if we suppose that Cicero introduced himself under an alternative 
name, say, ’Tully’. Since she did not realise that Cicero is the same person as Tully (or, if 
you prefer, that the person called ‘Cicero’ is the person called ‘Tully’), then, were Lucy to 
be prepared to make the same inference she was in the first case, she would not be 
rational in doing so. Being a rational thinker, the disposition does not obtain; but her 
ignorance of the identity would prevent it from being rational were it to obtain.  
We can compare the two cases in terms of the referential content of her thoughts, by 
which I mean the fact that the she is thinking about the things she is thinking about 
specified just in terms of those things, in a ‘transparent’ way. The referential content of 
both thoughts is the same in both cases, but one and the same inference would be 
rational in the first case, and not in the second. We might describe the second case, quite 
naturally, by saying that she is using diﬀerent ways of thinking about the same thing. In 
contrast, in the first case, she is using the same way of thinking. But what is it to use the 
same way of thinking? There must be something that provides a reason for treating the 
thoughts as being about the same thing which is present in the first case and which is 
absent in the second case. The fact that thoughts can be referentially coordinated or 
uncoordinated means that simply enumerating referential content is not suﬃcient for 
fully comprehending them; we need an account of ways of thinking for that. 
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This problem is a site of philosophical interest because referential coordination is needed 
for rational inferences of the sort that go towards forming the kind of rational conception 
of things of which creatures such as you and I are capable. Without it, this conception 
would be unrecognisable, perhaps impossible. Having a view of the world as populated 
by individuals, about which we can know that they have various combinations of 
properties and stand in various relations, and using this knowledge to formulate and see 
through out plans and projects, all in a form that hangs together for us in a coherent and 
plausible way—this is not something we could do without, epistemically limited 
creatures as we are. Whatever its wider implications, understanding the part of our lives 
that rational thought occupies requires understanding ways of thinking, and so requires 
an explanation of referential coordination. 
Chapter one, ‘The Problem of Referential Coordination’, develops the problem in more 
detail. Referential coordination involves an indication of sameness of reference that cannot 
consist in an explicitly formulated identity, but must instead be inferentially basic. The 
problem is that it not obvious what this might be. Anti-explanationists will be sceptical 
that any explanation can be given, since it requires a personal-level explanation, and 
nothing at the personal-level seems available; this is correct about what is required, but 
the claim about what is available is too quick (§1.2). I then provide reasons for treating 
referential coordination as independent of some related problems discussed in the 
literature, including Frege cases. I also present reasons for treating referential 
coordination as a prior problem, in the sense that the best explanation of it should 
constrain solutions to those other problems rather than the other way around (§1.3). I 
then set out some general theoretical questions about thought, and show how they 
supply dimensions across which diﬀerent responses to the problem of referential 
coordination may diﬀer. A sketch of the coordination functions explanation is provided 
to show how it fits into this framework (§1.4). I end by giving a formulation of the 
explanatory criteria to be employed in the argument in later chapters (§1.5). 
Chapter two, ‘Concepts’, discusses the relationship between referential coordination and 
debates in the theory of concepts. A problem in this area is that the question ‘what are 
concepts?’ is often given distinct answers that are not always clearly competitors (§2.2). 
Introducing referential coordination helps with this: the divergent answers to the 
question can either be seen as diﬀering over the question of what explains referential 
coordination, or else as providing a way of describing patterns of referentially coordinated 
thoughts (§2.3). This answer does better than some alternatives at providing a means of 
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achieving a degree of dialectical unity (§2.4). I then apply this to a claim made by 
Machery, to the eﬀect that philosophers and psychologists talk about diﬀerent things 
when they talk about concepts. The distinction is a useful one, though how to evaluate 
his claim is contingent on having a view on what the best explanation of referential 
coordination is (§2.5). More generally, the correctness of a commitment to the existence 
of concepts, at least in the explanatory sense, is itself contingent on a particular sort of 
explanation of referential coordination being correct. If the explanation to be defended 
here is the best, then this sort of explanation is incorrect, and so the theory of concepts 
rests on shaky foundations (§2.6). 
Chapter three, ‘Sense Theory’, evaluates explanations based on a development of Frege’s 
notion of sense as a theory of the content of thoughts. I begin by setting out the central 
tenets of sense theory in relation to the sense-theoretic explanation of referential 
coordination, and discuss some disagreements between those who accept Frege’s notion 
of sense relevant to the explanatory problem (§3.2). I then present an initial challenge to 
the sense-theoretic explanation: it needs to supply a theory of what it is for particular 
senses to feature in the contents of thoughts (§3.3). I examine some paradigm treatments 
of sense theory, presented by Chalmers and Peacocke, to see what responses to this 
challenge they can provide (§3.4). I argue that the response to the challenge that these 
treatments can provide is at best circular, and show how this problem can be traced back 
to one of the central commitments of sense theory in such a way that it can be 
generalised beyond the particular treatments examined (§3.5). 
Chapter four, ‘Typed Representations Theory’, evaluates explanations based on the claim 
that thought involves mental representations that stand in relations of type-identity. 
Typed representation theory is best treated as an alternative to sense theory (§4.2), 
though it faces a similar challenge: it needs to substantiate the relevant notion of a type 
(§4.3). The theory finds a clear expression in the language of thought hypothesis, closely 
associated with Fodor. Proponents of typed representations theory often appeal to the 
idea that mental representations are expressions in the language of thought, with the 
relevant types being types of expression in that language. However, the syntactic typology 
Fodor endorses is lacking in explanatory content suﬃcient for meeting the challenge 
(§4.4). More substantive proposals, owing to Sainsbury and Tye (§4.5) and Prinz (§4.6) 
can be shown to suﬀer from various explanatory deficits. Millikan’s related discussion of 
what she terms ‘grasping sameness’ fails to respect the fact that referential coordination is 
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a rational and not purely dispositional phenomenon, a mistake that the appeal to mental 
representations is apt to share (§4.7). 
Chapter five, ‘Mental File Theory’, evaluates explanations based on the idea that there are 
mental entities that serve to organise a thinker’s information. I oﬀer a reconstruction of 
how this might be motivated, on which mental files are stipulated to be the basis for the 
paradigmatic inferential dispositions, which can then be made the subject of substantive 
claims that explain the rationality of those dispositions (§5.2). What I call basic model 
explanations bring in some further capacity of the thinker, directed at her mental files, to 
provide the explanation. I discuss two basic model explanations that can be gleaned from 
the literature, due to Schroeter and Lawlor, and show that they require thinkers to have 
cognitive capacities that are psychologically unrealistic (§5.3). More robust explanations 
use more robust claims about what mental files are. Recanati has defended such a model, 
on which mental files exhibit properties similar to indexical expressions in public 
language, such as ‘I’, ‘here’, and ‘now’. Some discussion is needed to see what plausible 
explanation this model might provide (§5.4). The most plausible explanation fails due to 
the failure to be suﬃciently general; there are cases that are not plausibly treated as 
involving the kind of mental file that makes the explanation applicable (§5.5). 
Chapter six, ‘Coordination Functions Theory’, presents and defends the theory of 
referential coordination advocated in this essay. I elaborate the coordination functions 
explanation at length, and raise and respond to some objections. Particularly important is 
the point that, though coordination functions do not need to be based on mental files, it 
is a part of its being the best explanation that the appeal to coordination functions is 
given a mental file-theoretic basis (§6.2). The coordination functions explanation avoids 
the explanatory deficits associated with the competing explanations, a conclusion which I 
bolster by providing some comparisons with those theories. This provides the main 
argument in favour of the coordination functions explanation (§6.3). I then draw out the 
consequences of accepting it by elaborating on the character of the explanation. I show 
how it answers the three questions introduced in the first chapter, and elaborate on how 
it oﬀers a particular take on the rationality of the inferential dispositions as a matter of 
coherence between inferential dispositions and the thinker’s broader stock of 
information, rather than one of information that excludes possibilities. This provides 
points of overlap with the basic model explanations looked at in chapter five, and brings 
out the relatively deflationary character of the coordination functions explanation (§6.4). 
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Finally, chapter seven, ‘Applications’, completes the argument for the coordination 
functions explanation. I close the discussion of concepts by spelling out how 
coordination functions provides a reason to endorse the eliminative stance introduced in 
chapter two. This conclusion is aided by adapting a distinction between concepts and 
conceptions, where conceptions are to be thought of as bundles of information linked by 
coordination functions. Conceptions can account for much of what concepts are 
traditionally held to do (§7.2). The notion of a conception can be used to apply the 
coordination functions explanation to identity judgements (§7.3) and ways of thinking 
at issue in so-called demonstrative and indexical thoughts, albeit one that involves a 
reduction in the theoretical ambition. Though some with more inflationary ambitions 
might see this as a reason to object, I argue that conceptions provide a way of 
accommodating those ambitions in line with the deflationary character of coordination 
functions theory (§7.4). 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The Problem of Referential Coordination
Chapter 1 - The Problem of Referential Coordination 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter develops the problem of referential coordination in more detail, and 
provides an overview of what might be involved in solving it. The aim is not to advocate 
any particular position on referential coordination, but to get clear on what is at stake 
between diﬀerent explanations, and why it is worth seeing which is best. 
Referential coordination presents an explanatory problem because it is a way for identity 
to figure in thought that cannot be assimilated to explicit belief in one thing being 
identical with another. With referentially coordinated thoughts, identity figures in an 
inferentially basic way, and this prompts the need for some theoretical ingenuity in 
specifying what this could involve. I discuss the anti-explanationist position that taking 
referential coordination as an explanatory problem is somehow mistaken. This might be 
motivated on the basis of restricting the explanation of rational phenomena such as 
referential coordination to the personal-level. While this motivation is faulty, it does help 
to articulate an important aspect of what an explanation of referential coordination needs 
to do (§1.2).  
The philosophical literature features extensive discussion of a number of related problems 
that bear on referential coordination, including those raised by Frege's seminal discussion 
of identity and proper names. I argue that there are good reasons to treat referential 
coordination as an independent and prior explanatory problem, in that the best 
explanation of referential coordination provides a constraint on how to deal with these 
other problems (§1.3). I then set out some general questions and three theoretical 
approaches represented in the literature that I will discuss in subsequent chapters, and 
provide a sketch of the coordination functions explanation that I will defend, and explain 
how it diﬀers from the competing explanations in terms of the general questions. (§1.4). 
I end by setting out the explanatory criteria that will form the substance of the argument 
in later chapters (§1.5). 
1.2 Referential Coordination as an Explanatory Problem 
This section expands on the problem of referential coordination, and introduces some 
terms that will be useful in discussing proposed solutions. 
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1.2.1 What is referential coordination? 
In the introduction, I used the following example to illustrate the problem of referential 
coordination: 
Lucy is introduced to Cicero at a party and is told that he is Roman; after 
talking to Cicero for a while she finds out various things, including that he 
is an orator; when asked whether there are any Roman orators, she is able 
to answer ‘yes’. 
It is not hard to come up with cases that exemplify this same pattern: an individual has 
some thoughts (two will do), and puts them together inferentially to rationally support a 
third. In such cases, a thinker has referentially coordinated thoughts. The problem is to 
explain what makes this the case. 
The thoughts in these cases, it should be made clear, are thoughts in the sense of standing 
psychological states, of the kind often given the label of propositional attitudes. Thoughts 
in this sense are states that we can report by using a assertoric sentence in the context of a 
psychological verb, paradigmatically believing, though arguably, knowing is more central 
(cf. Williamson 2000). Since knowledge has the implication of the truth of what is 
known, it may be convenient to go with the more hedged notion of belief. I will just call 
them thoughts. These are not what might be considered episodes of thinking, or occurrent 
thoughts. Rather than imagined acts of speech in inner monologue, these thoughts are 
what such imagined acts would express. Nor are they episodes or acts of deciding or 
judging that something is the case. consciously or otherwise. They are employed in 
inference, but they are not themselves things that occur or happen. Similarly, inferences 
can be thought of primarily as relations of support between thoughts, not acts or episodes 
of inferring. 
We can describe the original case by making the psychology of the thinker more explicit 
like this: 
(1) Lucy thinks that Cicero is a Roman;  
(2) Lucy thinks that Cicero is an orator.  
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(3) On the basis of (1) and (2), she infers that there is something that is a 
Roman and an orator. 
When thoughts like those reported in (1) and (2) obtain together, the thinker will have a 
particular sort of inferential disposition. This is the disposition that is manifest in the 
inference as described by (3). The disposition is a preparedness to conjoin and generalise. 
The thinker infers that there is something (existential generalisation) that has both 
properties (conjunction). 
Conjoining and generalising in this way is, in truth, not a particularly interesting 
inference. There are more interesting kinds of inference that demonstrate the importance 
of referential coordination just as much. For the most part, these are ampliative 
inferences, those in which the thinker brings out more than the merely deductive 
consequences of what she thinks. These involve more than just the introduction of 
conjunction and existential generalisation. They include the subsumption of individuals 
under general categories (Lucy believes that Roman orators are usually loquacious bores, 
and so believes that Cicero is a loquacious bore), inferences that guide action (Lucy 
believes that loquacious bores are not worth talking to, and so makes her excuses and 
talks to someone else), and the revision of previously held beliefs (Lucy finds out that 
Cicero is an engaging person to have a conversation with and so changes her mind about 
Roman orators). However, the less interesting disposition to conjoin and generalise will 
be present whenever the more interesting dispositions are present, and it brings out 
particularly clearly what is at issue. I will take the inferential disposition to conjoin and 
generalise as the paradigm case, and refer to it as the paradigmatic inferential disposition. 
The rationality of inferential dispositions of both the paradigmatic kind and the other 
more interesting kinds depend on having a reason to treat two thoughts as about the same 
thing - or else, having a reason not to do this. The nature of this reason has to go beyond 
simply the fact that, as it happens, they are about the same thing. To use a visual 
metaphor that comes easily to hand, we cannot see what our thoughts are about 
independently of our thinking them. Rationality under such a limitation is about having 
reasons for taking our thoughts to represent the world in a particular way, as reflecting 
identity relations that really do obtain between what things there are. To stretch the 
visual metaphor further, we might say that a thinker has a perspective on the referential 
content of her thoughts that can be articulated in terms of the paradigmatic inferential 
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dispositions and the reasons that bear on them. This perspective is a crucial part of being 
a rational thinker. 
This points to how, at its heart, referential coordination bears on how information can be 
combined so as to extend a thinker’s knowledge (or, as it might be, justified belief ). It is a 
plausible idea that the paradigmatic inference in the absence of referential coordination 
could not be knowledge-extending even though truth-preserving, since it would be a 
process of bringing about beliefs irresponsibly, lacking the necessary circumspection that 
distinguishes knowledge from stabs in the dark. If that is disputed, then the point stands 
that it would be knowledge-extending only in an attenuated sense, as it would fall far 
short of an epistemic ideal. It would not be the activity of an epistemically responsible 
inquirer. Ampliative, action-guiding, and revisionary inferences again provide for more 
interesting kinds of case on this score. Even so, the point about inferences extending 
knowledge is just as pressing for the less interesting paradigmatic inferences that provide 
the clearest expression of the phenomena. 
Referential coordination means that something is needed in addition to referential 
content in order to understand how thought works. To employ the phrase that gives the 
title to this essay, thought is not simply about things, but involves ways of thinking about 
things. Another phrase often used to express the same idea is that thought is more fine-
grained than reference, the idea being that there can be a many-to-one relationship 
between what we think about and how we think about it. In the case of referential 
coordination, the rationality of the paradigmatic disposition to conjoin and generalise 
involves the thinker employing the same way of thinking about the thing in question. 
A slight modification to the example used above gives us an example where this is not so:  
Lucy is told that Cicero is at the party and is told that he is Roman; after 
talking to Cicero for a while she finds out that he is an orator; when asked 
whether there are any Roman orators, she does not answer ‘yes’, because 
she did not realise that the person she was told about is the person she was 
talking to. 
In this example, the same inferential disposition would not be rational even though the 
referential content of the thoughts is the same. The thinker is employing diﬀerent ways of 
thinking. As I said in the introduction, this kind of set up may be familiar from 
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discussions of what are known as Frege cases, which I will discuss in §1.3 below. Before 
then, I want to say more about why referential coordination presents an explanatory 
problem. 
1.2.2 Why does referential coordination present an explanatory problem? 
Where thoughts are referentially coordinated, there must be something that provides an 
indication of sameness of reference that is suﬃcient for making the paradigmatic inferential 
disposition rational. This sort of indication would be absent when thoughts are not 
referentially coordinated. Talk of sameness in ways of thinking is really only a label for 
the presence or absence of indications of this kind. The problem is that it is not at all 
obvious what the indication of sameness of reference might be. 
Whatever it is, it cannot be an additional thought that figures as a further premise in the 
inference. Such a premise would, presumably, need to concern the identity of the thing 
referred to by each thought; call this an identity premise. In the case of Cicero at the party, 
the identity premise might perhaps be expressed by Lucy by saying ‘Cicero and the guy I 
was talking to are one and the same person.’ This cannot be a solution to the problem. 
For one thing, bringing in an identity premise would represent something quite diﬀerent 
from simply thinking of something in the same way; it would stand for the realisation 
that what was thought of as two things is in fact one thing. But the paradigmatic 
inference does not involve this sort of realisation. 
That point aside, bringing in an identity premise does not work because it merely 
multiplies the problem. The identity premise would itself need to be referentially 
coordinated with the other thoughts. If Lucy thinks Cicero is a Roman, and the guy she 
was talking to is an orator, then the identity premise expressed by ‘Cicero and the guy I 
was talking to are the same’ must be referentially coordinated with those thoughts in 
order for that inference to be rational. The thing to be explained would then simply 
occur again, twice over. As Campbell puts it, the sort of inference that is the mark of 
referential coordination trades on sameness of reference (1987/88: 278-9; see also Campbell 
1994; cf. Sainsbury 2002: 133-6, Recanati 2012: 47-50). 
The indication of sameness of reference suﬃcient for explaining referential coordination, 
whatever it is, must therefore operate in a wholly diﬀerent manner to explicit belief in 
one thing being identical to another. We can put this by saying that the indication is 
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inferentially basic, in the sense that it is not just a further premise in the inference but 
more like a property of the thoughts that constitute its premises. This makes referential 
coordination particularly puzzling, and why the problem of referential coordination is a 
real problem and interesting in its own right, quite apart from its crucial place in our 
cognitive lives. Explaining it seems to require some theoretical ingenuity, since there is no 
obvious candidate for what an inferentially basic indication of sameness of reference is  
One might think that the appearance of a problem here is simply a product of how I 
have chosen to represent the cases where the inferences are rational and those where they 
are not. The form of the inferences in either case—the one Lucy is disposed to make, and 
the one she is not disposed to make—can be represented in a more perspicuous way 
using the standard notation of first-order predicate logic. In the first case, the form of the 
inference can be perspicuously written out like so: 
(1) F(a) 
(2) G(a) 
———— 
(3) ∃x (F(x)&G(x)) 
while in the second case, the form of the corresponding inference can be more 
perspicuously written out like so: 
(1) F(a) 
(2) G(b) 
———— 
(3) ∃x (F(x)&G(x)) 
These more perspicuous representation present an obvious diﬀerence between the two 
cases: a schematic letter of the same type, ‘a’, appears in the two premises of the first 
inference, whereas it appears only in one premise of the second. The form of the two 
inferences is therefore diﬀerent. One is a valid inference, and the other not. The first 
inference is an instance of a truth-preserving form, whereas the second one is an instance 
of a form that does not preserve truth. Lucy, being a rational thinker, is disposed to 
engage in valid inferences and not in invalid ones. Once this diﬀerence in validity is 
noted, the thought goes, the problem goes away.  
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But representing the form of the inferences like this does not make the problem go away; 
it just provides another way of illustrating the problem. The more perspicuous 
representation of the inferences with the same letter for the object in the first and 
diﬀerent letters in the second represents the fact that there is a diﬀerence between the 
inferences that can be represented, and this is just what calls for explanation. What makes 
it the case that the inferences in the two cases are better represented in one way or the 
other? Merely adverting to the way in which the inferences can be represented leaves this 
question untouched. The type of letter used to represent the inferences cannot literally be 
what provides the indication of sameness of reference. If some analogue of schematic 
letters in the notation of first-order predicate logic is what provides the explanation, then 
this could only be a substantive hypothesis in significant need of elaboration and 
support. 
The problem of referential coordination does not simply concern, and is not solved by 
accounting for, the validity or otherwise of inferences the thinker is disposed to make. 
What is being sought is an explanation of the rationality of the thinker’s disposition to 
engage in the paradigmatic inference. That an inference is valid may be part of the reason 
a thinker has to make it, and in other cases, invalidity may be part of the reason she has 
not to make it. But it is not the validity or lack of validity itself that matters. It is the 
presence of an indication of sameness of reference, where this is an indication that the 
inference would be valid. The problem is to say what form this indication takes. The 
rationality of inferential dispositions, in the relevant sense, and the validity of inferences 
therefore must be held apart, despite their obviously close relationship. 
1.2.3 Anti-explanationism and the personal-level 
I have claimed that referential coordination involves an inferentially basic way for 
identity to figure in thought, and that this means that it presents an explanatory 
problem. It is possible to treat this claim with scepticism. According to what I will call 
anti-explanationism, there only appears to be a problem, and that appearance perhaps 
points to a mistaken philosophical approach to thought. Ultimately, the best way to 
refute anti-explanationism is to provide an adequate explanation. But it is useful to 
consider the possible motivations for it, as it helps to articulate a constraint on what an 
adequate explanation needs to do. 
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Anti-explanationism about referential coordination would require rejecting the general 
principle that what seems to call for explanation can indeed be explained. Instead, the 
thought would go, we would need to move away from whatever it was that made it seem 
that an explanation was required. This attitude is sometimes given the label philosophical 
quietism; it is opposed to the idea that philosophical problems call for constructive 
theories. Proponents of quietism, such as McDowell (1994), sometimes find the origins 
of this attitude in the anti-theoretical animadversions of the later Wittgenstein: 
[T]he clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this 
simply means that the philosophical problems should completely 
disappear. 
The real discovery is the one that enables me to break oﬀ philosophising 
when I want to. – The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no 
longer tormented by questions which bring itself in question… 
  
There is not a single philosophical method, though there are indeed 
methods, diﬀerent therapies, as it were. (1953: §133) 
This kind of position is often based on identifying the ‘felt need’ for explanation as an 
over-enthusiasm for the theoretical style of the natural sciences, a hangover from the 
scientific revolution, or else driven by some need to relieve some deeper philosophical 
‘anxiety’. Quietism involves a change in deeply held views about philosophical questions, 
particular those concerning the status of ourselves as rational beings, and what it means 
to come to understand ourselves as such. Indeed, philosophical quietism might be 
expressed as the thought that philosophical questions, or rather the felt need to pose 
them and provide substantive theories by way of response, are themselves based on a 
mistaken attitude to what those questions are about. 
Evaluating the independent attractions of philosophical quietism would go far beyond 
the scope of this study, requiring, at a minimum, a discussion of Aristotelian 
metaphysics, the development of the idea of disenchanted nature and disengaged reason, 
the history of the Scientific Revolution, Hegelian Absolute Idealism, Deweyan 
pragmatism, and other such mind-boggling topics (see Pippin 2002 for related 
discussion). These aside, the general thesis of philosophical quietism can be brought back 
to earth by noting how it is open to refutation, or at least qualification, by specific 
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counter-examples (cf. Dummett's 1978 remarks on Wittgenstein). Whatever appeal it 
may have, there needs to be some specific reason to think that it gets witnessed by 
particular phenomena. What might that be in the case of referential coordination? 
Anti-explanationism could be independently motivated by arguing along the following 
lines. The cases that apparently raise the explanatory problem are those in which a person 
undergoes certain transitions in their thoughts. They are undergone by a thinker, for 
reasons that the thinker has. They therefore call for personal-level explanation. This means 
that it would not be genuinely explanatory merely to refer to something sub-personal, 
such as what is going on in a part of their computational psychology, or in their 
neurology, or whatever. Exactly what counts as being a personal-level explanation is not 
wholly clear. A helpful suggestion (Hornsby 2000) is that it is one that involves 
properties of a person, rather than properties or states of things that are not persons, 
though may be parts of a person, or otherwise intimately related to a person. This is 
admittedly still somewhat in need of clarification, but we may accept it as a guide. 
Dennett, when introducing the (or rather, an initial version of the) distinction between 
personal and sub-personal levels of explanation in the context of the phenomenon of 
pain, writes: 
Abandoning the personal level of explanation is just that: abandoning the 
pains and not bringing them along to identify with some physical event. 
The only sort of explanation in which ‘pain’ belongs is non-mechanistic; 
hence no identification of pains or painful sensations with brain processes 
makes sense… (Dennett 1969: 94) 
In Dennett’s hands, the point of the distinction is to reveal how some explanatory 
projects involve a problematic change of subject. The distinction provides the resources 
to pinpoint what is going on in cases where an explanatory proposal leads to darkness 
rather than illumination; when the phenomenon in question concerns persons and their 
reasons, changing the subject to talk of impersonal mechanisms and their dynamics 
would be a philosophical error rather than the beginning of wisdom (though see 
Dennett’s remarks about Wittgenstein and Ryle at op. cit.: 95-6). 
The thought might then be that, if the explanation needs to involve personal-level facts, 
the only relevant facts concern what the person, the thinker herself, could express and 
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recognise as what it is that makes sense of her inferential dispositions. But if so, the only 
thing they could say, if they found it sensible to say anything at all, would be “what I was 
thinking about was one and the same thing.” At that point, we hit bedrock (Wittgenstein 
1953: §217) where referential coordination is concerned. 
This forms the basis for two worries that point to anti-explanationism. It might be 
thought that hitting bedrock presents a perfectly adequate explanation of the inference 
that person made in terms that make sense to them, once we know that they would say 
“what I was thinking about was one and the same thing.” We as theorists can make sense 
of their thinking that it is the same thing in just the same way: were we in the same 
position, we would say exactly what they said, and it would make sense for us to do so 
just as well. All the explanation we need is there in what the thinker says. To think that 
anything further is needed in the way of explanation is to confuse the phenomenon of a 
person thinking in a rational way with something else. So the idea that providing an 
explanation is in any real sense a problem simply lapses in the face of a proper 
appreciation of what it is that needs explaining and how. Call this the levels worry. 
The same thought might be pushed to a more radical conclusion. If referential 
coordination requires personal-level explanation, the explanation must cite reasons that 
depend on properties of the person, the thinker herself, and not just on some part or 
‘internal’ mental mechanism. The normal way for such reasons to play a role in a person’s 
life is to be some proposition that a thinker can express. But if the only reason that the 
thinker could express is “what I was thinking about was one and the same thing,” then 
that reason provide no explanation at all. In which case, it might seem that the demand 
for an explanation cannot be discharged. So if we accept that there is a problem, then we 
must also accept that there can be no solution. That is a paradox that should lead to a 
rethink of how the phenomenon is being conceived; call this the radical levels worry. 
These worries support anti-explanationism in diﬀerent ways. With the levels worry, the 
thought is that it is obvious what is going on. With the radical levels worry, the thought is 
that it is only not obvious what is going on, and so there only appears to be a genuine 
problem, if one thinks of the phenomena in such a way as to make an explanation 
impossible. To vary the example a bit, suppose Lucy looks out of the window and sees a 
red car, and later notices that it is a Mercedes; Lucy is rationally disposed to infer that 
there is something that is red, and is a Mercedes. According to the levels worry, it is not 
mysterious what is going on because if asked, Lucy would say that she was thinking 
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about the same thing; we can imagine ourselves being in the same situation, and we 
would be disposed to make the same response. According to the radical levels worry, the 
response is no explanation, but there only appears to be an explanatory problem if we 
think that something more is needed. 
The two worries diverge over whether the thinker’s avowal that “what I was thinking 
about was one and the same thing” really is an explanation. On this point, we should side 
with the radical levels worry. The fact that a thinker might be willing to make that 
statement cannot be the reason that a thinker has for treating her thoughts as about the 
same thing. The statement merely asserts the identity of what is thought about with itself, 
and that cannot be the reason, because the identity of the thought about individual is the 
same in both the case of referential coordination and its absence. Moreover, the statement 
is only an expression, and not an explanation, of referential coordination. We knew 
already that they had referentially coordinated thoughts, and of course this can be 
expressed by saying “what I was thinking about was one and the same thing.” But why do 
they say that? The levels worry gives no reason to think that this question is ill-formed. It 
is really implicitly oﬀering an explanation rather than showing that no explanation needs 
to be given. 
The problem with the radical levels worry is connected to this. The assumption made is 
that personal-level explanations of rational phenomena such as referential coordination 
could only be given in terms of reasons a thinker can express. These are what we might 
call her discursive reasons (cf. McDowell 1994: 163-166). The worry put in these terms is 
that there are no appropriate discursive reasons and so there can be no solution to the 
alleged problem. The thinker can only give expression to the phenomenon, not cite 
anything more basic that could figure in an explanation. And so the conclusion could be 
drawn that the expression of referential coordination is all we could ask for. In which 
case, it might seem better to reject the idea that there is a real problem at all. But while it 
is reasonable to think that there are no appropriate discursive reasons, that is no grounds 
for pessimism about explaining referential coordination.  
One might grant that the paradigm of personal-level explanation is that of a linguistically 
expressible reason. It does not follow that only reasons of that sort may figure in such 
explanations. Facts about the thinker independent of her capacities for linguistic 
expression can be explanatory of the rationality of her thought. One may have a 
sensitivity to the particulars of a situation and what it calls for that goes beyond what one 
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can express at the time or afterwards. For example, a skilled bridge player may be able to 
bid and play her cards in just the right way to make the contract, although she is unable 
to say in advance exactly what she will do, or spell out afterwards what it was that called 
for bidding and playing the cards in the way she did. It was not, for all that, a merely 
automatic response to the situation, but something she did that made sense to her; she 
played the cards in the way she did because she was trying to make the contract and 
because that was the way to do it. It is not some extraordinary mystical awareness that 
allows her to respond rationally, but a capacity of a perfectly ordinary kind that one may 
have, perhaps as a result of training or native talent. The problem would be to explain 
that capacity. The restriction to discursive reasons anyway jibes badly with the basic 
nature of referential coordination, and it is unlikely that the explanation will bottom out 
with our linguistic capacities. 
While the levels worry can be rejected as implicitly oﬀering a faulty explanation, the 
radical levels worry calls for a more nuanced response. If there is an explanation to be 
had, it must be an adequately personal-level explanation that involves something other 
than discursive reasons. For the time being, we have no reason to think that there is not 
an explanation to be had, so the anti-explanationist idea that no explanation of referential 
coordination should be sought cannot be made particularly pressing on the basis of 
unavailable discursive reasons. Rather than grounds for scepticism, the point about the 
absence of discursive reasons shows rather another way in which referential coordination 
presents a real problem. 
1.2.4 Summary 
Referential coordination is a feature of thoughts that sustains our rational conception of 
things. An explanation of referential coordination needs to say what it is that provides the 
indication of sameness of reference in cases where it is rational to perform a paradigmatic 
sort of inference, from thoughts ascribing properties to things to an existential 
generalisation conjoining those properties. This indication cannot consist in more 
obvious ways for identity to figure in thought (explicit or linguistically expressible beliefs 
in identities), and so presents an explanatory problem that calls for some theoretical 
ingenuity.  
 26
The Problem of Referential Coordination
1.3 Related Problems 
There are a number of other phenomena closely related to referential coordination that 
have been more widely discussed. These include what are known as Frege’s puzzle of 
identity, Frege cases, and coreference de jure. There is also the more general issue of how 
to understand intentionality, the fact that thoughts are about things, or have referential 
content, at all. This section provides enough detail on these problems to motivate the 
idea that referential coordination should be treated as an independent problem that is 
explanatorily prior, in that the best explanation of referential coordination provides a 
constraint on how to deal with these other problems. At the same time, in some cases the 
relationship is close enough that they exert some pressure on what counts as a good 
explanation of referential coordination. 
1.3.1 Frege’s puzzle of identity 
Frege’s seminal essay ‘On Sense and Reference’ (1892/1948) raises a number of problems 
that indicate the insuﬃciency of referential content for comprehending thought. There 
are at least two problems, one concerning thoughts about identity, the other concerning 
rational though inconsistent propositional attitudes, that are useful to hold apart. I will 
discuss the puzzle of identity first. 
Frege’s discussion begins by raising a puzzle concerning identity. The puzzle comes down 
to how to understand properties of sentences that feature noun phrases surrounding the 
identity sign. A sentence of the form ‘a=a’ seems to be uninformative, or at least knowable 
a priori, since all it says is that something is identical with itself; everything is identical 
with itself; so no possibilities are ruled in or out (except, perhaps, that a exists). However, 
a sentence of the form ‘a=b’ can be informative, and can express some piece of empirical 
information. But if an ‘a=b’ sentence is true, then it is true if and only if the ‘a=a’ 
sentence is true. In which case, they should not diﬀer in informativeness if their meaning 
is the same; they do diﬀer in informativeness; so there must be some diﬀerence in the 
meaning of the two sentences, on some understanding of ‘meaning’. 
Frege used this puzzle about identity to motivate a distinction between the reference of a 
referring expression and its sense: 
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It is natural, now, to think of there being connected with a sign (name, 
combination of words, letter), besides that to which the sign refers, which 
may be called the referent of the sign, also what I would like to call the 
sense of the sign, wherein the mode of presentation is contained.… The 
referent of "evening star" would be the same as that of "morning star," but 
not the sense. (op. cit.: 210) 
Diﬀerence in sense is what is supposed to explain the informativeness of, for example 
‘Cicero is Tully’, as compared to sameness of sense with the uninformative ‘Cicero is 
Cicero’. 
Although Frege puts the puzzle about identity in terms of sentences, it can also be 
considered as a problem about a particular kind of thought (this distinction can be 
somewhat blurred by those who extend Frege’s semantic programme to the idea that the 
contents of thought are senses of sentences). Since the present topic is one that concerns 
thought, we can set aside the puzzle as concerning sentences and instead concentrate on 
what are known as identity judgements. Identity judgements are explicit beliefs in the 
identity of one thing with another, which might be expressed in sentences of the form 
‘a=b’ or ‘a is the same thing as b’. Frege’s discussion raises two questions about identity 
judgements: 
How can identity judgements have empirical significance? Everything is self-
identical, and so we know automatically that one thing is identical to itself, 
and not identical to everything else. But then how is discovering an 
identity possible, as it evidently is? 
How is there a diﬀerence in the rational role of identity judgements? Trivial 
identity judgements are obvious, perhaps knowable a priori, whereas 
informative identity judgements can only be knowable on the basis of 
empirical discovery. What accounts for this diﬀerence? 
These questions can be understood in terms of the loose notion of ways of thinking 
introduced above. The empirical significance and rational role of identity judgements is 
dependent on an epistemic achievement that changes one’s ways of thinking; as I put it in 
§1.2, they involve realising that what one thought of as two things is in fact one and the 
same thing. So the empirical significance of an identity judgement can be thought of as 
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depending on having thoughts that exhibit diﬀerent ways of thinking. Similarly, merely 
entertaining identities, as opposed to believing or ‘judging’ them, can be understood as 
entertaining a potential change to one’s distinct ways of thinking. Understanding how 
identities can be discovered and brought into a thinker’s stock of information, and as a 
result modify the inferences that she can rationally make, requires first understanding the 
inferences that she can rationally make before that discovery.  
Answers to these questions might therefore be given in terms of the more basic way in 
which the identity of what we think about is represented in thought, which is referential 
coordination. Sameness in ways of thinking comes before operations on distinct ways of 
thinking. To get a workable theory of the latter, it would be a good idea to get a satisfying 
explanation of the former. And if that’s right, then we should treat referential 
coordination as a problem that is prior to that of answering the two questions about 
identity judgements. This does not mean that providing with a good explanation of 
referential coordination is wholly independent of dealing with identity judgements. A 
good explanation of referential coordination should ideally extend to an account of 
identity judgements. If these are to be understood as modifying patterns of referential 
coordination, then an explanation of referential coordination is better if it can be 
extended to also provide an account of the empirical significance and the rational role of 
identity judgements. 
A short digression on terminology: as Frege puts it in the quotation above, the sense of 
an expression is that “wherein the mode of presentation is contained.” Following Frege’s 
discussion, the informativeness of identity statements and the rationality of believing 
incompatible propositions are often discussed in terms of modes of presentation. 
Diﬀerent modes of presentation are contained in the sense of the expressions, or diﬀerent 
modes of presentation are involved in the thinker’s attitudes to the incompatible 
propositions. The ease with which this terminology can be used can obscure the fact that 
it is not always clear exactly what a mode of presentation is supposed to be. Sometimes, it 
seems to be similar to how I have been using ‘way of thinking’, as a stand-in for whatever 
it is that does the explanatory work. Sometimes, they seem to figure as a particular 
explanatory proposal, tied to Frege’s notion of sense. 
Understanding what is intended by the term ‘modes of presentation’ requires some 
sensitivity to whether it is being used to outline a problem, or to propound a solution to 
a problem, which is not always a straightforward matter. I want to suggest that, where 
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mention is made of modes of presentation, this may be reinterpreted so as to make the 
link to referential coordination more apparent. Sameness of mode of presentation can be 
understood as just whatever it is that provides an indication of sameness of reference, and 
diﬀerence in mode of presentation can be understood as the absence of such an 
indication. In the technical sense, as meaning something akin to Frege’s notion of sense, 
sameness and diﬀerence in mode of presentation stands for a substantive proposal about 
referential coordination that is subject to explanatory disconfirmation. Interestingly, in 
his Varieties of Reference, Evans (1982: 18-22) makes explicit a preference for cashing out 
the notion of Fregean sense in terms of ways of thinking, though he intends it to serve as 
a term for “what makes it the case that a subject's thought is a thought about the object 
in question,” (op. cit.: 20; see also Evans 1985: 294) thus giving it in a much more 
substantive meaning than the one I am adopting here. 
1.3.2 Frege cases 
Frege employed the distinction between sense and reference to provide treatments of a 
number of other problems in semantics, including reference to non-existents and 
reference in indirect discourse, including what are now known as Frege cases. Frege cases 
are those that fit the pattern of the example used above to provide the contrast case to 
cases of referential coordination: a thinker has thoughts about the same thing but does 
not treat them as about the same for purposes of rational inference. Frege’s well-thumbed 
example of the morning star and the evening star provides us with the following case: 
Lucy looks up and sees the brightest star in the morning sky and calls it 
‘Phosphorous’. She thinks that Phosphorous is a planet. Later, she looks up 
and sees the brightest star in the evening sky and calls it ‘Hesperus’. She 
thinks that Hesperus is not a planet. Hesperus and Phosphorous are in fact 
both the planet Venus. 
Such cases are sometimes discussed in the context of arguments about the meanings of 
propositional attitude reports. The problem there is to provide an analysis of, for 
example, 
(i) Lucy believes that Phosphorous is a planet. 
(ii) Lucy believes that Hesperus is not a planet. 
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that allows for both (i) and (ii) to be true even though Hesperus is identical to 
Phosphorous and Lucy is not simply being irrational. 
Frege cases can also be looked at in terms of the thoughts themselves rather than 
sentences about them. Understood that way, a Frege case involves a thinker with 
thoughts whose referential content is the same but are not referentially coordinated. The 
fact that referential content is the same shows that we need something other than 
referential content to comprehend thought. The problem is essentially that of accounting 
for what makes it the case that there are two distinct bundles of referentially coordinated 
thoughts. This point can be obscured by the presentation of Frege cases as only involving 
two thoughts which the thinker does not treat as about the same thing; but where this is 
one thought, there will almost always be many more, and even when there is only one 
there could be more in the bundle. If that’s the right way to think about the relationship 
between referential coordination and Frege cases, then it is a good idea to have an 
account of what makes for there being a bundle in order to get a sense of what might 
account for their being distinct. 
Frege cases are always also cases of referential coordination, though not vice versa. So we 
should treat them as independent problems. Frege cases also involve the absence of 
referential coordination. It may well be that there are multiple explanations of what is 
going on in a Frege case, depending on what is the correct way to think about referential 
coordination. It is not a given that Frege cases present an explanatorily unified 
phenomenon. By contrast, it seems more likely that referential coordination presents an 
explanatorily unified phenomenon. Getting a grip on Frege cases requires first 
understanding what is absent in them. Because of this, referential coordination should be 
treated as explanatorily prior. Although thoughts for which the thinker is ignorant of the 
identity of referential content provide a comparison helpful for setting out what 
referential coordination is, focusing on them will not necessarily provide a means of 
getting at what is going on (compare Rattan 2013, who argues for a similar conclusion 
from within the Fregean perspective). For these reasons, referential coordination should 
also be treated as explanatorily prior to Frege cases. The explanation of the latter should 
be constrained by the best explanation of the former.  
There are some cases that can be seen as variations on classic Frege cases that have played 
no small part in philosophical discussion about thought and language that are worth 
discussing in relation to referential coordination. One variation that has received a very 
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large amount of attention is related to some cases Frege discussed in a later essay, 
‘Thought’ (1918/1956). Perry’s (1979) discussion of indexical thoughts has provided a 
rich seam of cases involving thinkers holding incompatible attitudes to propositions 
involving themselves and their current temporal or spatial location. Perry’s first case 
makes the point: 
I once followed a trail of sugar on a supermarket floor, pushing my cart 
down the aisle on one side of a tall counter and back the aisle on the other, 
seeking the shopper with the torn sack to tell him he was making a mess. 
With each trip around the counter, the trail became thicker. But I seemed 
unable to catch up. Finally it dawned on me. I was the shopper I was trying 
to catch (op. cit.: 3) 
As it is usually put, Perry believed that the shopper with the torn sack was making a 
mess, but he did not believe that he himself was making a mess, even though he was the 
shopper with the torn sack.  
Similar to this is a case discussed by Evans, involving what are taken to be examples of 
demonstrative thoughts: 
Suppose a person can see two views of what is in fact one very long ship, 
through two windows in the room in which he is sitting. He may be 
prepared to accept ‘That ship was built in Japan’ (pointing through one 
window), but not prepared to accept ‘That ship was built in 
Japan’ (pointing through the other window). (1982: 84) 
The special detail in this case is it seems that diﬀerent thoughts are expressed with exactly 
the same linguistic expression (‘that ship’) that work in such a way so as to have the same 
reference.  
Another variation is demonstrated by some cases presented by Kripke (1979) as part of 
his discussion of beliefs made available via understanding, or misunderstanding, uses of 
proper names. One case involves beliefs expressible by inter-translatable proper names in 
diﬀerent languages: 
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Suppose Pierre is a normal French speaker who lives in France and speaks 
not a word of English or any other language except French. Of course he 
has heard of that famous distant city, London (which he of course called 
‘Londres’) though he himself has never left France. On the basis of what he 
has heard of London, he is inclined to think that it is pretty. So he says, in 
French, “Londres est jolie.”… Later, Pierre, through fortunate or 
unfortunate vicissitudes, moves to England, in fact to London itself, 
though to an unattractive part of the city with fairly uneducated 
inhabitants. He, like most of his neighbours, rarely leaves this part of the 
city… He learns, of course—speaking English—to call the city he lives in 
‘London’. Pierre’s surroundings are, as I said, unattractive, and he is 
unimpressed with most of the rest of what he happens to see. So he is 
inclined to assent to the English sentence: [London is not pretty.]… Of 
course he does not for a moment withdraw his assent from the French 
sentence, “Londres est jolie”; he merely takes it for granted that the ugly 
city in which he is now stuck is distinct from the enchanting city he heard 
about in France. But he has no inclination to change his mind for a 
moment about the city he still calls ‘Londres’. (op. cit.: 254-255) 
By means of the proper names ‘Londres’ and ‘London’, Pierre seems to have incompatible 
beliefs, though he is not irrational in doing so. In the same paper, Kripke supplies 
another case:  
Peter… may learn the name ‘Paderewski’ with an identification of the 
person named as a famous pianist. Naturally, having learned this, Peter will 
assent to “Paderewski had musical talent,” and we can infer—using 
‘Paderewski,’ as we usually do, to name the Polish musician and statesman: 
[Peter believes that Paderewski had musical talent.]… Later, in a diﬀerent 
circle, Peter learns of someone called ‘Paderewski’ who was a Polish 
nationalist leader and Prime Minister. Peter is skeptical of the musical 
abilities of politicians. He concludes that probably two people, 
approximate contemporaries no doubt, were both named ‘Paderewski.’ 
Using ‘Paderewski’ as a name for the statesman, Peter assents to 
“Paderewski had no musical talent.” (op. cit.: 265) 
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This case seems to show that something like Pierre’s situation can happen even with the 
same proper name in the same language. 
Kripke intended his two cases purport to provide a puzzle that shows something about 
proper names that can be missed if one concentrates only on classic Frege cases. While 
the problem of referential coordination is a problem about thought, and not about 
language, the case of Peter and Paderewski/Paderewski does provide an interesting set of 
analogous cases for thought. One might describe Peter’s psychology as thinking that 
Paderewski has no musical talent, and thinking that Paderewski has musical talent; and 
yet, Peter is not irrational in entertaining referentially inconsistent thoughts. Put in terms 
of ways of thinking, there is a question of how one should one distinguish ways of 
thinking in such cases: is the thinker employing the same way of thinking about 
Paderewski with both thoughts, though the thinker does not know this? If so, that would 
suggest something unexpected about ways of thinking, namely that they do not 
necessarily go with patterns of referential coordination. If not, then what is the basis for 
distinguishing them? The diﬃculty seems to be that there is a sense in which Peter should 
be using the same way of thinking, but fails to do so. This suggests that such cases need 
to be understood in terms of what explains referential coordination more generally. 
A similar point can be made about some of the arguments made by Kripke (1980) 
concerning the issue of descriptivism. Descriptivism is the claim that reference to 
individuals goes by means of descriptions that those individuals satisfy, where a 
description is some sort of general condition that may be satisfied by distinct individuals 
in diﬀerent possible ways for the world to be. Though directed against descriptivism 
about the semantics of proper names (what he called the ‘Frege-Russell’ view), Kripke’s 
arguments, involving cases where it seems that descriptivism predicts the wrong results 
about reference and use, present a parallel set of issues about thought. The debate about 
descriptivism is an important one, though for present purposes, it can be overlooked. It 
seems clear that a descriptivist approach to thought about things will not present any 
distinctive way of dealing with referential coordination; if it does, it will only be under 
the auspices of one of the views of thought that I will consider in subsequent chapters. 
The presentation of the cases provided by Perry and Evans, in contrast to Kripke’s cases 
involving proper names, are described using diﬀerent sorts of referring expression, those 
whose reference can change between given uses but whose meaning stays the same across 
those uses. In Kaplan’s (1989) influential terminology, token expressions of this sort have 
 34
The Problem of Referential Coordination
the same character as other token expressions of the same type, but can diﬀer in their 
content. Indexicals, or ‘pure indexicals’, such as ‘I’, ‘now’, and ‘here’, and demonstratives, 
such as ‘this’ and ‘that’, fall into this category. Pure indexicals shift their reference as a 
function of elements of the context that can be specified independently of their being 
used, while demonstrative expressions shift their reference as a function of salience-
making features of their use (paradigmatically, indicating by pointing at something). The 
thoughts in the Perry/Evans cases are often referred to as ‘indexical’ or ‘demonstrative’ 
thoughts, part of the reason being that they are most naturally expressed, and perhaps 
require expression, using these sorts of expressions. 
Thoughts labelled as demonstrative are often held to have an indispensable explanatory 
role in tasks like engaging in actions that interact with objects in one’s immediate 
environment. Consequently, they are often closely tied to perceptual experience, or are 
said to be ‘perceptually based’ thoughts. Thoughts that are labelled as indexical are 
similarly held to have a crucial explanatory role in beliefs about ourselves, such as where 
we are, who we are, and what the present time is. Perry, in his discussion of the case 
(amongst several others) mentioned above, coined the phrase essential indexicality, and it 
is widely accepted that the thoughts in those cases are special in some way that answers to 
this description, and that there is a link between thoughts being essentially indexical (or 
demonstrative) and their connection to perception, identification, and action. The idea is 
that, just as there are expressions with the peculiar semantic structure, having a fixed 
character and variable content, so there are thoughts with an analogous representational 
structure, and this structure is somehow crucial for certain cognitive capacities. 
The question of whether there really are thoughts of this kind is not independent of what 
should be said about referential coordination more generally. The existence and use of 
expressions with the character/content structure does not necessarily, or even obviously, 
bear on whether thoughts involve some analogous structure. That we can engage with 
objects in our immediate environment and think about ourselves is not an incidental 
feature of our cognitive lives. But it is not obvious that a special representational 
mechanism is needed to account for these capacities. Rather than the terminology of 
indexical and demonstrative thoughts, I will refer to this question more neutrally as the 
problem of special ways of thinking: is there a special representational structure that 
accounts for the rationality of identification and action on the basis of perception, and 
beliefs about ourselves?  
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Referential coordination may be treated as explanatorily prior to the problem of special 
ways of thinking. In order to determine whether special representation structures are 
needed, it needs to be seen whether an account of referential coordination that does not 
make use of any special representational structure can be made consistent with general 
facts about these capacities. If it can, then the motivation for thinking that there are 
indexical or demonstrative thoughts is to that extent undermined. 
1.3.3 Coreference de jure 
A reader familiar with the recent philosophical literature might have noticed a close 
aﬃnity between referential coordination and what has been discussed under the heading 
of coreference de jure. This idea gets its most obvious application in the context of 
referring expressions that can be used to refer to the same thing previously referred to in a 
discourse, and need to be taken to do so in order to be properly understood. This covers 
the phenomena of syntactic binding, as with anaphoric pronouns, and repeated 
occurrences of noun phrases, and more complicated cases involving diﬀerent sorts of 
referring expressions like proper names and definite descriptions. The expressions exhibit 
coreference de jure because of this condition on how they are to be understood. 
Coreference de jure is therefore to be contrasted with coreference de facto, which occurs 
when referring expressions refer to the same thing, but it is not a condition of 
understanding them that they are taken as doing so. 
Although there is no definitive consensus on what coreference de jure is, we can see it as a 
combination of epistemic and semantic or representational conditions. Pinillos (2011: 
303-5) cashes out coreference de jure in terms of three distinct epistemic conditions: a 
priority of existential generalisation (a relevant existential generalisation is known to 
follow a priori), attitude closure (the point about existential generalisation also goes when 
the sentences are embedded within propositional attitude contexts) and knowledge of 
conditional coreference (if two terms are coreferential de jure, then if they are 
understood, then they are known to refer to the same thing if they refer at all). Fine 
(2007) provides a similar set of conditions on what he calls strict coreference, or 
representation as the same. Schroeter (2012) discusses what she calls the appearance of de 
jure sameness of reference, and imposes the conditions of obviousness (no further 
reflection is required for one to figure out if they refer to the same thing), rational 
incontrovertibility (one cannot rationally reject sameness of reference if it is put to the 
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question), and epistemic primitiveness (there is no further thought to appeal to in 
explaining why one knows that they corefer).  
Coreference de jure clearly cannot be assimilated to Frege cases or the puzzle about 
identity. It involves sameness rather than diﬀerence in ways of thinking. It may seem as 
though the terms used to articulate coreference de jure are very similar to those used to 
articulate referential coordination. This is particularly so in the idea that the one can infer 
an existential generalisation from things that are coreferential de jure. Nevertheless, they 
are not the same thing. Coreference de jure is much stronger than referential 
coordination. It involves a representational condition and an epistemic condition (or 
conditions), neither of which are part of referential coordination. The representational 
condition is coreference: two things corefer if and only if they refer to something and 
what they refer to is the same thing. The epistemic conditions involve someone knowing, 
or it being rationally incontrovertible, that the items (words, thoughts) are coreferential. 
Referential coordination does not in itself involve coreference. Though it is natural to set 
up the problem by providing cases of thoughts that share referential content, to draw 
attention to the fact that referential content is insuﬃcient, referential coordination does 
not require thoughts to refer to anything. Thoughts about things that do not exist can be 
referentially coordinated: Lucy is unwittingly made to participate in an experiment 
involving an hallucinogenic chemical and hallucinates a butterfly that is green and and 
that it has wings, and so comes to think that there is such a butterfly; she can be rational 
in being disposed to infer that there is something that is a butterfly and has green wings, 
even though there is no butterfly and so her thoughts do not corefer because they do not 
refer at all. We could say that Lucy has a reason for treating her thoughts as coreferential 
de facto, though that would be unnecessarily prolix.  
Recanati cashes out de jure sameness of reference in terms of knowledge of conditional 
coreference (2012: 92-3), which is knowledge that two things refer to the same thing if 
they refer at all, and so it might be thought that coreference as such is not required on 
some ways of understanding it. If so, then it remains the case that de jure coreference is 
stronger because referential coordination does not involve knowledge in this way. The 
paradigmatic inference is one that Lucy is disposed to make, and she is rational in doing 
so, but this does not necessarily mean that she knows that the paradigmatic inference 
follows, and she might not know anything about the inference; it just means that she has 
a reason to make it.  
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Moreover, granting that coreference de jure does involve sameness in ways of thinking, it 
must be said to do so in a way very diﬀerent to referential coordination. Coreference de 
jure as a feature of language articulates a basic condition on linguistic competence that 
entails a certain level of reflectiveness. That is, it concerns the kinds of attitudes and 
evaluations we can take towards words and the sentences they compose that we need to 
have in order to be competent with a language, or to understand a given utterance or 
inscription. Similarly, as a feature of thought, the sorts of attitudes and evaluations that 
come with coreference de jure entail a level of reflectiveness about one’s thoughts, and so 
a degree of cognitive sophistication, that is not entailed by referential coordination—even 
if, as Schroeter puts it, no further reflection is required, coreference de jure still seems to 
involve the capacity to reflect on one’s thoughts.  
The two conditions are therefore distinct, even though they both involve thoughts 
exhibiting sameness in ways of thinking. Referential coordination may also be treated as a 
prior explanatory problem, for two reasons. One is that referential coordination will 
obtain whenever coreference de jure obtains, though not vice versa. It is plausible to think 
that what explains the stronger condition should turn on what explains the weaker 
condition. Another reason is that coreference de jure may not, after all, be a genuine 
feature of thought. Although it is plausible to think that coreference de jure is a genuine 
aspect of the meaning of referring expressions, the combination of representational and 
epistemic conditions does not obviously apply to thought. That is not to say that it does 
not apply, only that whether or not it does is a substantive question that, presumably, will 
turn on the correctness or otherwise of theoretical accounts of thought. This in turn 
needs to be informed by the best explanation of referential coordination. 
1.3.4 The metaphysics of intentionality 
The fourth and final problem is not one that points to the insuﬃciency of referential 
content, but rather concerns the fact that thoughts have referential content at all. 
Following Brentano’s (1874/1973) revival of Scholastic terminology, what is known as 
the metaphysics of intentionality concerns the conditions that are necessary and/or 
suﬃcient for one thing to be about another. Intentionality presents a host of problems. 
Local problems involve accounting for intentionality in particular cases: whether and how 
it possible to think or talk about what does not exist; whether there is a genuine 
distinction between general or descriptive aboutness (where one thing is about another in 
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virtue of it satisfying a certain collection of properties) and singular or particular 
aboutness (where one thing is about another independently of it satisfying any collection 
of properties); whether the capacity to be in states or undergo episodes with intentional 
content depends on the possession of inferential capacities, or whether they involve 
representational entities that have intentional content independently of inferential 
capacities.  
These local problems have been discussed both in relation to and apart from the global 
problem concerning intentionality as such: as to whether it is a genuine property, and if 
so, what it is. One of the main debates on this score concerns the viability of a 
naturalistic theory of intentionality, such as those advocated by Dretske (1981), Millikan 
(1984), Papineau (1987), and Fodor (1990), on which intentionality is to be explained in 
non-intentional terms. Opposed to this are positions that accept the reality of 
intentionality but reject its explanation in naturalistic terms, for which Wittgenstein 
(1953) stands as the main progenitor. Opposed to both are eliminativist or 
instrumentalist (or in any case, not straightforwardly realist) attitudes towards the 
intentional, an approach that can be traced to Quine (1960). 
The metaphysics of intentionality presents a problem that is in some sense deeper than 
referential coordination. But referential coordination may be treated as explanatorily 
prior in this case as well. Investigation into the conditions on intentionality requires 
having in hand a view of the kinds of things that exhibit it. Since one of the questions 
that gets raised by referential coordination is what view of thought needs to be adopted, 
settling what view provides the best explanation of referential coordination should be an 
input into the debates surrounding the metaphysics of intentionality. One cannot settle 
what the problem of the metaphysics of intentionally is really about, at least with respect 
to the intentionality of thought, without having a good idea of what the best explanation 
of referential coordination is. 
A consequence of this is that explanations of referential coordination should not be 
evaluated in terms of or informed by considerations bearing on the viability or otherwise 
of naturalism, the view that every phenomena is either susceptible to explanation on the 
model of natural scientific theory, or not genuine. Rather, the viability of naturalism or 
its denial depends on the consequences of the right theory of referential coordination. In 
making this claim, I particularly mean to diverge from those, such as Fodor (1987; 1990; 
2008), who would insist on a broad-ranging and thorough-going naturalism as a 
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presupposition of arguments concerning the right way to understand intentionality, and 
so also as a constraint on what the correct theory of mental content must be. Whatever 
exactly naturalism entails, it is a view that should be earned rather than claimed as a 
condition of any reasonable approach. In light of the fact that no proposal for 
naturalising intentionality commands anything like widespread acceptance (cf. Loewer 
1997), I take it that doing things this way is more attractive than the Fodorian 
alternative. 
1.3.5 Summary 
Referential coordination presents an explanatory problem that is closely related to a range 
of other phenomena that have received comparatively much more attention. Referential 
coordination may be viewed as an independent problem in its own right. There are also 
good reasons to treat it as explanatorily prior to these problems. The correct explanation 
of referential coordination can provide a way of seeing what these problems involve and 
so how they might resolved. The fact that referential coordination is implicit in these 
phenomena, and the fact that they have received a great deal of philosophical attention, 
attests to its importance. 
1.4 Questions and Theories 
This section sets out some questions to which possible explanations should provide 
answers, and introduces the explanatory theories to be discussed in subsequent chapters. 
1.4.1 Three questions 
Thoughts that are referentially coordinated can be thought of in two ways: in terms of 
their content, or in terms of the fact that they are things that have content. This provides 
a simple way to distinguish possible explanations of referential coordination. A content-
based explanation looks to provide a theory of the contents of thoughts that allows for 
them to be more fine-grained than reference, and explains referential coordination by 
locating the indication of sameness of reference there. An opposed approach is instead to 
give a vehicle-based explanation. A vehicle-based explanation will look to provide a theory 
of the vehicles of thought, of the psychological states that have content, and explains 
referential coordination by locating the indication of sameness of reference in a fine-
grained representational structure. 
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Though the contrast between content- and vehicle-based explanations provides a fairly 
natural way of thinking about possible positions and what is at stake between them, the 
contrast is not really adequate for a few reasons. It is not exclusive, in that there can be 
views that count as both. It is also inaccurate, in that there are distinctions that can be 
made within the two sides of the contrast that it leaves out. And it is incomplete, in that 
there are views that count as neither. More subtle distinctions can be made according to 
how views come down on three key questions. 
One of the main questions concerning the explanation of referential coordination is: 
Can referential content be treated as a primitive property, or not?  
Call the view that it is referentialism, and the opposed view anti-referentialism. According 
to the referentialist, there are no facts more basic than thoughts’ having the referential 
content they do that would bear on rational inference. The anti-referentialist, on the 
other hand, wants to appeal to the conditions that account for thoughts’ having the 
referential contents that they do and use these conditions to provide a way explaining 
rational inference. As far as referentialism is concerned, thoughts may only have 
referential content (it is therefore to be distinguished from the stronger thesis that 
content is exhausted by reference), whereas the anti-referentialist is committed to there 
being some sort of content in addition to referential content. 
A further question is: 
Does the correct explanation of referential coordination make reference to 
psychological entities, properties, and states, or not? 
Call the view that it does psychologism, and the opposed view anti-psychologism. The need 
for the psychologistic answer arises particularly acutely on the referentialist answer to the 
first question. If the explanation of referential coordination is not to be found in the 
conditions on referential content, then some other relevant feature must do the job, and 
psychological states and properties, of some sort, seem to be the only available alternative. 
Despite this, these first two questions are logically independent, in that combinations of 
views across both are perfectly coherent. One could advocate an psychologistic and anti-
referentialist explanation as much as an anti-psychologistic and referentialist or 
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psychologistic and referentialist explanation. This demonstrates how thinking about the 
debate in terms of a contrast between content- and vehicle-based explanations is neither 
exclusive nor accurate.  
A third question adds another dimension to possible kinds of explanation: 
Is there an explanatory link between referential content and referential 
coordination, or not? 
According to heavyweight theories, there is some explanatory link; according to 
lightweight theories, there is not. Lightweight theories must not be misconstrued as 
denying that there is any relationship at all between them. The point is that, on a 
lightweight theory, there is no explanatory link; what explains one need not figure in an 
explanation of the other. As with the first and second questions, there is some overlap 
between answers to this third question and the previous two. Lightweight explanations of 
referential coordination must be referentialist, and so must be psychologistic. But they 
will be neutral as to whether the psychological states or properties must also be states or 
properties that involve referential content. This neutrality is what makes them 
lightweight; they are relatively non-committal as to what needs to be in place. If 
properties relevant to determining referential content play no part of the explanation of 
referential coordination as on the lightweight approach, then it is wrong to say that it is 
either content- or vehicle-based explanation either. This shows that the contrast between 
content- and vehicle-based explanations is also incomplete, because there can be 
explanations that make use of neither notion. 
1.4.2 Theoretical approaches 
Explanations of referential coordination can be seen as implicit in some theoretical 
approaches to thought that have a prominent place in the philosophical literature. The 
three questions go a long way towards characterising both what is at issue between them 
and how they overlap. The division between the approaches is in some ways artificial, but 
for purposes of orientation it helps to see them as discontinuous competitors.  
Going back to the initial crude distinction, we can begin with theoretical approaches that 
oﬀer explanations in terms of contents and vehicles.  
 42
The Problem of Referential Coordination
According to sense theory, thoughts have contents additional to their referential contents. 
These contents are structured complexes the constituents of which are individuated by 
their role in rational inference, and that determine referential content in a fine-grained 
way. These constituents therefore have properties that make them akin to Frege’s notion 
of sense. Sameness of sense indicates sameness of reference, because the same referential 
content is determined in the same way. Sense theory represents one development of 
Frege’s notion of sense, introduced by him in the course of dealing with some problems 
in semantics, which has not proved uncontroversial even amongst supporters of Frege.  
Sense theory has often been opposed by defenders of typed representations theory, on 
which thought involves mental representations. These are vehicles of referential content 
that have causal roles in a cognitive system, structured in a way akin to how a sentence is 
made up of words. The types of typed representations theory are ways of grouping such 
representations together. The representations grouped together are tokens; the groupings 
are the types of those tokens. Types of mental representations are meant to involve 
properties that bear on the way that the thinker whose mental representations they are 
can manipulate them in cognitive processes. The thought is that properties that type 
these representations can provide a similar fine-grained relationship to referential content 
without the need to bring in an additional notion of content. On this approach, 
referentially coordinated thoughts are a matter of mental representations belonging to the 
same type. 
Both approaches are internally diverse, and it will be necessary to spend some time 
articulating the details of how they work in due course. At this stage we can remain at the 
level of the general ideas upon which each approach relies. They both oﬀer explanations 
that can be characterised as heavyweight, in that they locate the explanation in one or the 
other side of the content/vehicle contrast. While sense theory is explicitly anti-
referentialist and anti-psychologistic, typed representations theory is explicitly 
psychologistic, and depending on the typing criteria, can be either referentialist or not. 
Typed representations have often been appealed to in light of various diﬃculties that 
have been alleged against the anti-referentialist features of sense theory, and the sorts of 
explanation that I will consider under that heading will be those with referentialist 
commitments (see §4.2). 
A third explanatory tradition that can be distinguished from both sense theory and typed 
representations theory is mental file theory. The basic idea of mental file theory is to posit 
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mental entities that are like the sorts of files one finds in draws and cabinets, in that they 
are associated with, or in some sense contain, information, and organise that information 
in useful ways. Unlike senses, though like typed representations, mental file explanations 
are psychologistic. Unlike both, they need not, though they can, be involved in 
explanations of referential content. Mental file explanations can therefore be either 
heavyweight or lightweight, and either referentialist or anti-referentialist. Extant 
treatments of mental file theory tend to be given in the service of heavyweight 
approaches to thought. 
The three theoretical approaches obviously overlap and diﬀer in many and more-or-less 
complicated ways, but one can see that between them, and taking into account internal 
disagreements, they cover most of the positions defined by the three questions. The 
exception to this is a position that is anti-psychologistic and referentialist. It is hard to 
find examples of this sort of view in the literature, perhaps because it it is diﬃcult to see 
how fine-grained contents that are not individuated in terms of rational inferences can 
bear on a thinker’s inferential dispositions at all. Fine's (2007) proposal to introduce 
equivalence relations, or coordination schemes, over referentialist propositions as part of 
the contents of thoughts may be an example, although it is unclear if it represents a 
genuine explanatory alternative to the three views just sketched (cf. Lawlor 2010, Sosa 
2010). In any case, I will overlook this alternative as insuﬃciently developed. 
These theories and their respective positions on the three questions can be set out in table 
form like so: 
As this table indicates, there is logical space for a position that diﬀers from the other 
three in at least one respect. This space is occupied by the explanation I will develop and 
defend. 
Psychologism Referentialism Weight
Senses No No Heavy
Typed representations Yes Yes Heavy
Mental files Yes Yes/No Heavy
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1.4.3 Introducing coordination functions 
I will develop and defend an explanation that uses mental file theory, extended in a 
couple of ways. One extension is a distinction between mental files and file predications. 
Files and their predications provide the basis for the fact that a thinker has the 
paradigmatic inferential dispositions (note: not their rationality). The second extension is 
the idea that the role these dispositions have in a thinker’s life, in structuring and 
providing information relied upon in furthering her broader projects and plans, mean 
that file predications have normative functional properties that concern the information 
that they carry. File predications belonging to the same file are required to carry 
information about the same thing. This coreference requirement means that file 
predications belonging to the same file have coordination functions that link them. 
Requirement-based coordination functions put in place a default indication that the 
information carried in is about the same thing. Information that indicates that the 
conclusion cannot or is unlikely to be true will defeat this. A special kind of defeating 
information will concern the identity of the thing that the information concerns. The 
rationality of the paradigmatic inferences consists in a thinker’s sensitivity to the 
coherence of her inferential dispositions with the rest of her information and the 
potential for defeat that it presents. 
This explanation fits into the framework like this: it is psychologistic because mental files 
and their predications are mental entities; it it is referentialist because it makes no use of 
and is not dependent on any more fine-grained notion of content; and it is lightweight 
because there is no explanatory link between this explanation and the explanation of the 
referential content of thoughts. 
Adding coordination functions to the table given above makes it look like this: 
Psychologism Referentialism Weight
Senses No No Heavy
Typed representations Yes Yes Heavy
Mental files Yes Yes/No Heavy
Coordination functions Yes Yes Light
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The character of the account I wish to propose is, then, somewhat unique. One may 
think that there are good reasons for this. Something that I acknowledge from the start is 
that it is not especially inspiring. In particular, it does not do much by way of furthering 
certain projects in epistemology, philosophy of mind, or philosophy of language. This 
point comes out quite clearly by noting how theories in these domains, and accounts of 
inference, and thought in general, are often given in terms of concepts. Concepts are often 
made use of in the course of pursuing broader philosophical projects. One example of 
such a concept-theoretic approach is the attempt to provide an account of a special sort 
of knowledge, often called a priori, that someone can have independently of experience. 
This sort of rationalist epistemology is sometimes supported by the idea that the 
conditions needed for possessing certain concepts also supply epistemic warrant of a 
distinctive kind. Another example is the attempt, consonant with the project of cognitive 
science, to provide a theory of the capacities that thinkers have to be in mental states 
with referential content, and the systematic relationships between them, compatible with 
the fact that we are creatures with a finite cognitive repertoire. Referential coordination 
by itself speaks to neither of these issues, and this may seem a disappointment and reason 
enough to dismiss it.  
Those who are sympathetic to that thought are asked for forbearance, however. Though 
the uninspiring—or, as I would prefer to put it, relatively deflationary—explanation that 
I want to recommend does not speak directly to ways of providing a rationalist 
epistemology, or furthering the project of cognitive science, a benefit of focusing on 
referential coordination is that it provides a sort of key for the various uses (and there are 
many) to which talk of concepts is put. This means that they can be comprehended as at 
least bearing on the same topic, and so apparently diﬀerent explanatory concerns can be 
made to bear on each other in a philosophically satisfying way. This point will be 
discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. 
The result of focusing on referential coordination is not limited to oﬀering a way of 
clearing things up, however. A commitment to explaining features of thought in terms of 
concepts is a commitment to a heavyweight explanation of referential coordination, since 
concepts are meant to explain both the referential properties and the rational properties 
of thoughts. If an explanation that only requires a lightweight relationship between 
referential coordination and referential content is correct, then no support for a 
rationalist epistemology or an account of referential content is provided. That these 
projects cannot be supported through reflection on referential coordination, and that the 
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soundness of talk of concepts is questionable, are interesting results even though they 
have deflationary consequences. Those with more inflationary ambitions owe a response 
other than hopeful dismissal on this score. 
1.4.4 Summary 
Diﬀerent theories of thought can be seen as diﬀering over how they explain referential 
coordination. Diﬀerent explanations diﬀer over what provides the inferentially basic 
indication of sameness of reference suﬃcient for making the paradigmatic inferential 
dispositions rational: whether it involves a more fine-grained notion of content, whether 
it involves psychological entities and properties or not, and whether it is linked to the 
possession of referential content or not. The coordination functions explanation that I 
will defend provides a distinctive set of answers to these questions. 
1.5 Assumptions, Requirements, and Desiderata  
I will now set out the explanatory criteria that will be applied to the solutions to that 
problem to be considered in the remaining chapters. This has three parts: first, setting out 
some assumptions that are in place that help to focus the scope of the explanations; 
second, setting out some requirements on explanations that must be met as a standard of 
adequacy; and third, setting out some desiderata on explanations that meet that minimal 
standard. 
I will rely on the following assumptions: 
Core Cases: The explanation of referential coordination should, in the first 
instance, be given in terms of cases where a thinker has thoughts about 
individuals in a straightforward sense, or core cases. 
Core cases are cases of propositional attitudes that do not introduce any more delicate 
problems than that of referential coordination in order to understand what is going on. 
Peripheral cases include thoughts about ourselves, our present location and present time, 
the kinds of thoughts covered by what I earlier called special ways of thinking. Peripheral 
cases also include cases where a thinker is arguably exploiting some description, cases of 
thoughts about fictional or non-existent entities, cases of thoughts that rely on some kind 
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of deference to experts, or any logical notions more sophisticated than those engaged in 
the paradigmatic inferences. 
Availability: In core cases, referential content is unproblematically available, 
in the sense that what we think about, and that we think about them, is 
easy to specify.  
Cases such as Lucy’s thinking about Cicero are in the core; it is reasonably clear what is 
going on, and her thinking about Cicero, in her thinking that he is a Roman, does not 
obviously involve any peculiarities that demand particular treatments of her thoughts. 
Rather than start with oddities and work back to the more mundane cases, these 
assumptions mandate dealing with the more ordinary cases and then building outward, if 
needed. In the core cases, the fact that someone is thinking about something does not 
itself raise any puzzles, and so can be treated as a given for the explanation. Any reasons 
to think otherwise will require assumptions that are more controversial than this, and so 
can be put aside for the purposes of evaluating explanations of referential coordination. 
An explanation of referential coordination must meet these three conditions of adequacy: 
An explanation must specify an indication of sameness of reference that: 
(1) provides a reason for the thinker to engage in the paradigmatic 
inferences that is 
(2) inferentially basic, and  
(3) adequately personal-level. 
Requirement (1) means that it is not enough to come up with some feature of thoughts 
that provides an indication of reference that is only available from the theorist’s 
perspective; it must be something that the thinker can respond to. Requirement (2) 
means that the indication should not consist in something that needs to be included as a 
premise in the paradigmatic inferences. Requirement (3) means this inferentially basic 
reason cannot operate only at the sub-personal level. An explanation must join up with 
the idea that it makes sense for a thinker to answer the question as to why they are 
disposed to make the paradigmatic inference by saying something to eﬀect of “what I was 
thinking of is one and the same thing.” The target phenomenon is one that concerns a 
thinker (a person) and her perspective on her thoughts, how they make sense to her. Any 
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explanation that does not link up with what a thinker can be conscious of as expressed in 
this sort of answer is inadequately personal-level. 
However, we need not find ourselves, in Martin’s (1997) phrase, “stuck here in the 
shallows of the mind.” A personal level explanation, in the sense that figures in the 
requirement, is not one that can only make reference to that of which a thinker can be 
conscious. An explanation needs to make contact (as we might put it) with the personal 
level through showing why it would make sense for a thinker suitably equipped with the 
verbal and reflective resources to cite the identity of what she thinks about. But making 
contact in that way does not limit the resources that can be legitimately used in giving an 
explanation to those found in the conscious life of a thinker. If a psychologistic 
explanation is correct, then something beyond this will be required, and there is no sense 
in ruling out psychologistic explanations on the basis of an arbitrary restriction. 
I will impose the following desiderata on explanations that meet the conditions of 
adequacy: 
The explanation to be preferred provides a specification that is:  
(1) suﬃciently general,  
(2) non-circular, and 
(3) psychologically realistic, in a way that 
(4) can be extended to providing a plausible account of identity 
judgements, and 
(5) is consistent with general facts concerning special ways of thinking. 
Desiderata (1-3) are applications of general explanatory virtues to the specific case. They 
are meant to apply to the core cases, as per the assumptions noted above. (1) means that 
an explanation is better if it covers these cases; (2) means that an explanation is better if it 
does not make appeal to or introduce some explanatory notion that can only be justified 
on the basis that the theory is correct, or that needs to itself be explained in terms of the 
capacity to have referentially coordinated thoughts; (3) means that an explanation is 
better if it does not require of thinkers capacities or other properties that we have no 
reason, independent of the explanatory proposal, to think they have, or that are overly 
demanding in proportion to what it generally takes to be a thinker capable of 
referentially coordinated thoughts. 
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Desiderata (4) and (5) are an application of the idea that the explanation of referential 
coordination is not wholly independent of closely related problems discussed above. 
Identity judgements overcome diﬀerences in ways of thinking. Special ways of thinking 
involve referentially coordinated thoughts that issue in particular cognitive abilities, such 
as intentional action or thought about oneself and one’s present location. It is, therefore, 
incumbent on a theory that it be consistent with general facts about these cognitive 
abilities and does not render them mysterious or unavailable. I emphasise that it must be 
consistent with general facts, not with claims that can only be motivated or articulated 
on theories concerning the nature of thought that are open to disconfirmation by dint of 
how they fare as an explanation of the core cases as per the other desiderata. 
The reasons for adopting the coordination functions explanation can be briefly stated as 
follows. Anti-psychologistic explanations, as represented by sense theory, and 
psychologistic explanations as represented by typed representations, are both involved in 
problems to do with circularity and psychological realism. Extant treatments of mental 
file theory suﬀer from being psychologically unrealistic, or else from failing to cover 
enough cases. These problems can be avoided by adopting lightweight approach, which 
in turn means adopting referentialism. 
1.6 Conclusion 
Referential coordination is a way for identity to figure in thought that is distinctive in 
that it involves an inferentially basic though personal-level indication of sameness of 
reference. The problem is that it is not obvious what this indication might be. The 
problem of referential coordination is closely related to some other problems that have 
been relatively more widely discussed, but it should be treated as independent and 
explanatorily prior to these. There are a number of theories that diﬀer over how they 
address some key questions about the nature of thought, on which the theory I will 
defend oﬀers a distinctive set of answers. Arguing for it requires demonstrating that it 
meets the requirements and desiderata on an explanation better than the competitors. 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Chapter 2 - Concepts 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the relationship between the problem of referential coordination 
and the theory of concepts. Readers impatient to get to the main argument of the essay 
may skip this chapter without much loss, although it contains material germane to how 
that argument relates to the philosophical literature. 
There are a number of views on what concepts are, and these are diﬀerent enough to 
encourage the thought that they are not not really views on the same thing (§2.2). I 
propose that these competing view may be understood as diverging over the nature of 
theoretical entities that explain why thoughts that are exercises of referential capacities are 
also exercises of what I term conceptual capacities. A conceptual capacity is exercised in 
thoughts that are referentially coordinated. The link between referential and conceptual 
capacities means that concepts are tied to a heavyweight explanation of referential 
coordination (§2.3). This does better than some alternatives at comprehending what is at 
issue between competing views of concepts (§2.4). The term ‘concept’ is also used in 
psychological theories of categorisation and related epistemic capacities, and this provides 
a contrast between psychological and philosophical concept theory; I argue that whether 
and how these are related depends on what the best explanation of referential 
coordination is (§2.5). More generally, the cogency of (philosophical) concept theory 
depends on the merits of a heavyweight explanation of referential coordination; if the 
argument in subsequent chapters is correct, then a lightweight theory is better and the 
commitment to concepts will to that extent be undermined (§2.6). 
2.2 What Are Concepts? 
It is a banal point that concepts are involved in conceiving of things, which is to say, in 
thinking about them. But in what way? What are concepts? This is not an entirely 
straightforward question to answer. 
The fact that ‘concept’ is a term that gets used to refer diﬀerent things is often remarked 
upon (see, for example, Peacocke 1992: 1-2). Some of these are highly distinct, some 
more closely related. Margolis and Laurence (1999), in a lengthy survey of the literature 
on concepts, find them variously identified with prototypes, exemplars, theories, various 
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hybrids of these things, definitions both classical and neo-classical, and unstructured 
symbolic atoms. In other parts of the literature, one finds concepts identified with mental 
images, or abilities to use words, or with mental files. One might well wonder what it is 
that makes putting all of these things together under the heading of concepts 
appropriate. 
With some qualification, we can distinguish two ways in which the question ‘what is a 
concept?’ might be taken. On one way of taking it, the question is about what it is that 
concepts do, or what their explanatory role is; call this the job description question. On a 
diﬀerent way of taking it, the question is about what sort of thing it is that plays this role; 
call this the identification question. The identification question asks what sort of thing, 
otherwise picked out, should be be identified as that which plays the concept role. A 
great deal of the diﬃculty with making sense of all the many diﬀerent uses of the same 
term arise from the fact that these questions are not as easy to keep apart as they are to 
distinguish. The way in which one is answered will constrain and inform the answer to 
the other. 
This problem can be illustrated by considering a way that Margolis and Laurence frame 
their survey of the concepts literature (1999: 5-8, 75-77). As they say, concepts are often 
identified at a high level of abstraction as being mental representations of categories, 
properties, individuals, or whatever else. As such, concepts are sometimes thought to be 
the vehicles of mental content, or otherwise of various kinds of information. This is 
contrasted with an opposed identification of concepts as parts of the contents of mental 
states. This seems like a straightforward disagreement (recall the discussion in §1.4). But 
do these identifications answer to the same job description? If not, then are they really 
competitors? 
In line with this divergence, debates about concepts are sometimes taken to be concerned 
with whether concepts are to be thought of as abstract or non-abstract entities (see 
Margolis & Laurence 2007; Sutton 2004). While this may well be something at stake 
between proponents of the diﬀerent answers to the identification question, it is unlikely 
to be what the disagreement is about at a more fundamental level. The fact that concepts 
as constituents of contents are abstracta is less important than the fact that the claim that 
they are constituents of contents is made, presumably, in the course of propounding a 
particular theory to a particular explanatory end. As a representative example, Burge 
(1993a: 309) claims that a benefit of the claim that mental contents are conceptually 
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structured (i.e. have concepts as constituents) is that such structures “enable one to 
capture a thinker's ability to relate diﬀerent thoughts to one another according to rational 
inferential patterns.” What drives the identification of concepts with abstracta is this 
explanatory concern, not some ancillary ontological agenda. By contrast, the 
identification of concepts as vehicles of mental content is more focused on a diﬀerent 
collection of explanatory concerns. Again, as a representative example, Fodor’s 
identification of concepts with vehicles of thought has been directed at accounting for 
the systematic nature of intentional states and oﬀering a naturalistic theory of them (see 
especially Fodor 2008: 25-49; also Fodor 1998: 1-22). 
At the same time, it would be wrong to think that there is no overlap in broader 
explanatory projects. For instance, Peacocke (1992: 41-59), after explicitly identifying 
concepts as constituents of contents, oﬀers a lengthy discussion of the systematic 
properties of thought, in the guise of a discussion of Evans’ (1982: 100-105) concern 
with what he called the Generality Constraint. And going in the other direction, though 
Fodor (2008) makes clear that his concern with concepts is part of a project of a theory 
of the workings of the representational mechanisms of the cognitive system, he has a 
lengthy discussion of the way in which his favoured account deals with Frege cases of the 
various sorts discussed in the previous chapter (op. cit.: 50-100). 
Both explanatory projects bear on the nature of thought, so it is not surprising that there 
should be overlap. But beyond this, more needs to be said to relate them, and from the 
perspective of figuring out whether divergent answers to the job description and 
identification questions can be comprehended as bearing on the same topic, the overlap 
is less important than the diﬀerence in fundamental explanatory concerns, which is big 
enough to give one pause. Diﬀerent takes on the identification question can be informed 
by diﬀerent takes on the job description question, and vice versa. The problem is that 
there is no obvious position from which to decide between them, and perhaps no need to 
decide between them, if this is a merely verbal disagreement. 
To see the problem from another angle, consider what is a fairly common way of 
introducing talk about concepts, the dictum that concepts are building blocks of thoughts. 
One finds this given a variety of formulations, but the basic idea is the same: concepts are 
fundamental in making up thoughts, in some sense of ‘making up’. The problems that we 
saw above with the job description/identification questions arise for the dictum, as one 
might expect: what exactly is the sense in which they make up thoughts? and what is 
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meant by ‘thoughts’? Is it the content of a thought, or vehicle of that content? What it 
means to be a constituent of a thought depends on how this is answered, so the 
diﬀerence between content and vehicle provides for incompatible ways of understanding 
the dictum. While it perhaps serves to focus the issue, the dictum itself sheds little light.  
Margolis and Laurence remark that “[g]iven the foundational role that concepts have for 
understanding the nature of cognition, it’s not possible to provide a theory of concepts 
without taking sides on a number of fundamental questions about the mind.” (2003: 
190) Perhaps this is right, and perhaps it extends also to it not being possible even to say 
what a theory of concepts is a theory of without taking such a stand. It might then seem 
attractive, or even obligatory, to simply side-step the job description question altogether, 
and instead pick an answer to the identification question and stipulate that that is what 
concepts are. Peacocke (1992: 2-3) does something along these lines when he makes clear 
that his talk of concepts is intended to pick out constituents of propositional contents at 
the level of Fregean sense, and then goes on to discuss a wide range of issues related to 
thought, perception, and language. This sort of stipulation has the not negligible 
attraction of promising progress without getting bogged down in ground-level 
disagreements over fundamental questions about the mind. But it does mean that no 
stance is taken on those fundamental questions, and there is the danger that it makes it 
more rather than less diﬃcult to avoid merely verbal disagreement. 
Alternatively, and in the interests of not simply taking sides, one might think it a good 
idea to dismiss concepts as “creatures of darkness” (Stalnaker 2008: 105-6) and simply try 
to avoid talking about them at all. The problem with this is that the sorts of explanatory 
proposals framed in terms of concepts, and indeed much of what has been done in the 
direction of giving a philosophical account of thought, would be rendered opaque. 
It would be far preferable to come up with a way of answering the job description 
question that does maximum justice to divergent positions on the identification question 
and involves as little side-taking as possible. Fortunately, there is a such an answer that 
achieves this. As may come as no surprise, I want to suggest that the job description 
question should be answered in terms of referential coordination. Put in terms of the 
dictum: concepts are the building blocks of thoughts because they explain a fundamental 
fact about how thoughts work, that they exhibit patterns of referential coordination. This 
is as neutral as one could hope, and provides a reasonably clean way to separate out what 
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diﬀerent ways of talking about concepts are about and to discern whether they are 
competing or consistent. 
2.3 Conceptual Capacities 
To see how referential coordination helps, rather than focus on thoughts just as such, 
which seems to force the question of whether we have contents or vehicles in mind, we 
might do better to look at them as exercises of certain capacities.  
Thoughts can be viewed as exercises of capacities. Which capacities? There are a number 
of diﬀerent ways that thoughts might be grouped together, and hence a number of 
diﬀerent ways of individuating these capacities, where individuating such a capacity is 
giving suﬃcient conditions for a thought to be an exercise of it. One of these is in terms 
of what thoughts are about. We can call capacities individuated in this way referential 
capacities. Exercises of the same referential capacity are about the same thing. However, if 
exercises of referential capacities—that is, thoughts about something—are exercises of 
capacities of rational thinkers, then a further condition is required. For the purposes of 
enumerating the capacities of rational thinkers, thoughts need to be grouped together 
according to whether the thinker has a reason to treat them as being about the same 
thing or not. In other words, the thoughts of rational thinkers exhibit patterns of 
sameness and diﬀerence in ways of thinking. This means that the cognitive capacities 
exercised by rational thinkers are individuated not just by their referential content but 
also by their being referentially coordinated. We can call the capacities individuated this 
way conceptual capacities.  
To illustrate: Lucy knows Fido the dog, and thinks that Fido has fleas. Thinking this is 
exercising a referential capacity, the capacity to think about Fido. Lucy also thinks that 
Fido is a labrador. In thinking this, she exercises the same referential capacity again. She 
is also disposed to infer, on the basis of these two thoughts, that there is something that is 
a labrador that has fleas, and it makes sense to her to do so. These two thoughts about 
Fido are therefore referentially coordinated. So these thoughts involve exercising the same 
conceptual capacity as well as the same referential capacity. Using a standard 
typographical convention, we can put this by saying that Lucy is exercising her FIDO-
capacity in both cases. Lucy sees Fido shortly after a trip to the vet, but his new anti-flea 
collar has somehow been mixed up with one belonging to a dog called Rex. Lucy fails to 
recognise him and thinks of him as a diﬀerent dog with that name. Knowing that the 
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dog she thinks of as Rex has an anti-flea collar, she thinks that Rex does not have fleas. In 
thinking this, she is thinking of Fido, and so is exercising the same referential capacity. 
But she is not exercising her FIDO-capacity. Perhaps she still thinks that Fido has fleas. 
She would not be irrational in maintaining this belief. Instead, she is exercising a 
diﬀerent conceptual capacity, her REX-capacity. She also thinks that Rex is a labrador, 
and is rationally disposed to infer that there is a labrador that does not have fleas. These 
two thoughts are therefore both exercises of her REX-capacity. 
Exercises of conceptual capacities are therefore exercises of referential capacities that meet 
some further condition that makes them referentially coordinated. We can then frame an 
interesting explanatory hypothesis about conceptual capacities: the fact that thoughts are 
exercises of the same conceptual capacity because they are constituted, at least in part, by 
the same entity. We could then call the entities posited by this explanation concepts. What 
makes the first two of Lucy’s thoughts about Fido exercises of her FIDO-capacity are that 
they are partially constituted by the same concept, the concept FIDO. FIDO is absent in 
the third thought that is nevertheless about Fido. Instead, in exercising her REX-capacity, 
she thinks a thought constituted by a distinct concept, the concept REX. 
The job description question can therefore be answered like this: concepts are whatever it 
is the presence of which explains why thoughts that are exercises of the same referential 
capacity are also exercises of the same conceptual capacity. Same concept, same referential 
capacity, same conceptual capacity; call this the capacities answer to the job description 
question. 
What I will concept theory is the idea that there are concepts, that is, things that answer to 
this job description. The debate between those who hold divergent views on what 
concepts are can be seen as coming down to which answer to the identification quest 
should be given. This is determined by which best solves the problem of referential 
coordination. The immediate benefit of this interpretation is that the problem of 
referential coordination can be posed without presupposing much by way of fundamental 
questions about the mind; we can seek a satisfying explanation of referential coordination 
without having to settle the other questions. 
This helps make sense of much of the debate about concepts, and in particular with 
comprehending how diﬀerent answers to the identification question are in fact related to 
the same fundamental explanatory concern. The emphasis on rational inferential relations 
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is an emphasis on what it is that explains the rational inferential relations that make them 
exercises of the same conceptual capacity. The emphasis on systematicity is an emphasis 
on how to explain this as a feature of conceptual capacities. These are diﬀerent 
explanatory projects, but they are still parts of one overarching explanatory project, and 
answerable to a central strand of that project, the explanation of referential coordination. 
Earlier, I said that taking the question ‘what are concepts?’ as either asking for a job 
description or for an identification of a kind of entity otherwise described needs 
qualification. The qualification is this: not all talk of concepts is intended to be 
explanatory. Reference to concepts can be a means of capturing what thoughts a thinker 
can have, either by simply adverting to what she can think about described without any 
reference to what identity relations her thinking presupposes, or else as a way of 
capturing these presuppositions. So, for example, we might say that Lucy has a concept 
of Fido ( she ‘has the concept FIDO’), because she can think about Fido, and also has the 
concept of having fleas, because she can think of things’ having fleas. But she also has a 
distinct concept (she ‘has the concept REX’) because she can think of Fido in two 
diﬀerent ways. This sort of reference to concepts, what we might call concepts in the 
descriptive sense, contrasts with the theoretical sense corresponding to the capacities 
answer.  
The capacities answer has its uses here too. The descriptive sense brings with it no 
weighty theoretical presuppositions, whereas the theoretical sense does. This means that 
cases where the use is theoretical and where it is not should be held apart, and the 
capacities answer provides a means of telling which is which—and also for revealing cases 
where the distinction is elided (perhaps unintentionally) and some substantive 
commitment gets introduced under cover. 
The capacities answer converges in an interesting way with Evans’ (1982) talk of 
conceptual abilities in the context of his discussion of the Generality Constraint (op. cit.: 
101-5) mentioned above. The Generality Constraint is sometimes taken to be 
definitional of conceptual thought (see Beck 2012 for a recent example). Seeing thoughts 
as exercises of conceptual capacities is in line with this. Evans states the Generality 
Constraint like so: 
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[I]f a subject can be credited with thought that a is F, then he must have 
the conceptual resources for entertaining the thought that a is G. (1982: 
104) 
The idea that concepts are entities that explain how thoughts are exercises of the same 
referential and conceptual capacity involves no commitment to the kind of systematic 
connection between the thoughts a thinker is able to have to which Evans wants to draw 
attention. However, systematic connections aside, both the Generality Constraint and 
the explanation of conceptual capacities concern the fact that what thoughts a thinker 
can have are not arbitrary; there are connections between them, and these involve seeing 
thoughts as in some sense structured, and this structure corresponds to the capacities that 
are exercised in thinking a thought. This is made clear when Evans goes on to elaborate 
by saying that 
someone who thinks that John is happy and that John is sad exercises on 
two occasions a single ability, the ability to think of, or think about, John. 
(op. cit.: 101) 
The convergence becomes more obvious when, in a footnote, Evans adds  
When two thought-episodes depend on the same ability to think of 
something, we can say that the thing is thought about in the same way. (op. 
cit.: 101n16) 
The abilities that figure in the Generality Constraint are articulated not just in terms of 
referential coordination, but in a more fine-grained way. If one thinks of concepts as 
governed by the Generality Constraint, then one should also think of them as tied to the 
explanation of conceptual capacities. 
Evans denies that mental representations are required by the Generality Constraint (op. 
cit.: 101), and instead recommends that it be articulated just in terms of abilities. The 
explanation of the Generality Constraint that he sketches and goes on to develop is not, 
however, neutral, but is clearly aligned with a content-based view of concepts, as is made 
clear in the comparison with Frege’s notion of sense in the footnote just quoted (see also 
op. cit.: 104n24). One need not follow Evans on this. Concepts, understood as entities 
that explain referential coordination, might be more or less anything, and might not have 
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anything to do with Frege’s notion of sense. The identification question remains open 
when the job description question is answered in this way. 
On a related point, while adopting the capacities answer means that concepts are closely 
tied to the inferences a thinker can make, it does not beg any questions against those, 
such as Fodor, who deny that concepts are individuated by their role in inference, the 
position he terms ‘Cartesianism’ and contrasts with ‘Pragmatism’ (see Fodor 2004, 2008). 
The capacities answer does not mean that particular concepts play particular roles in 
inference, much less that what makes a concept the concept that it is has a particular 
inferential role. It only means that concepts play a role in a particular form of inference; 
using the same concept means being disposed to treat one’s thoughts as being about the 
same thing, and this means being disposed to make inferences of certain forms, 
paradigmatically the inference to conjoin and generalise. This does not individuate 
concepts, it just sets a condition on what concepts, however individuated, do. If 
Cartesians and Pragmatists about concepts cannot agree even on this point, then it 
becomes unclear what the substantive issue between them might be. 
2.4 Alternative Answers 
The literature on concepts features other ways of answering the job description so as to 
comprehend diﬀerent answers to the identification question. They do not do quite so 
well as the capacities answer. 
One of these alternatives is the requirements answer. This sees concepts as the target of 
requirements that any adequate theory must respect; concepts should be identified with 
whatever respects them best. This sort of answer is advocated by Fodor (1998: 22-39), 
who places a number of ‘non-negotiable’ requirements on a theory of concepts. On his 
view, they must be 
(i) mental particulars,  
(ii) categories and routinely employed as such,  
(iii) constituents of thoughts (the dictum again), and so  
(iv) have compositional structure, 
(v) such that many are learned, and 
(vi) public, which is to say, sharable across diﬀerent thinkers.  
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Although a little more sophisticated than simply oﬀering a stipulation, this does not 
mark much of a departure. Someone could dispute any given requirement, and there 
would not a lot to fall back on other than agreeing to disagree. Why the requirements are 
requirements on a theory of concepts is left unclear. They must come from somewhere, 
and that somewhere must be some explanatory project. Simply imposing the 
requirements does little by way of helping with uncovering what this might be. 
Perhaps a more promising alternative on this score is the desiderata answer. Prinz (2002) 
presents something akin to Fodor’s list of non-negotiable demands, though in the form 
of explanatory desiderata to which he thinks a theory of concepts should be responsive, 
and which he finds “widely accepted among philosophers and psychologists.” (op. cit.: 3) 
Rather than non-negotiable, they are negotiable provided some trade-oﬀ can be made 
between competing explanatory proposals. The explanatory project is cast as a collection 
of diﬀerent explanatory projects. A theory of concepts is better if fewer trade-oﬀs are 
required, and the more compelling the explanation given on each of the particular 
desiderata. The desiderata Prinz provides are  
(i) Scope: a theory should “accommodate the large variety of concepts that 
we are capable of possessing;” (ibid.)  
(ii) Intentional content: a theory should “help us understand how concepts 
attain their intentional content,” (op. cit.: 4) i.e. their referential properties; 
(iii) Cognitive content: a theory should explain “how coreferential concepts 
can diﬀer and how divergently referential concepts can be alike;” (op. cit.: 
8)  
(iv) Acquisition: a theory should “ultimately support a plausible explanation 
of how concepts are acquired;” (ibid.)  
(v) Categorisation: a theory should predict and explain facts to do with the 
cognitive ability of categorisation (op. cit.: 9-12);  
(vi) Compositionality: a theory should account for the fact that the 
intentional and cognitive contents of complex concepts are a function of 
the simple concepts out of which they are composed. so as to account for 
the ability to form novel thoughts (op. cit.: 13); 
(vii) Publicity: a theory should account for the fact that concepts are 
“capable of being shared by diﬀerent individuals and by one individual at 
diﬀerent times.” (op. cit. 14) 
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This list, based on the various uses to which concepts have been put, brings out the fact 
that concepts are often seen as explaining more than just exercises of conceptual 
capacities, in my sense. The capacities that concepts are supposed to explain include not 
just the fact that their exercises are coordinated (or come in systematic groups), but also 
that they include referential capacities, and are tied up with the exercise of other 
cognitive capacities such as identification and categorisation. Coming at the job 
description question with a list of desiderata may seem to provide a degree of flexibility 
not available otherwise. 
The problem with the desiderata answer is that it provides no way to settle disputes over 
how the desiderata are understood, whether or how they should be ordered for the 
purposes of trade-oﬀs, and whether they genuinely apply or not. To take an example of a 
disputed desideratum from Prinz’s own discussion, he imposes the categorisation 
requirement because, although “[i]f concepts are thought constituents, it might be best to 
remove the explanation of categorisation from the list of desiderata,” doing otherwise  
would strongly bias the case against psychological theories of concepts. In 
psychology, an enormous amount of research on concepts has focused on 
categorisation. Concepts are often stipulated to be the cognitive 
mechanisms by which we categorise. If a theory of concepts were absolved 
of its obligation to explain categorisation, most psychological accounts 
would be rendered moot. (op. cit.: 11) 
Prinz is surely right that “[c]ategorisation certainly stands in need of an 
explanation,” (ibid.) but part of what is at issue in the debate about what concepts are is 
whether one and the same thing explains categorisation and plays the explanatory roles 
associated with conceptual constituents of thought contents, and so whether the 
obligation (presumably Prinz means the desideratum) can be imposed. What is needed is 
a way to decide this. That psychological accounts might be rendered moot is beside the 
point (more on psychological theories of concepts shortly). 
While it is true that explanatory power achieved through the unified explanation of many 
problems is a virtue of a theory, it is not enough to come at the job description question 
without a principled way of comprehending the problems and the relations between 
them. Any way of unifying the less basic explanatory problems will presuppose some idea 
of what the best explanation of referential coordination is. Referential coordination 
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provides the principled way of comprehending the problems that is missing from the 
desiderata answer. So whatever speaks in favour of the desiderata answer speaks more 
strongly in favour of the capacities answer. 
2.5 Philosophical vs. Psychological Concept Theory 
What I have been calling concept theory is the idea that there are entities that explain 
why diﬀerent thoughts that are exercises of the same referential capacity are also exercises 
of the same conceptual capacity. Following Machery (2009), we might locate this in a 
further distinction between psychological and philosophical concept theory. As Machery 
has it, concepts as understood by psychologists are “those bodies of knowledge that are 
stored in long-term memory and that are used in the processes underlying the higher 
cognitive competences,” (op. cit.: 10) where knowledge is understood in an epistemically 
neutral way, and the higher cognitive competences include categorisation, inductive and 
deductive inference, analogy formation, linguistic understanding, and planning. By 
contrast, Machery takes it that concepts as understood by philosophers are “capacities for 
having propositional attitudes.” (op. cit.: 31) This diﬀerence between psychological and 
philosophical concepts is most helpfully seen as a divergence over the job description 
question. Philosophical concept theory bears directly on the explanation of conceptual 
capacities; psychological theory bears directly on the explanation of behaviours linked to 
categorisation.  
Prominent entries in psychological concept theory are prototype theory (cf. Rosch & 
Mervis 1975), exemplar theory (cf. Medin & Schaﬀer 1978), and theory theory (cf. 
Carey 1985). Though these theories have often also been discussed in the philosophical 
literature under the heading of the theory of concepts (see e.g. Fodor 1998; Margolis & 
Laurence 1999), Machery claims that “theories of concepts in psychology have in fact 
entirely diﬀerent goals.” (op. cit.: 34) Eﬀectively, Machery’s idea is that philosophers and 
psychologists work with job descriptions for concepts that are diﬀerent enough to be 
independent, and so it should not be assumed that what psychologists have to say bears 
directly or even indirectly on what philosophers have to say when they use superficially 
similar terminology. Doing otherwise would be to commit an equivocation. 
In response, critics (Edwards 2010; Margolis & Laurence 2010; Rey 2010; Weisskopf 
2010) have argued variously that because concepts are constituents of thoughts (the 
dictum again) there is no need for Machery’s distinction, that the fact that psychologists 
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and philosophers intend to talk about concepts in a non-equivocal way shows the same, 
or that the distinction does not imply that the concepts psychologists and philosophers 
talk about are not the same. This last point is correct, but it is no grounds for insisting 
that the explanatory projects really are the same. The problem with the first and second 
responses is that they fail to be suﬃciently sensitive to the point of the distinction that 
Machery draws. The point is that there is a question as to how these diﬀerent explanatory 
projects are related. Neither the dictum nor the intentions of theorists is enough to show 
that they must be related in some particular way. 
Though it is true that an approach to concepts that provides for a treatment of both of 
the two job descriptions distinguished by Machery would have the explanatory virtue of 
unification, Machery is surely right that it is not enough merely to want a unified 
explanation. Machery’s point is best taken as the claim that there is a need to motivate 
the claim that these explanations fall together. To simply insist that they do is therefore 
dubious, both dialectically and theoretically. Referring to Prinz’s (2002) list of desiderata, 
Machery makes the point that diﬀerent criteria apply when evaluating the relative 
successes of theories addressed to them (2009: 36). One cannot simply assume that 
desiderata apply in the same way across diﬀerent explanatory projects. 
Having said this, it would be equally wrong, and a mistake Machery could perhaps be 
accused of making by omission if not commission, to proceed on the basis of the idea 
that the two explanatory projects should be treated separately. In fact, if we interpret the 
aim of philosophical concept theory as per the capacities answer, then any claim on this 
point must be withdrawn. The question must be left open. The explanation of referential 
coordination needs to come first, here as elsewhere; determining what is the relationship 
between psychological and philosophical concepts, and whether there is one, depends on 
what the best explanation of referential coordination demands.  
Machery has relatively little to say about the relationship between the two forms of 
concept theory that he distinguishes, limiting himself to an argument against the idea 
that proponents of philosophical concept theory set tasks for psychologists to carry out 
(2009: 41-7), and some skeptical remarks about the role of thought experiments and 
intuitions about the attribution of propositional attitudes have in theorising about 
philosophical concepts. He sometimes gives the impression that he thinks the project of 
philosophical concept theory is suspect, because “we have no access to people’s 
propositional attitudes except through the inferential ascription of propositional 
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attitudes,” (op. cit.: 48) and so it relies to a problematic degree on thought experiments 
and intuitive judgements. This is almost certainly incorrect. I can give you quite direct 
access to my propositional attitudes by telling you what I believe, what I intend, and my 
hopes and fears as well, and you can do this with your own thoughts by considering what 
you would say about the same. Carrying out explanatory projects concerning 
propositional attitudes, thoughts, does not need to rely on thought experiments or 
appeals to intuition. There is less murkiness here than Machery seems to suppose. 
2.6 Eliminating Concepts 
Machery uses the distinction between psychological and philosophical concepts to make 
room for an argument in favour of eliminativism specifically about psychological 
concepts. Eliminativism about psychological concepts is the idea that concepts are not a 
natural kind (2009: 230-246). This point is apt to be misunderstood. Psychological 
concept theory holds that there are things that have this feature. The point about natural 
kinds is not that this feature is not instantiated—that there are no bodies of information 
used as defaults in categorisation tasks—but that there is no interesting set of 
generalisations to be made about what instantiates it. Whether Machery is right about 
this (cf. Piccinini & Scott 2006; Weisskopf 2009) does not matter for present purposes. I 
mention Machery’s claim not because it will be a concern of this essay, but because there 
is a case to be made for a similar eliminativism, not contemplated by Machery, about 
philosophical concept theory, and this case turns on what we should conclude about 
referential coordination. 
As noted above, philosophical concept theory is committed to there being entities that 
account for thoughts that are exercises of the same referential capacity also being exercises 
of the same conceptual capacity. This pattern of explanation can be made out in the 
various views of how to think about concepts discussed above: Peacocke’s stipulation that 
they are constituents of propositional contents and Fodor’s requirement that they be 
mental representations both take concepts to be either contents that determine referential 
content or vehicles that have referential content. Prinz includes the explanation of both 
intentional content (i.e. referential content) and cognitive content (i.e. patterns of 
sameness and diﬀerence in ways of thinking, roughly) as desiderata. The disagreement 
between those who identify concepts as contents and as vehicles takes place against an 
agreement on this point.  
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Philosophical concept theory is therefore committed to a heavyweight explanation of 
referential coordination in one form or another. But if the best explanation of referential 
coordination is a lightweight explanation, then concept theory is to that extent mistaken. 
It has a presupposition that should be rejected. There would be no kind of thing that 
would provide an answer to the identification question. This eliminativism about 
philosophical concepts is therefore congruent with Machery’s eliminativism about 
psychological concepts.  
The coordination functions explanation for which I will argue is lightweight. Since the 
argument will take the majority of the remainder of this essay to make out, it is too early 
to say that philosophical concept theory is in error. The point for now is just that it 
should be regarded as a live possibility that it is. That is, as long as we accept the idea that 
talk of concepts is best understood as oﬀering an explanation of conceptual capacities, 
then it must be seen as making a substantive commitment that may turn out the be false. 
Machery remarks that “[o]nce at the center of philosophy, the philosophy of concepts has 
now been marginalized, maybe because for a few years now, it has been stalled.” (2009: 3) 
Machery’s suggestion in the face of this is to “modify philosophers’ relation to the 
psychology of concepts.” (ibid.) My suggestion is that the project might be better oﬀ 
being dismantled, and some parts thrown away. 
In talking about concepts, I have been narrowly concerned with concepts of things, those 
that are involved in the exercise of referential capacities, rather than concepts of ways for 
things to be, such as concepts of properties or relations. The thesis of eliminativism about 
concepts therefore needs to come with a caveat. There is an obvious sense in which 
something similar to referential coordination goes for properties and relations; it can be 
rational to infer, from the thought that Cicero is a Roman and Caesar is a Roman, the 
conclusion that there are at least two things that are Roman. The lightweight explanation 
of referential coordination does not imply a lightweight explanation of this sort of 
coordination. I submit that it would be surprising if concept theory was wrong about 
things but right about ways for things to be; these would seem to stand or fall together. 
It should also be emphasised that what gets called into question is concept theory, and 
philosophical concept theory in particular. Psychological theories of concepts are left 
untouched. It may also be the case that particular classes of entities identified as 
philosophical concepts still play a role in the best over-all theory of the mind; in 
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particular I have in mind the constituent mental representations that are vehicles of 
referential contents of thought. I will go into this further in §7.2. 
2.7 Conclusion 
Bringing in referential coordination and a handful of distinctions makes it possible to 
comprehend what talk of concepts is about. Concepts, in the philosophical literature at 
least, can be seen as theoretical entities that are linked to heavyweight explanations of 
referential coordination. Concept theory is therefore open to disconfirmation by the test 
of how well it explains referential coordination. The explanation of referential 
coordination does not, therefore, fall under the rubric of the theory of concepts, even 
though it is directly relevant to much of what does. 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Chapter 3 - Sense Theory 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter evaluates the sense-theoretic explanation of referential coordination. I will 
argue that, at best, sense theory can only provide an explanation that involves circularity; 
there is no way to establish that it is correct without already assuming that it is correct. 
Sense theory finds its source in the semantical investigations of Frege, discussed in §1.3 
above, as an attempt to build on his distinction between the sense and reference of an 
expression to provide a general account of rational content-involving phenomena such as 
thought and language. The sense theorist holds that thoughts are possessed of a sort of 
structured content distinct from and determinative of their referential content; these 
contents and their elements are senses. Sense theory is not the only way to develop Frege’s 
notion of sense, and there are some internal disagreements which I shall discuss briefly. 
The basic idea behind the sense-theoretic explanation of referential coordination is that 
referentially coordinated thoughts are those that feature the same sense as an element of 
their content (§3.2).  
In terms of the three questions, this puts us here: 
Because the sense-theoretic explanation locates the indication of sameness of reference in 
sameness of sense, it is adequate only if it can meet the handles challenge. This is the need 
to give some account of which thoughts have which senses as (part of ) their contents. 
More exactly, the sense-theoretic explanation needs an account of what it is for a thinker 
to have the capacity to think thoughts featuring a particular sense, as distinct from any 
other. Such an account can be called a theory of grasp. If a theory of grasp can be given, 
there is still the possibility that it will make the overall sense-theoretic explanation fail  to 
meet one of the explanatory desiderata (§3.3). To show that this second kind of objection 
Psychologism Referentialism Weight
Senses No No Heavy
Typed representations Yes Yes Heavy
Mental files Yes Yes/No Heavy
Coordination functions Yes Yes Light
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can be sustained, I will examine two representative theories of grasp: Chalmers’ appeal to 
epistemic intensions, and Peacocke’s appeal to implicit conceptions (§3.4). In both cases, the 
theory of grasp is adequate but only because it is circular. There is no way to motivate the 
theory of grasp, or say exactly how it is supposed to work, without presupposing the 
correctness of the theory in question, which means that the sense-theoretic explanation is 
also involved in circularity. This problem can be traced to the central commitments of 
sense theory, and the objection can be generalised. This motivates looking at 
psychologistic alternatives (§3.5). 
3.2 Developing Frege’s Notion of Sense 
Frege’s original introduction of the distinction between sense and reference inaugurates a 
number of complex issues about thought and language. Interpretative disagreements 
abound concerning how his notion of sense should be understood. Sense theory is one 
development of Frege’s arguments and proposals. I will first bring out the core 
commitments of sense theory and how it provides an explanation of referential 
coordination. The notion of sense may be developed along either realistic or anti-realistic 
lines, or in constructive or non-constructive ways, though in considering how to apply 
Frege’s notion of sense to the problem of referential coordination, we need only 
concentrate on realistic and constructive developments. 
3.2.1 Core commitments and the sense-theoretic explanation 
Chalmers (2002: 138-142) helpfully provides a brief statement of Frege’s main claims 
about his notion of sense (the labelling is my own): 
(FS1) Every expression that has a reference has a sense. 
(FS2) Sense reflects cognitive significance. 
(FS3) The sense of a complex expression depends on the sense of its parts. 
(FS4) Sense determines extension. 
(FS5) In indirect contexts, expressions refer to their customary senses. 
(FS6) The sense of a sentence has an absolute truth value.  
(FS7) The sense of an expression can vary between occasions of use. 
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(FS1), (FS5), and (FS7) apply narrowly to language, and so can be put aside. (FS6) and 
(FS3) are both important, but need not concern us for present purposes. (FS2) and (FS4) 
will be the main focus, and provide the core of sense theory. 
These two commitments can be expressed as the idea that there is a special kind of 
content other than referential content. Frege’s preferred terminology was to talk about 
these contents as ‘thoughts’, though to avoid confusion with states and episodes of 
thinking, they can be called Fregean propositions. They are propositions because they 
determine a truth value, which Frege thought of as the reference of a thought. Fregean 
propositions are to be understood as complexes whose constituents are senses. Thoughts 
are themselves senses, but in what follows, ‘sense' should be understood to mean 
constituent elements rather than whole contents. 
Senses have identity conditions that reflect cognitive significance, as per (FS2). ‘Cognitive 
significance’, much like ‘mode of presentation’, is a bit of jargon that has accrued to the 
Fregean tradition, the idea behind which is not always clear. Roughly though, the idea is 
that sameness and diﬀerence of sense goes with what a thinker can rationally do with 
thoughts, such as employing them in inference or revising them in the face of new 
evidence. ‘Goes with’ is, of course, a phrase that oﬀers little by way of illumination. The 
job (or one of the jobs) of the sense theorist is to give a fleshed out account of what this 
means. Fleshings out (FS2) will say something about how sameness and diﬀerence in 
sense determines or explains patterns of mental states and rational transitions between 
them. This elaboration will need to individuate senses in a way that satisfies (FS4). 
Because it depends on the individuation conditions on senses, determination of 
extension will not be accidental but rather constitutive: that there is a link between the 
two that explains cognitive significance is what makes a sense the sense that it is. We can 
call (FS2) and (FS4) the individuation and determination principles, respectively. 
Contemporary formulations of sense theory are often put in terms of concepts. This 
sometimes takes the form of saying that concepts are individuated at the level of sense 
(Peacocke 1992). This is most naturally (though not necessarily) understood as the idea 
that concepts have the same individuation conditions as senses—which is just to say that 
concepts are senses. Of course, when taken this way, senses may not have or be able to do 
all that Frege originally wanted them to do.  
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This notion of sense links up in a fairly neat way with the explanation of referential 
coordination. Frege’s original concern was to explain the closely related phenomena of 
what have come to be known as Frege’s puzzle and Frege cases (see §1.3.1-2). The fact 
that referential coordination involves sameness of reference is naturally explained by the 
determination principle, and the idea of cognitive significance can easily be understood 
to include the rationality of the paradigmatic inferential dispositions. The way in which 
the individuation and determination principles can combine to provide such an 
explanation is reasonably clear. Thoughts that are referentially coordinated are those with 
propositional contents with senses as constituents. Sense determines reference, so if the 
propositional contents of two thoughts feature the same sense, then reference to the same 
thing is determined in the same way. If reference to the same thing is determined in the 
same way, then there is an indication of coreference.  
As I will shortly argue, this explanation is in an important sense incomplete, though one 
can see the beginnings of a plausible explanation here. 
3.2.2 Realist and anti-realist developments 
Frege’s notion of sense has been the topic of a large and contentious literature. Some of 
this can be understood as concerning the right way to develop it in order to do 
theoretical work. Others are better understood as concerning whether senses can be put 
to theoretical use at all. And sometimes these two concerns overlap. These disagreements 
often centre on the application of the notion of sense to questions in the philosophy of 
language, though they carry over to debates about thought as well. 
One of the most important disagreements of the first kind is over the role of semantic 
properties, by which I mean the property of truth, reference (to things), and satisfaction 
(by things of predicates), which can be used to elaborate the contribution to truth of 
things at the sub-propositional or non-truth evaluable level. This disagreement applies 
directly to how the individuation and determination principles are to be elaborated. On 
one view, these properties are independent of the capacities that thinkers have to 
appreciate them. We can say that a thought is true, or that it refers to something, whether 
or not a thinker is capable of appreciating its truth, or knowing what it refers to, or what 
it is to satisfy it, in some non-trivial sense of those phrases. On the contrasting view, 
semantic properties have no explanatory role independent of the capacities for thinkers to 
make use of them (which is not to say that they have no explanatory role).  
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This disagreement is often characterised as a debate between realists and anti-realists. 
What is at issue beyond the rough characterisation just given is itself a matter of debate 
(cf. Brock & Mares 2014). In terms of sense theory, realists argue that semantic 
properties have an independent role in giving an elaboration of the individuation and 
determination claims, and anti-realists argue for the epistemically constrained notions in 
terms of warrant, justification, or evidence instead. Labels aside, the disagreement is 
usefully thought of as concerning the explanatory merits of the notion of sense that 
results. Anti-realists argue that appealing to properties like truth or reference is of no use 
in explaining the rationality of language or thought if it goes beyond any capacities that 
thinkers have to rationally respond to them (see Dummett 1959 for an early presentation 
of this view). Realists are moved to respond to this arguing that the epistemically 
constrained notions that the anti-realists take to be more explanatorily respectable cannot 
themselves be understood without appeal to semantic properties (cf. Peacocke 2008: 
7-52). 
This debate is a general one concerning the nature of content, though it may be diﬃcult 
to state clearly what is at stake outside of particular applications. In any case, I propose to 
sidestep this debate altogether. The assumption I called Availability says that, in the core 
cases, referential content is unproblematically available. This assumption mandates 
looking only at realist versions of sense theory, for reasons of simplicity. Without the 
assumption, or on the anti-realist’s view, it is unclear how the thoughts that need to be 
explained are to be identified, without doing so in terms of their referential content. This 
possibly accounts for (or perhaps it is the other way around) the fact that anti-realism 
often goes with a language-first approach to thought, the idea that one should come at the 
nature of thought via sentences in public language. This is insisted upon by Dummett 
(1991), for instance, and explicitly denied by Peacocke (1997). If one gets to thoughts via 
sentences in public language, then the problem goes away. But it is not clear that this can 
be done without presupposing a view of thought that implies a particular stance on 
referential coordination.  
In any case, the assumption that referential content is unproblematically available in the 
core cases need not be unacceptable to anti-realists. They will simply accept it under 
suﬀerance, with the understanding that the core cases will need to be encompassed 
within a more general view acceptable on anti-realist lines. I will proceed as if things had 
been settled in favour of realism. 
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3.2.3 Constructive vs. non-constructive developments 
A further disagreement amongst those who accept something like Frege’s notion of sense 
concerns the extent and nature of the explanatory purposes to which the notion of sense 
can be put. Sense theorists both realist and anti-realist can agree that the point of 
appealing to Frege’s notion of sense is to give explanations. Treatments of Frege’s notion 
of sense that are supposed to be explanatory need to provide an account of what senses 
are so that the individuation and determination principles come out right, so as to be 
capable of providing genuine explanations; this needs to be done in terms that can be 
specified independently of sense theory. This means that they need to make use of the 
idea that, and so show how, they determine extension and reflect cognitive significance. 
This is what we could call the constructive character of sense theory. It aims to construct 
senses from materials independent of the notion of Fregean sense, so that they can be 
applied to explanatory problems that appear where things can be said to have content. 
Non-constructive developments of Frege’s notion of sense reject the general theoretical 
ambitions of sense theory. Such views do not necessarily posit entities in the manner of 
sense theory. For example, Sainsbury (2002) claims that while there are relations of 
sameness and diﬀerence in sense between token expressions, these relations do not need 
to consist of shared relations to entities that are elements of propositions. Sainsbury calls 
this a ‘pared down’ treatment of Fregean sense. It is explicitly limited to semantic 
theorising, and there is no question of entities that might be made use of in other 
projects.  
Alternatively, sense might be held to involve more than just relations between words, but 
not things whose nature can be specified in independent terms. In this way, no non-
circular account of what it is for something to have a given sense in its content can be 
given. The elaboration of how sense reflects cognitive significance will provide 
individuation conditions, and relations of sameness or diﬀerence sense, by expressing the 
relevant senses, rather than saying what the sense is, or what the relations of sense consist 
in. Non-constructive sense theory therefore oﬀers no clue as to what senses are that does 
not presuppose the appropriateness of appeal to sense. McDowell’s ‘modesty’ in the 
theory of meaning is of this sort (the term comes from Dummett 1975, himself a 
promoter of the opposed ‘full-blooded’ option). McDowell sees the point of sense not in 
providing theoretical explanations of content-involving phenomena, but in bringing 
 72
Sense Theory
attention to a sort of datum that needs to be respected in the theory of meaning 
(something about which McDowell presents Frege himself as being somewhat confused, 
cf. 1998d: 190-1). 
As with the debate between realists and anti-realists (with which this debate is closely 
tied), the question over the viability of a constructive treatment of Frege’s notion of sense 
can be ignored for present purposes. Though they present not inconsiderable interpretive 
diﬃculties, it is possible to see the arguments McDowell brings to bear as lying very close 
to those that I will lodge against the sense-theoretic explanation of referential 
coordination (cf. the argument against Peacocke in McDowell 1994: 162-174, and the 
dilemma for full-blooded theories of meaning presented in 1998b, 1998c). The argument 
of this chapter will eﬀectively be that the case against a constructive treatment of Fregean 
sense is correct. But whereas McDowell seems to want to derive from this a sort of anti-
explanationist moral (cf. the argument against ‘sideways-on’ views of concepts, to the 
eﬀect that no non-circular theory of the contents of thoughts can be given in McDowell 
1994), I take it that this a reason to look at alternatives to sense theory. 
3.3 The Handles Challenge 
The sense-theoretic explanation of referential coordination makes use of the idea that 
thinkers with referentially coordinated thoughts have capacities of a particular sort. These 
are capacities to think thoughts with particular senses as constituents of propositional 
contents. An initial worry that one might have about this as an approach to the problem 
of referential coordination is that it involves a very substantial set of commitments. 
Concentrating on that problem only, as I have argued that we should, it is not obvious 
why such commitments should be necessary. While some may wish to respond by 
arguing that treatments of problems, such as referential coordination, that turn on 
rational content-involving phenomena need to make use of a more fine-grained notion of 
content, this response is not particularly compelling. Why must content be the right 
place to locate the explanation? A diﬀerent response might be to say that, even if we take 
referential coordination as an independent problem, it promises a theoretical approach to 
that problem that would unify it with solutions to a range of other issues to do with 
rational content-involving phenomena, and that is something desirable even if not 
mandatory. Given that this is an attraction that sense theory has had for those who 
advocate it, the initial worry needs to be set aside. 
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If this response is somewhat more compelling, then it simply raises the question as to 
whether the sense-theoretic explanation of referential coordination is a good one. 
Whether it is a good one or not depends on how the explanation sketched above gets 
completed. That sketch made use of relations of sameness and diﬀerence between 
thoughts in terms of the senses that constitute their content. So there needs to be some 
basis for determining which senses appear in the contents of which thoughts, and so for 
determining which capacities a thinker has that can figure in the explanation in a given 
case. 
We can call a thinker’s possession of a capacity to think thoughts that feature a particular 
sense grasp of that sense. An account of what makes for such capacities we can call a 
theory of grasp. Though this terminology may be familiar, the use of ‘grasp’ here is slightly 
unhappy, as it is also the term used for how language users understand expressions (one 
grasps their meaning) and so it can obscure the diﬀerence between the semantic and the 
psychological explanations that sense theory oﬀers. I will stipulate that grasp of a sense is 
to be understood only and strictly to mean possession of the capacity to think thoughts 
featuring that sense. 
With this terminology, we can state the following challenge: 
Handles challenge: A sense-theoretic explanation of referential coordination 
is incomplete without, and so requires, a theory of grasp. 
It has sometimes been suggested that something like this suﬃces as an objection to sense 
theory without needing to look at what theory of grasp might be given. So it has been 
claimed that, since senses are mind-independent abstracta, what it would be to be related 
to a sense in the ‘grasping’ sort of way is obscure, or else that there might be multiple ways 
of being related to a sense in the ‘grasping’ sort of way and the only way to avoid this is 
by making an arbitrary stipulation (Fodor 1998: 17-20; Margolis & Laurence 2007: 
580-1). Neither sort of argument is compelling. It is not at all obvious why senses being 
mind-independent or abstract makes it obscure what it is to grasp them. By the sense 
theorist’s lights, senses do play a role in psychology, so simply insisting that they cannot 
sounds like uncharitable interpretation at best. And their playing some role in psychology 
is consistent with their not being themselves reducible to psychological entities. Nor is it 
obvious why being abstract or mind-independent should mean that the sense theorist can 
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only rule out multiple ways of being related to a sense in the ‘grasping’ sort of way by 
means of arbitrary stipulation. 
The sense theorist can make a more direct response by oﬀering some elaboration of what 
being related to a sense in the ‘grasping’ sort of way is. Here is Burge: 
Grasping a thought [i.e. a Fregean proposition] is simply a misleading 
metaphor. Any view should cash out the metaphor in terms of having a 
certain ability to think. Such an ability is attributable on the basis of 
ordinary evidence and is constitutively associated with a variety of 
applicational and inferential abilities. How does one ‘‘grasp’’ a thought 
content? One thinks it. Even on a Platonist view [i.e. one that takes senses 
to be mind-independent in a particularly strong sense], the thought 
contents should be regarded as playing a role in type-individuating mental 
events, states, and abilities. On any view, the contents should be regarded 
as abstract, in order to account for the multiplicity of instances of events 
that they type-individuate, to account for the shareability of kinds of 
thoughts, to account for compositionality, to account for the structure of 
inference and for various aspects of truth and justification. (2004: 30; 
emphasis added) 
Burge is talking about senses at the level of whole propositions, but the point goes for 
constituent senses just as well. The idea is that what it is to grasp a sense is just whatever 
it takes to have an ability to think thoughts that have propositional contents that feature 
that sense. This suggests that the fact that senses are abstracta, whether mind-
independent or otherwise, does not itself pose any special problem for their playing a role 
in psychological theorising. If their role was meant to be causal, then there would be a 
problem. Burge’s suggestion that their role is that of type-identification, or type-
individuation, avoids this, since that role is not causal. 
Allowing that what it is to grasp a sense is to be able to think thoughts of a particular 
kind does not mean the handles challenge is resolved, however. Easing worries arising 
from the ontological status of senses does not remove the need to say what is involved in 
grasping a sense. The point of the handles challenge is that there is a need to say why it is 
a good idea to attribute to thinkers capacities that are to be type-identified in terms of 
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senses. Without this, there is no explanation. The worry about arbitrariness remains live. 
This presents the potential for two sorts of objection.  
A theory of grasp is adequate only if it shows that there is not more than one way to grasp 
a sense (at least, at a level relevant to the kinds of explanations that senses might provide; 
diﬀerences at the of level chemistry, for instance, would not provide for diﬀerent ways of 
grasping senses). An inadequate theory of grasp will not demonstrate this. The potential 
objection is that there is no adequate theory of grasp, and so the appeal to sense must be 
rejected as a candidate explanation of referential coordination. Call this the adequacy 
objection.  
Supposing a theory of grasp is adequate, it may involve commitments that have the 
consequence that the sense-theoretic explanation fails to meet the desiderata on an 
explanation of referential coordination. There might be some appeal to facts or 
conditions that apply only in limited cases; the theory might attribute psychological 
capacities to thinkers there is no independent reason to think that they have; or the 
theory might illicitly make use of resources that are only available on the prior 
assumption that the theory is correct. These all present ways sense theory may fail to 
meet one or other of the desiderata on a theory of referential coordination. Call this the 
explanatory objection. 
Constructive realistic sense theory would appear to be well placed to respond to the 
adequacy objection. They aim to provide an account of what senses are which can make 
use of the referential properties of thoughts, and an account of what makes for sameness 
and diﬀerence in sense can be provided on that basis. A theory of grasp can be given by 
specifying the properties of thinkers that relate them in the ‘grasping’ sort of way to a 
sense individuated according to the constructive account. This would show that, for each 
distinct sense, there is one way of determining referential content, and so one way of 
grasping it, i.e. one way of having the ability to think thoughts whose referential content 
is determined in that way. Such an account would provide a demonstrably adequate 
theory of grasp. However, it is not a given that adequate theories avoid the explanatory 
deficits just mentioned. Ultimately, critics of sense theory who think that senses cannot 
provide an explanation of psychological phenomena are correct, though strictly speaking, 
the conclusion must be that they can explain psychological phenomena, but it will not be 
a good explanation. But in order to see this, it is necessary to look at some theories of 
grasp that have actually been given. 
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3.4 Theories of Grasp 
This section sets out two approaches to sense theory and why they provide an adequate 
theory of grasp. I provide (but do not endorse) some motivations for the theory in each 
case. 
3.4.1 Epistemic intensions 
One way to approach giving a theory of grasp is to do so in terms of the ‘variety of 
applicational and inferential abilities’ that Burge mentions. To say what ability can be 
type-identified by means of a determinate sense, on this approach, is to pick out a 
specific and distinctive set of possible manifestations; call this a dispositional approach to 
the theory of grasp. The dispositional approach can be motivated by a particular sort of 
proposal about how to think of senses. The association with the applicational and 
inferential abilities can be thought of as representational, in the way that formal objects, 
such as a mathematical entities like functions or vectors, can be used to represent non-
formal phenomena like traﬃc flows and magnitudes of physical force. This 
representational association is direct, and so is the relationship between between a sense 
and what it is to grasp it. There can be no complete overlap in the dispositions of 
thinkers relevant to senses that are nevertheless distinct, since there is nothing more to a 
sense than the representation of those dispositions. Sameness and diﬀerence in sense is 
just sameness and diﬀerence in the relevant dispositions.  
A detailed treatment of a dispositional approach to sense theory can be found in the 
work of Chalmers (2002, 2006 2011, 2012), and I will take this as representative. 
At the heart of Chalmers’ complex treatment is what he calls epistemic intensions. These 
are an extension of the intensions familiar from Carnap (1947). A Carnapian intension, 
or subjunctive intension, is a sort of mathematical object: a function from possible worlds 
to extensions. Carnap’s purpose was to use this to do work in semantics and modal logic. 
In the case of sentences, the corresponding subjunctive intension is a function from 
possible worlds to truth-values; in the case of words, the corresponding subjunctive 
intension is a function from possible worlds to individuals, properties, relations, classes, 
and so on. Sentence-level intensions can be thought of as structured complexes with 
word-level intensions as parts. Subjunctive intensions bear similarities to Frege’s notion of 
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sense, since they determine extension and can form structured complexes. But they lack 
the connection to cognitive significance distinctive of senses.  
Epistemic intensions reinstate this constitutive connection. Instead of functions from 
possible worlds to extensions, they are functions from descriptions of how the world 
might be, which Chalmers calls epistemically possible scenarios, or just scenarios, to 
extensions. An epistemic intension, in combination with how the world in fact is (i.e. 
which scenario is actual), determines a subjunctive intension. Chalmers (2006) puts this 
in terms of primary and secondary intensions. Primary (epistemic) intensions account for 
facts about rationality, while secondary (subjunctive) intension account for facts about 
modality. This two-dimensional aspect (elaborated at length in Chalmers op. cit.), though 
crucial for the applications Chalmers makes of the theory, can be set aside.  
In what way do epistemic intensions account for facts about rationality? On this way of 
constructing senses, a sense is considered to be an epistemic intension, and distinct senses 
are distinct epistemic intentions, on the understanding that the individuation of senses 
goes with characteristic applicational and inferential abilities that epistemic intensions 
represent. The specific inferential abilities are those manifested in a set of dispositions to 
infer from a scenario to an extension (a truth value in the case of structured epistemic 
intensions, an individual, property, relation, or class in the case of elemental epistemic 
intensions). A thinker can think a thought with a certain cognitive significance—a 
particular sense in its content—if she can think thoughts that she would be a priori 
disposed to infer from a particular set of scenarios. Crucially, this disposition is relative to 
certain idealisations. A thinker’s actual inferential dispositions may go wrong in various 
ways, and the relevant set of dispositions are those where these mistakes are absent. 
This can be summarised like so: 
Epistemic intensions theory: A thinker grasps a sense if and only if they have 
idealised a priori inferential dispositions that are represented by the relevant 
epistemic intension. 
Epistemic intensions theory provides a demonstrably adequate theory of grasp. Epistemic 
intensions theory implies that there is a one-to-one correspondence between senses and 
epistemic intensions, since there can be only one condition, one set of idealised 
inferential dispositions, suﬃcient for grasping a given sense. There is no set of idealised 
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inferential dispositions suﬃcient for grasping a sense that cannot be represented by the 
relevant epistemic intension, and so there cannot be multiple ways to grasp a sense that 
involve diﬀerent patterns of cognitive significance. 
Though epistemic intensions theory is not merely stipulative, the explanatory objection 
to theories of grasp might nevertheless be pushed, somewhat in the spirit of Fodor’s 
objection, on the grounds that there are no independent reasons for thinking that what 
the theory of grasp presupposes as a way of constructing senses really obtains, beyond the 
way in which it can feed into a theory of grasp. In the present case, the worry would be 
that there is no motivation for idealised inferential dispositions that can be represented as 
epistemic intensions. Not just any set of properties for which there is a one-to-one 
correspondence with a way of constructing senses will do by way of an adequate theory. 
So what independent reason is there for accepting the epistemic intensions theory?  
One consideration that can be oﬀered is this: 
Constructive Basis: We form judgements regarding extensions about cases. 
Forming a judgement about a case is an inference from a description. If 
one idealises the descriptions to get scenarios, and idealise the inferences 
that are made so that they are purely rational, then one gets epistemic 
intensions.  
The capacity to make extension-identifying judgements automatically grounds epistemic 
intensions by providing the materials for their construction. Another set of 
considerations by way of motivation concerns the advantages of the epistemic intensions 
theory: 
Construction Without Speculation: Constructing senses by way of epistemic 
intensions provides a theory of grasp that avoids tendentious speculations 
about the psychological states of thinkers. In particular, it provides a theory 
of grasp without imputing inner states that may or may not be realised. By 
contrast, the dispositions that can be represented by an epistemic intension 
can be multiply realisable, so the theory of grasp that results is not 
committed to any speculations about psychology. 
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The elements involved in the construction are simply those required by the data that give 
rise to Frege puzzles in their various guises, and referential coordination more generally, 
both of which concern the rational properties of thoughts that can be represented by 
epistemic intensions. Nothing has been brought in that we did not have reason to think 
was present in the set up of the case. 
3.4.2 Implicit conceptions 
An alternative to the dispositional approach instead looks to the basis of inferential 
dispositions. The relevant inferential dispositions in either case are those that serve to 
identify an extension. So on this alternative, senses are to be constructed from conditions 
for determining reference; diﬀerent conditions for determining reference correspond to 
diﬀerent senses. This sort of approach is represented by the treatment provided by 
Peacocke (2008, developing his 1998). In Peacocke’s terms, the conditions for 
determining reference that individuate a sense are what he calls fundamental reference 
rules (FRRs). These are fundamental, because while there might be multiple ways for 
picking out the reference of a given expression or thought, this will be true in virtue of 
them and not the other way round.  
Peacocke places great emphasis on the fact that the dispositions in question are rational 
ones. He comments (2008: 114n2) that his earlier and perhaps better known (1992) 
theory of grasp, which was given in terms of ‘primitively compelling inferential 
dispositions’ and hence is much more in line with the dispositional approach, is 
inadequate to account for this. On this point, given that we are interested in a sense-
theoretic explanation of the rationality of a certain form of inferential disposition, those 
important for understanding referential coordination, it seems appropriate to concentrate 
on not just any basis for the dispositions, but on what we can call the rational basis; call 
this the rational basis approach. 
Although the central claim of the rational basis approach oﬀered by Peacocke is the idea 
that senses are individuated by FRRs, this is meant to be closely tied to considerations to 
do with what it takes to grasp a sense. The details are developed by looking at some 
specific examples (2008: 56-76), of which four are particularly important (I follow 
Peacocke’s preferred terminology of ‘concepts’ rather than ‘senses’): perceptual or 
observational concepts, logical concepts, demonstrative concepts, and the first-personal 
concept. As an example, for “the observational concept oval,” we get the following: 
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What makes something fall within the extension picked out by the 
observational concept oval is that it is the same shape as things are 
represented to be in perceptual experiences of things as oval. (This 
representation will be of the correctness of a non-conceptual content in my 
view). (op. cit.: 56-7) 
This FRR features what Peacocke calls an ‘objective-perceptual’ component, that 
identifies a feature of the world, and an ‘identity’ component, that makes that feature 
apply to things more generally (op. cit.: 31).  
The connection between an FRR and what it is to grasp a sense is that senses 
individuated by FRRs are components of propositional contents of thoughts that are 
subject to certain norms, and these norms are meant to be explained by the FRR. This 
means that, if one thinks a thought in a way that involves one’s grasp of a particular 
concept, then one will be subject to a particular set of requirements in one’s thinking that 
thought. These have bearing on their ‘introduction’ and ‘elimination’: only certain other 
mental states will rationally entitle one to form that thought, and having formed it, one 
will thereby be rationally entitled to make transitions to certain other thoughts. These 
norms articulate the analogue of the ‘inferential and applicational abilities’ that type-
identify thoughts featuring a determinate sense. Senses individuated by FRRs are 
therefore constructed from requirements on rational inferential dispositions, rather than 
those dispositions themselves. 
Peacocke substantiates the idea of there being such requirements by employing what he 
calls argument types (op. cit.: 61-72). These show that one can derive FRRs from norms, 
and norms from FRRs, in at least a few and possibly many diﬀerent ways. In order for 
FRRs to figure as the rational basis for inferential dispositions, Peacocke claims that a 
kind of mental state that has the FRR as its content must be present in the thinker’s 
psychology. These are what he terms implicit conceptions (op. cit.: 113) They are implicit, 
because it is often not the case that a thinker can articulate their content in a way that 
would constitute their being explicit. They are conceptions because they involve an 
identification of a referent in a certain way, one that corresponds to the conditions given 
by a FRR.  
The theory of grasp we get from this can therefore be stated like so: 
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Implicit conceptions theory: A thinker grasps a sense if and only if they have 
an implicit conception of the fundamental reference rule that individuates 
it.  
Implicit conceptions theory can provide a demonstrably adequate theory of grasp, since 
for any given sense, there is only one way to grasp it, by having the relevant implicit 
conception. 
As with epistemic intensions theory, implicit conceptions theory is in need of 
independent motivation. Neither of the two points motivating epistemic intensions 
theory go for implicit conceptions theory, as one would expect given their quite diﬀerent 
commitments. The sorts of considerations Peacocke adduces have to do with the norms 
that he argues apply to thoughts that feature particular senses (op. cit.: 72-6): 
Distinctive Norm Explanation: The norms that apply to thoughts that 
feature a given sense can be explained by the fundamental reference rules 
for that sense. 
A closely related proposal (op. cit.: 134-40) is what Peacocke calls 
Phenomenon of New Principles: The rationality of a thinker’s acceptance of 
principles governing a sense that do not follow from any principles the 
thinker already accepts can be explained by the fundamental reference rules 
for that sense. 
Concepts—senses—are constitutively and definitionally tied to rationality in this way. 
The thesis that a concept so understood is individuated by its FRR is a substantive, non‐
stipulative philosophical thesis about such concepts. On this conception, only certain 
rules will be capable of explaining norms, and the acceptance of principles, that are 
distinctive of concepts. It is these reference rules which, as a matter of substantive fact, 
individuate certain senses (op. cit: 60). 
3.5 Circularity Problems 
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There are clearly responses to the handles challenge that at least avoid the adequacy 
objection. But sense theory is not in the clear. The explanatory objection is still there. In 
this section, I will argue that there are explanatory problems with both theories of grasp: 
they make the sense-theoretic explanation circular in two ways, circularity in how the 
theory is motivated, and circularity in how the theory is applied. Diﬀerent though they 
are, the problems are parallel for both theories. Motivating and applying the theory of 
grasp requires assuming the correctness of the theory; not doing so simply brings us back 
to the handles challenge. The fact that these are parallel problems indicates a common 
root in general commitments of the sense-theoretic explanation, and I will use this to 
generalise the objection beyond the particular theories considered. 
3.5.1 Circularity problems for epistemic intensions theory 
Epistemic intensions theory relies on the idealisation of inferential dispositions. As such, 
it needs to give some elaboration on which idealisations are the relevant ones, and it is 
not clear that it can do this without making the account circular. How can the non-ideal 
dispositions be identified? And, how should the non-ideal dispositions be made ideal? 
Answers need to be given that do not simply assume the correctness of the theory. And 
such answers are not available. 
The first question points to a problem of circularity in how the theory is motivated: 
CM1: There are no grounds for determining which inferential dispositions 
are ideal and which are non-ideal that are independent of which epistemic 
intensions represent them. 
What it means to have non-ideal inferential dispositions of the relevant sort is that the 
thinker’s actual dispositions will sometimes pick out the wrong extension, or the right 
extension in the wrong way, by involving some sort of mistake or mis-step in her 
reasoning from scenarios to extensions. What determines which of a thinker’s inferential 
dispositions are non-ideal? The answer must be that inferential dispositions are non-ideal 
if they deviate from the inferential dispositions that would be represented by the 
epistemic intension of the relevant sense were they idealised. But this makes the account 
circular, since we needed to know which is the relevant sense. And it is not clear what 
alternative there might be.  
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This point undermines a presupposition of what I called Constructive Basis, the idea that 
representing idealised inferential dispositions with epistemic intensions is simply a matter 
of doing some work on inferential dispositions that thinkers can be said to have anyway 
prior to the theory. In fact, things are the other way around: the inferential dispositions 
have to be understood as those that can be idealised by means of epistemic intensions. 
The epistemic intensions theorist could respond by arguing that the class of non-ideal 
inferential dispositions is defined by the presence of ordinary faults in reasoning. 
Ordinary faults include occasions when one forgets a step, or makes a mistake about 
what follows from what, or about the distribution of one’s prior probabilities. But what is 
being idealised are inferential dispositions, and presumably mistakes in reasoning are 
errors in the manifestation of an inferential disposition, not in the dispositions 
themselves. So the absence of ordinary faults in reasoning does not define the class of 
non-ideal inferential dispositions.  
Even if this were suﬃcient, appending this to the theory is unsatisfactory without an 
answer to the question of why the class of non-ideal inferential dispositions is defined by 
the presence of ordinary faults in reasoning. This cannot be something that is available 
outside of the theory, but must have something to do with the fact that ordinary faults 
make inferential dispositions not candidates for representation by an epistemic intension. 
In addition, there is a question about whether ordinary faults in reasoning really are all 
that goes into defining the class of non-ideal inferential dispositions. The theory cannot 
exclude there being extra-ordinary faults in reasoning that could produce deviation in the 
extension. The only obvious way of ruling this out is to say that ideal inferential 
dispositions are those that can be represented by the relevant epistemic intension, so that 
ordinary faults in reasoning define a class of non-ideal inferential dispositions because 
they cannot be so represented. With this, we are are back with the question about how to 
understand the ideal/non-ideal contrast. It appears to depend on what it is supposed to 
explain. 
The second question points to a problem of circularity in application: 
CA1: For any given non-ideal inferential disposition, there are no grounds 
that determine how to idealise that are independent of which epistemic 
intension represents it. 
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This problem also turns on the reliance on idealisation. How should a thinker’s non-ideal 
inferential dispositions be idealised? Any non-ideal inferential dispositions can be 
idealised in more than one way, since there will be more than one way to correct the 
process of reasoning so as to determine an extension. Any putatively non-ideal inference 
therefore presents a choice between maintaining the extension determined by the faulty 
inferences, or not, and between diﬀerent ways of modifying the extension. Which 
idealisation is the right one to make must be answerable to which sense she is supposed 
to grasp, since what inferences one is disposed to make is meant to captured by the senses 
that figure in the thoughts that one has the capacity to have. 
Diﬀerences in how inferential dispositions are idealised will make a diﬀerence to which 
sense is grasped, because they will make for diﬀerence in which epistemic intension 
represents them. In which case, this theory provides no way of determining which 
idealisation should be made without presupposing that a particular sense is being grasped 
(that is, that the thought is represented by a particular epistemic intension). And if it 
cannot be determined which inferences are the ideal ones without presupposing grasp of 
a particular sense, then epistemic intensions theory would have the consequence that one 
cannot say, for any given sense, whether or not a thinker grasps that it without already 
presupposing an answer. Hence applying the epistemic intensions theory of grasp 
involves the sense-theoretic explanation in a circle.  
The inferential dispositions are supposed to be a priori. Perhaps it could be objected that 
this provides a way out of the circle. Some sort of rationalist epistemology is a natural 
counterpart to the Fregean view of content, and the support it might lend to or draw 
from such an epistemology is often highlighted by advocates of the Fregean view of 
mental content, not least Chalmers himself (cf. his 2004; 2006; see Schroeter 2004 for 
critical discussion). Idealisation, it might be said, is only an extension of what happens 
when, attending carefully to how we are reasoning, we consider what we would count as 
being the same individual, or instantiating the same property. This is one way of 
construing Constructive Basis. Putting aside the question of whether that idea is sound, 
the epistemic intensions theorist might argue that certain inferential steps will strike us as 
obviously right or as obviously wrong, where that is not informed by any information we 
have about how things are with the world that we could find out by going and looking. 
Circularity in application is avoided because a priori reflection is something we do have 
reason to think is available to us independent of the theory. Although we might not be 
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able to say independently of enjoying this a priori reflection which idealisations apply, we 
can say that they do apply. 
An initial worry about this response is that the idea of a priori reflection goes far beyond 
what could reasonably be supposed falls under the motivation given as Constructive 
Basis. It makes the account psychologically unrealistic, since there can be little reason to 
credit thinkers with an epistemic power directed at their own inferences that has no 
parallel directed at other domains. Aside from this, as a response to the circularity 
problem, the appeal to a priori reflection is undermined by the fact that thinking that the 
correct way of idealising inferential dispositions is something to which one can have 
access through a priori reflection, is not independent of accepting the theory. A priori 
reflection would provide access to how to idealise an inferential disposition only if it is 
already supposed that such reflection is based on the senses that are grasped. By itself it 
provides no indication that thoughts do involve grasping senses, much less that they are 
representable by epistemic intensions. The circularity problem arises again when cashing 
out what a priori reflection would need to be. 
I conclude that a theory of grasp on the lines of epistemic intensions theory would 
involve the sense-theoretic explanation in vicious circularity. 
3.5.2 Circularity problems for implicit conceptions theory 
Implicit conceptions theory will not have exactly the same problems for exactly the same 
reasons, because idealisation does not feature. What gets posited in implicit conceptions 
theory is a state that is present whether or not it is manifested in one way or another in a 
set of dispositions. However, implicit conceptions theory has similar problems for similar 
reasons. It makes use of the idea that an implicit conception explains a set of inferential 
dispositions. Just as epistemic intensions theory needs to constrain the idealisations of the 
relevant inferential dispositions, implicit conceptions theory needs to give content to the 
idea that implicit conceptions oﬀer this sort of explanation, and this need gives rise to 
circularity in a parallel way. 
Implicit conceptions theory is motivated by the thought that there are norms governing 
the use of certain concepts, and that these norms need a particular sort of explanation. 
But this is not really an independent motivation for the theory. One needs to already 
assume the correctness of the theory in order to generate the data to be explained: 
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CM2: There is no reason to accept the existence of the norms governing 
thoughts featuring particular senses, or principles that are rationally 
accepted, unless one already accepts the individuation of senses by FRRs. 
If this is right, then the fact that the alleged norms in need of explanation are those 
distinctive of thoughts featuring a particular sense means that there is no way to motivate 
their existence independent of the idea that there are senses individuated by FRRs. So the 
explanatory considerations provide no motivation without already assuming the 
correctness of the theory being motivated.  
The defender of implicit conceptions theory might want to appeal to a priori applicability 
of norms as a way of giving the explanation some content, in the rationalist style 
considered in the context of epistemic intensions theory. The idea would be that the 
norms can be formulated independently of any theory because they are obvious or at 
least available to rational reflection to any thinker suﬃciently equipped with the 
cognitive wherewithal to do so. But, as before, it is unclear that this is a legitimate fix. 
The norms that Peacocke thinks apply a priori only apply at all if the concepts in 
question exist. Otherwise, they may be diﬀerent norms, which may have diﬀerent 
implications. 
At this stage, it is worth raising a general worry about implicit conceptions theory. The 
idea that FRRs are brought out by reflection on the norms governing thoughts can be 
undermined by considering alternative deflationary explanations that do not involve 
implicit conceptions. Such deflationary explanations will locate what implicit 
conceptions theory holds to be the content of an implicit conception—call this a putative 
FRR—in something other than a thinker’s mental states. On a deflationary explanation, 
rather than being implicit in a thinker’s mental states, putative FRRs are implied by 
something else, and what that is will involve things other than the sense in question in 
systematic ways. 
Deflationary explanations apply to many of the examples that Peacocke provides. As he 
acknowledges (2008: 122), in giving the motivation for implicit conceptions, Peacocke 
often relies on examples where the referents are mathematical and logical entities: 
arithmetical functions, such as the concept of a limit of a sequence, or truth functions, 
such as the concept of disjunction. Such concepts refer to formal entities. Formal entities 
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occupy a place within a formal system, such as ways of filling out a truth table, or 
operations on topological spaces. Such entities admit of definitions. These are canonical 
ways of spelling out their place within such systems. They compare, not incidentally, with 
frequently given examples of definitions involving gender and kinship relations, like 
bachelorhood (=def unmarried man). But given their occupation of places within a formal 
system, giving the conditions that define this sort of entity can be understood as a matter 
of finding out something implied by the place of the referent in the relevant formal 
system, as opposed to finding out something implicit in the mental states of thinkers. On 
the deflationary view, putative FRRs for mathematical and logical entities are not 
reference rules but claims about formal entities and their place in formal systems. They 
reveal something about these special sorts of entity, not something interesting about the 
psychology of thinkers that can think about them. 
In the other sorts of examples, the putative FRRs seem to be statements of generalisations 
about the use of expressions in public language. These generalisations have little to do 
with the machinery posited by implicit connections theory. In the case of indexical and 
demonstrative concepts, putative FRRs are generated by providing an explicit statement 
of how such words are understood to refer to elements that are salient or have positions 
in a context, for example, the speaker or the time of a context. In the case of 
observational concepts, the FRRs are generated by introducing a bit of neologism 
stipulated to refer to a theoretically posited ‘non-conceptual content’ (cf. op. cit.: 56-7). 
The deflationary explanation in these cases is that putative FRRs are implied by these 
(stipulative) semantic facts, rather than what is implicit in the mental states of thinkers. 
There are, admittedly, examples Peacocke discusses that do not fit this pattern. But these 
consist of what must be considered inadequate attempts to provide FRRs. One such 
example is given as an example of explanation by implicit conception, concerning what 
he calls ‘the concept chair’: 
One of the thinker's perceptual systems, say, identifies some object in the 
environment as having a supporting area and a back, and the subject has 
the background information that the object is used for sitting on. This 
information from the perceptual system, together with the background 
information, is combined, at a subpersonal level, with the content of the 
implicit conception involved in possession of the concept chair. It is 
computed, from this body of information, that the presented object is a 
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chair. This in turn explains the thinker's willingness to judge that that 
object, demonstratively given in perception, is a chair. (2008: 140) 
The putative FRR for chair seems to be “having a supporting area and a back, … used for 
sitting on.” This is clearly not suﬃcient for picking out chairs as distinct from other sorts 
of thing. Sofas are not chairs, but they have backs and supporting areas, and are used for 
sitting on. Interestingly-shaped boulders have supporting areas and backs of a kind; does 
someone’s using them for sitting convert them into chairs? Perhaps chairs are artefacts 
rather than natural objects—perhaps you and I have diﬀerent opinions on that. Does this 
show that we understand the concept chair diﬀerently while still thinking about chairs as 
such? Or does it show that at least one of us has failed to grasp it ‘properly’? There is 
really no way of saying, at least not without already buying into the theory that is under 
scrutiny. The implicit conceptions theorist is committed to the idea that one of us must 
fail to grasp the concept, or fail to do so properly. But whether it makes sense to appeal 
to the idea that people can fail to properly grasp a concept is what is at issue, including as 
it does the idea that there is anything to grasp at all. So that can add no weight to the 
proposal. 
More importantly, for our purposes at least, it is very hard to see what putative FRRs for 
individuals could be when they do not involve specifying a relation in which the thinker 
stands to that individual, as in the demonstrative or indexical case. It is hard to know 
what an implicit conception would be other than a description, and these are notoriously 
unreliable for picking out correct extensions (cf. Kripke 1980). Even though implicit 
conceptions need not have the form of descriptions, it is not encouraging to see Peacocke 
treating the Hesperus/Phosphorous case with the idea that the implicit conception of 
Hesperus is that it is the brightest star in the evening sky (2008: 60).  
Peacocke remarks that  
[s]ince it can be hard to make explicit the content of one of one's own 
implicit conceptions, we should equally not be surprised if thinkers 
sometimes mischaracterize the content of their implicit conceptions. A 
thinker's explicit endorsement of an incorrect definition does not mean 
that he does not have an implicit conception whose content is the correct 
definition. (2008: 122) 
 89
Sense Theory
This seems to be correct as far as it goes. But the point about cases where the putative 
FRR is inadequate, such as that given for chair or for concepts of individuals thought of 
in non-indexical or non-demonstrative ways, is that the deflationary explanation applies 
here as well, albeit in a diﬀerent manner. In cases where the putative FRR is not 
inadequate, there is an alternative to the explanation to do with either facts about the 
referent, as in the mathematical and logical case, or facts about semantic properties of 
certain special expressions in natural language. The deflationary explanation of cases 
where there is diﬃculty in stating an adequate FRR, or where it is only possible to oﬀer a 
vague statement, is that it is diﬃcult because the sort of basis for putative FRRs that the 
deflationary explanation exploits is missing; there is no formal system in which 
something is located, and no special linguistic expressions about which to generalise. 
Might it be that, like epistemic intensions, FRRs for individuals are description-like, 
though highly complex? This would predict the diﬃculty in stating correct FRRs for 
individuals. But it does not help matters to say that implicit conceptions are like 
descriptions, in that they determine an extension, but diﬀerent, without then specifying 
what that diﬀerence comes to. It is also unclear that highly complex FRRs for individuals 
can reasonably be attributed to thinkers capable of the simple task of thinking about 
individuals. This seems to stretch psychological realism to the limit. 
Peacocke says that “[t]o make an implicit conception explicit can, then, on occasion be a 
major intellectual achievement.” (op. cit.: 120) For the examples he gives, what eﬀort is 
needed seems to be directed more towards finding out facts about how things are, either 
with the logical or mathematical aspects of the world, or with semantical generalisations 
about words. It is not clear that this deflationary explanation lacks something that 
implicit conceptions theory provides. The problem of circularity in motivation aside, this 
point undermines the introduction of the class of mental states that implicit conceptions 
theory needs. 
The role of explanation in implicit conceptions theory is also at the root of the problem 
of circularity in application. Despite it being an important part of his overall view of 
thought, Peacocke actually says relatively little on the details of what exactly the 
explanatory link between the rationality of thought and inference and implicit 
conceptions is supposed to be, and at one point issues a promissory note for a fuller 
account in later work (op. cit.: 146). As Peacocke says, however, “explanation by an 
implicit conception is a species of explanation by a content‐involving state, the content 
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being the content of the implicit conception.” (op. cit.: 140) However the exact details 
are to be worked out, the content-involving nature of the explanation will need to be 
preserved. This brings up the following problem: 
CA2: If explanation by implicit conceptions is a species of explanation by 
content involving state, then implicit conceptions figure as premises in 
inferences; implicit conceptions can figure as premises in such inferences 
only if the content of the implicit conception features the sense in 
question; in which case, the explanation is circular. 
The problem can be illustrated by one of the examples Peacocke supplies for proposed 
implicit conceptions. For the sense he calls ‘the observation concept oval’, the implicit 
conception is this: 
What makes something fall within the extension picked out by the 
observational concept oval is that it is something of the same shape as 
things are represented to be in the perceptual experiences of things as oval. 
If grasp of the sense picked out by oval consists in knowing this proposition, then the 
account of what it is to grasp this sense presupposes the thinker’s grasp of it. Suppose oval 
did not appear in the implicit conception; there would then need to be some explanation 
of why this implicit conception explains the rationality thoughts and inferences it is 
supposed to. The account cannot just rely on the assertion that the implicit conceptions 
do have this explanatory role. It needs to say something about how they do. And the 
problem is that a necessary condition on doing this is that the implicit conception 
features the sense the grasp of which which it is meant to provide.  
Admittedly, not all of the FRRs Peacocke supplies are like the that given for oval. But this 
only means that the FRRs he supplies will not all be adequate to providing an 
explanation. If the sense does not figure in the content of the implicit conception for it, 
then there is no way, certainly no obvious way, for the implicit conception to be 
explanatorily relevant to the relevant thoughts and inferences. So the account seems to be 
adequate only on the condition of being circular. 
A response might be to argue that the implicit conception does not need to feature the 
sense in its content, but rather only needs to refer to the sense. More exactly, the sense 
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figures in the implicit conception as what the implicit conception is about rather than in 
its content. Implicit conceptions are, it could be said, conceptions about particular 
senses, rather than the referents of those senses. This is enough to make them 
explanatorily relevant without being circular.  
However, implicit conceptions referring to senses in this way would have the 
consequence that implicit conceptions theory is committed to more than implicit 
knowledge of FRRs, but also implicit knowledge of how rational thought works. It 
would hold that thinkers implicitly know that there are such things as senses, and that 
they are individuated by FRRs. In other words, rational thinkers would implicitly believe 
in Peacocke’s theory (coincidentally guaranteeing that the theory is correct). Aside from 
being scarcely credible in itself, this move would have the consequence that implicit 
conceptions theory is saved from circularity only at the cost of attributing capacities that 
there is no reason, independent of the theory, to attribute to thinkers capable of 
referentially coordinated thought. This counts as no less an explanatory deficit, and so 
does not do much to preserve what might be otherwise appealing about the theory. 
The problem stated in CA2 is, in a way, recognised by Peacocke (op. cit.: 144-8), though 
he does not go so far as to say that circularity will be part of any implicit conception 
adequate for giving explanations of rational inference. The way he puts it is by 
acknowledging that implicit conceptions theory involves a departure from the account 
given in his earlier A Study of Concepts (1992) because it drops the requirement of what 
he there called the ‘A(C) form of possession conditions for a concept’ (ibid.: 9); that is, a 
requirement on the form a theory of grasp for any given sense will take. The A(C) form 
requires that the sense not figure within the scope of a propositional attitude; that is, in 
the content of thoughts, of the thinker who grasps it as a condition on their doing so. 
Dropping this requirement allows circularity to be accepted as a part of the account. But 
Peacocke seems also to want to maintain that there is genuine explanatory content in the 
theory of grasp given in terms of implicit conceptions. In which case, the circularity 
involved must be minimised in some way so as to be unproblematic. How might this be? 
After acknowledging the violation of the A(C) requirement, Peacocke writes: 
Violations of the A(C) form are unobjectionable in the explication of a 
concept F because one can use one's own mastery of the concept F to assess 
what someone with an implicit conception involving F could be expected 
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to think or do in any given state of information. This is why a statement 
about what is involved in possession of a concept, and which does not 
respect the A(C) form, is not vacuous. It still makes an assessable claim. 
Each one of us, in evaluating the claim it makes, draws on his own mastery 
of the concept F being explicated. One draws on that mastery, and engages 
in simulations to assess what one would be obliged, or rational, to think or 
do in any given state of information. (2008: 145) 
It is unclear how this provides any response to worries about the explanatory content of 
implicit conceptions theory. It might be that explanatory content comes from the fact 
that we, as theorists, can employ our own grasp of the sense. This would allows the view 
to be ‘assessable’ by us.  
The shift to the theorist’s perspective does not minimise the circularity so as to make it 
unproblematic. What we want is an explanation of what makes it rational to have certain 
inferential dispositions from the thinker’s own perspective. The idea that circularity is not 
a problem because we can shift to the theorist’s perspective, in specifying the content of 
mental states available to the thinker when performing certain inferences, means 
remaining silent on what needed explaining. In addition, the account would now 
presuppose that the theorist has an implicit conception. The circle is widened, but not in 
a way that lessens the problem (a never-ending chain of theorists explicating each other’s 
concepts would not help). The idea that “one can use one's own mastery of the concept F 
to assess what someone with an implicit conception involving F could be expected to 
think or do” is of no help at all in figuring out whether someone possesses the concept 
(i.e. grasps the sense) in question. That is merely presupposed. 
A diﬀerent way the circularity might be minimised is to appeal to the idea that, as 
Peacocke says in the sketch quoted above, the inferences in which they figure are sub-
personal. In various places, he characterises implicit conceptions themselves as sub-
personal states. It might be that the circularity is present but is minimally problematic, 
because the inferential dispositions are rational and so personal-level, whereas the mental 
states that make them rational are sub-personal. Whatever exactly this means, it is not 
clear that Peacocke is entitled to say that implicit conceptions are sub-personal and 
maintain their explanatory role. In a comment on implicit conceptions, Burge writes: 
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I take the subpersonal level to be a level that is not only not conscious, but is 
not accessible to introspective or reflective consciousness and must be gotten at 
only theoretically. This is true of the basic grammatical structures underlying 
our linguistic competence and the information-processing structures 
underlying our perceptual experience. But… Peacocke takes implicit 
conceptions to be diﬃcult but not impossible to make explicit through 
reflection. This makes it look as if implicit conceptions are really personal-level 
conceptions, just ones that are unconscious and relatively diﬃcult to articulate 
in consciously available judgments. (Burge 2003: 384) 
A fuller assessment would require working out exactly what the explanatory relation 
between implicit conceptions and rational inferences is meant to be. But however this 
might go, the idea that implicit conceptions are really sub-personal seems to be of 
dubious coherence, and so could not be what minimises the problem. 
I conclude that a theory of grasp on the lines of implicit conceptions theory would 
involve the sense-theoretic explanation in circularity. 
3.5.3 Diagnosis and generalisation 
The fact that the problems for paradigms of the dispositional and rational basis 
approaches to the theory of grasp are so similar suggests that the source of the objections 
is something general about theories of grasp and how the sense-theoretic explanation of 
referential coordination can respond to the handles challenge. 
Though they are ways of constructing senses that make use of diﬀerent materials means 
that the precise nature of the problems are diﬀerent, there is a pattern that can be 
discerned in both. Because it is part of an explanatory theory, a theory of grasp cannot 
mention thoughts that feature the sense in question. In other words, the theory needs to 
re-describe the phenomena. The theory changes the subject by saying what it is to have an 
ability to think thoughts featuring a particular sense in their contents without 
mentioning that sense. But then it is not clear why thoughts picked out in the new way 
are the right ones. In order to show that they are the right ones, the theory needs to show 
that thoughts of that sort are those that feature the sense in question. In other words, the 
theory needs to demonstrate how its redescription relates to what is being redescribed. 
The problem is that there are multiple ways of doing this, and there is no independent 
 94
Sense Theory
reason for choosing one way rather than another. This means that the theory leaves open 
which thoughts have been picked out, the result being that the theory of grasp is not 
demonstrably adequate. The only way to determine which is the correct way is to 
presuppose the correctness of the theory, the result bring that the explanation using that 
theory of grasp involves circularity.  
The problems presented as CA1 and CA2 fit this pattern. Thoughts with senses in their 
contents are identified in terms of inferential dispositions. Idealised representation and 
rational explanation of those dispositions are ways of showing that the thoughts in 
question feature the relevant sense. Neither idealised representation nor rational 
explanation can be shown to fix the right dispositions without assuming the correctness 
of the theory of grasp in question. The problems presented as CM1 and CM2 can be 
traced to something else: generally speaking, if a theory can only be worked out by 
assuming that it is correct, then it is highly likely to be false, and the fact that theories are 
likely false makes it unsurprising that their truth needs to be assumed in order to 
motivate them. 
The source of the pattern can be traced to two commitments of sense theory, one 
essential, and one highly unavoidable. The essential commitment is the individuation 
principle, which says that the individuation conditions for senses are to be given in terms 
of the thoughts and inferences that they make rational. The highly unavoidable 
commitment is that an adequate theory of grasp needs to employ the individuation 
conditions for a sense in order to ensure a one-to-one correspondence between a sense 
and conditions suﬃcient for grasping it. The thoughts and inferences that they make 
rational must be those that involve the sense for which one is giving a theory of grasp; 
this is true both in the general case, where one quantifies over senses in general, and in 
the specific case where one takes a given sense and specifies a theory of grasp for it. This 
means that it will be necessary for those thoughts and inferences in which the sense 
features to figure as part of the account. 
This provides good grounds for thinking that the sorts of objections to the theories of 
grasp considered here will apply quite generally. If one must assume the correctness of a 
theory before doing anything with it, then it becomes unclear that one can really do 
anything at all, much less use it to give a substantive explanation. The sense-theoretic 
explanation seems to require assuming its correctness in order to motivate and formulate 
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an essential part of it, the theory of grasp. I conclude that it is safe to reject sense theory 
more generally as an adequate explanation of referential coordination. 
3.6 Conclusion 
Sense theory may seem to provide the perfect resources for giving an explanation of 
referential coordination. It posits and makes use of a kind of entity whose very nature is 
tied to patterns of rational inference. But it is really too good to be true. If there is 
nothing more to a sense than the patterns of rational inferences it is supposed to explain, 
then appeal to such things can have little explanatory content. This is illustrated by the 
failure of epistemic intensions theory and implicit conceptions theory to provide an 
adequate and non-circular theory of grasp. In the absence of any convincing reason to 
think that only sense theory will do, we have good reason to look instead at 
psychologistic explanations. 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Chapter 4 - Typed Representations Theory 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the typed representations-theoretic explanation of referential 
coordination. Although typed representations theory can provide an alternative to sense 
theory, it faces a similar objection; there seems to be no way of filling out the notion of a 
type of mental representation that does not make the explanation fail to meet one or 
other of the explanatory desiderata. 
Typed representations theory makes use of the idea that there are vehicles of mental 
content. These vehicles include mental representations at the level of complete thoughts 
(for example, the thought that Cicero is a Roman), and constituents of such 
representations (a representation of Cicero, and a representation of something’s being 
Roman). The key idea is that these constituent representations can, in some way, be 
grouped together. This is often expressed by saying that they are of the same type. 
Advocates of mental representations have made appeal to such types in order to deal with 
Frege cases and associated problems without positing a more fine-grained sort of content. 
Rather than contents that determine reference, these theorists posit types of 
representations individuated in some way or other. This puts us here: 
There is room for convergence between sense and typed representations theories, but it is 
more interesting to look at typed representations theory understood as a referentialist and 
so genuine alternative to sense theory (§4.2).  
Even as an alternative to sense theory, the typed representations explanation faces a 
problem very similar to the handles problem: it is one thing to say that there are types of 
representations, but it is another to say what it is that belonging to a type, their type 
identity, consists in. It is another thing again to provide an account of type identity that 
Psychologism Referentialism Weight
Senses No No Heavy
Typed representations Yes Yes Heavy
Mental files Yes Yes/No Heavy
Coordination functions Yes Yes Light
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provides a compelling explanation of referential coordination. Like the handles challenge, 
the typing challenge raises potential objections based on the adequacy and explanatory 
merits of the explanation that results from employing a way of typing mental 
representations (§4.3). The problem is clearly illustrated by a treatment of Frege cases 
given by Fodor in terms of the so-called language of thought hypothesis, making use of the 
idea of syntactic properties. The notion of a syntactic property is insubstantial enough 
that it can only be cashed out in a circular way that makes it devoid of explanatory 
content (§4.4).  
More substantive proposals than that found in Fodor’s discussion have been made, 
however. I consider two: Sainsbury and Tye’s originalist theory, which types 
representations according to chains of deference which link back to an original 
introduction of the type (§4.5), and Prinz’s proxytype theory, according to which 
representations are short-term constructions in working memory (§4.6). These proposals 
can be shown to be psychologically unrealistic or insuﬃciently personal-level. These 
problems are evidence for thinking that the type-identity of mental representations 
depends on rather than explains referential coordination, a conclusion reinforced by 
reflections on some remarks due to Millikan on what she mistakenly sees as the 
equivalence between what she calls typing rules and judgements of identity (§4.7). The 
conclusion is that psychologistic theories need a richer set of resources than mental 
representations and their types. 
4.2 Typed Representations as an Alternative to Sense Theory 
This section clarifies the theory under examination, and shows how it oﬀers a set of 
explanatory resources distinct from sense theory. 
To begin with, what are typed representations? The representations in question are mental 
representations. Overlooking a number of complicating factors, a minimal gloss on what 
typed mental representations are can be given like so:  
Something is a typed mental representation if it is (i) a mental entity that 
(ii) contributes its referential content to the content of a corresponding 
thought, and (iii) can be grouped together with other such entities in some 
way.  
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The ‘representations’ part of typed mental representations comes from (ii); the ‘typed’ 
part comes from (iii). The idea of a ‘type’, and its complementary notion of ‘token’, has 
its origins in the mechanics of the printing press, and is naturally associated with the 
particular way in which words, along with the letters that constitute them and the 
sentences which they in turn compose, can be grouped together. So, for example, the 
sentence ‘Every dog is a dog’ contains two tokens of the same type of word; we can say 
that they are token distinct, but type identical. Their type identity groups them together as 
tokens of the word ‘dog’. The application of this distinction to the idea of representations 
more generally is obvious. This includes mental representations, which are frequently, 
though not exclusively, cashed out as being very much like words and sentences. The 
image of ‘brain writing’ is frequently invoked for illustrative purposes, though it is 
important that mental representations be understood as psychological and not simply 
neurological in nature.  
Though sometimes taken to be controversial (cf. Kaplan 1990), there is no need to worry 
too much about the metaphysics of types and their tokens here. For the purposes of 
giving a theory of referential coordination, a type is simply any way of grouping things 
together, and tokens are simply the things that are grouped. I will refer to a theory of 
what it is that groups mental representations together as a typology. Typologies are distinct 
from types; a type is a way of grouping things, a typology is a statement concerning what 
types there are. Typed representations theory can therefore be summarised as a 
commitment to the existence of entities meeting conditions (i-iii) in the gloss above, plus 
some such statement. The exact manner in which typed representations theory might 
provide an explanation of referential coordination will depend on the details of the 
typology, but the general idea is that the conditions that group representations together 
suﬃce to provide the indication of sameness of reference. A typology adequate to this 
explanatory task will be one that groups representations together at least partly in terms 
of properties that meet this condition.  
Typed representations theory promises to avoid the problems with sense theory. A 
typology can make reference to a much broader range of factors than can the 
individuation conditions on senses. Mental representations have causal properties, and 
the properties needed to sustain these, and can interact with a thinker’s psychology in 
whatever forms that psychological processes can take. This means that typed 
representations theory can be much more closely anchored in the actual processes of 
thinking than sense theory. 
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As with sense theory, there is an initial worry to do with the fact that the particular 
theoretical commitments it makes are controversial. This is more true of mental 
representations than their being typed (if one grants the former then you get the latter for 
free). This is notwithstanding the presence throughout the history of philosophical 
theorising about the mind of appeals to mental representations of one kind or another at 
least since William of Ockham (see King 2007), to say nothing of Descartes, Locke, 
Hume and other luminaries, all of whom share the idea that mental representations 
present neat explanations for a range of facts about thought and other cognitive 
processes. Theorists often find it helpful to treat thought in terms of mental 
representations and their functional relations, such as the idea that beliefs are token 
representations in a ‘belief box’. It is not out of the question to think that the reason such 
treatments are helpful is because, in some way, they are true. At any rate, explanatory 
power is a large part of the argument for the existence of mental representations, and I 
take it that if they provide a good explanation of referential coordination, that would 
count as a strong bit of evidence in their favour. This initial worry can therefore be set 
aside. 
A more immediate complication comes from the potential congruence between typed 
representations theory and sense theory. Although mental representations, as 
psychological entities, must be distinct from senses, as abstract entities, it is easy to 
overstate the diﬀerence between the two theories. This has been exploited by some 
defenders of sense theory who would also like to make appeal to the sorts of explanatory 
benefits they see as conferred by typed representations theory (see e.g. Peacocke 2005, 
Ichikawa & Jarvis 2013). The thinking here is not hard to make out: types of 
representations, as opposed to token representations, are a bit like senses, since they are 
abstract, and can occur in contexts (as words occur in sentences perhaps in conjunction 
with a context or other semantic features) so as to determine a particular referential 
content and hence a truth condition or proposition, or some other semantic complex. 
One might therefore want to say that the correct typology is one that types 
representations by the senses that they express—again, much as words and sentences are 
said to express senses.  
This congruence does not warrant the conclusion that there could only be a merely 
’verbal dispute’ between sense theorists and typed representations theorists. The 
explanatory scope of typed representations theory is dependent on the typology that is 
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supplied; without a typology, it is a framework for explanation but will lack explanatory 
content. This need not be filled out with a sense-theoretic typology. The obvious problem 
for a typology that employs sense theory is that the handles challenge will simply arise 
anew. The rules of good housekeeping demand recognition of the congruence, but the 
exigencies of explanation favour developing typed representations theory as a genuine 
alternative.  
Typed representations theory presents a genuine alternative to sense theory, at least, when 
the typology is referentialist; a typology is referentialist if it does not group together 
mental representations in terms of (and so does not impute to mental representations) 
properties that are more basic than referential content. In the remainder of the present 
study, I will therefore understand typed representations theory specifically as involving 
such a referentialist typology, and reference to typed representations should be 
understood as mental representations with a referentialist typology. 
‘Referentialist’ is here being used in the sense introduced in §1.4, not in the sense 
employed by Edwards (2009) when discussing a version of typed representations theory 
advocated by Fodor to be examined in the next section. According to what Edwards calls 
‘Concept Referentialism’, “concepts are individuated referentially. A constituent of a 
mental state is a token of WATER insofar as it bears the reference relation to water; and 
similar for DOG and the property of being a dog, BACHELOR and the property of being a 
bachelor, and so on.” (2009: 294) Types individuated by their reference will not be 
suﬃcient to give an explanation of referential coordination either: sameness of type 
guarantees sameness of reference, but sameness of type needs to provide an indication of 
sameness of reference, and there would obviously need to be more to the explanation 
than simply that they belong to the same type, which demands further resources. A 
typology that is referentialist in Edwards’ sense would therefore make the typing of 
mental representations eﬀectively redundant. 
4.3 The Typing Challenge 
I said above that the initial worry about typed representations theory, that it involves 
controversial theoretical commitments, can be set aside in part because, if it oﬀers a good 
explanation of referential coordination, then this would count significantly in its favour. 
There is, however, a general challenge that can be raised for that kind of explanation. The 
explanation of referential coordination by mental representations belonging to the same 
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type does not simply fall out of the notion of sameness of type. Since we are taking 
sameness of type as simply equivalent to being grouped together in some way, the way of 
grouping representations needs to be developed in such a way so as to show that 
sameness of type provides an indication of sameness of reference. We can put this issue 
like so: 
Typing challenge: A typed representations-theoretic explanation of 
referential coordination is incomplete without, and so requires, an 
adequate typology. 
Putting the challenge like this hopefully makes evident the similarity between this and 
the handles challenge for sense theory. Sense theory needs a way to say which senses are 
in the contents of, or can be used to type, which thoughts, so typed representations 
theory needs a way to say which types of representations are instantiated. That there is a 
similar problem is hardly surprising, given the similarity between senses and types of 
representations. In both cases, a condition on sameness and diﬀerence—of sense or type 
of representation—is needed so as to make the explanation complete. The potential for 
objections will be the same too. If there is no way of doing this without some explanatory 
problem creeping in, then the challenge indicates that the explanation is not a good one. 
Nevertheless, the theories diﬀer in more ways than they are similar, and the similarity 
once noted should not be taken as the end of the matter. Two diﬀerences are particularly 
relevant. One is that the range of possible typologies is going to be quite broad. 
Consequently, this chapter will look at a diﬀerent typologies in order to make the case 
that the typing challenge presents more than an initial problem. There is no question of a 
diagnosis of a general diﬃculty, as was given in the last chapter to generalise the objection 
to sense theory, because of this breadth. But I think there is enough to indicate that typed 
representations are not the right way to go about explaining referential coordination. The 
other diﬀerence is that, since the potential objections that the typing challenge present 
will turn on what resources the typologies appeal to, and since these will diﬀer from those 
of sense theory, the potential objections will diﬀer also.  
Whereas the entities posited by sense theory are guaranteed to be such as to cash out the 
basic idea that sameness of sense makes for referential coordination, this is not the case 
for types. A necessary condition on a typology meeting this end is that it must supply 
type identities that match patterns of referential coordination. Relations of sameness of 
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type must, at least, match relations of referential coordination between thoughts, 
otherwise it will not be plausible that sameness of type explains that feature of thoughts. 
There is a question about whether a proposed typology can be shown to meet this 
condition. The first potential objection is that, for any given typology, this cannot be 
shown. Call this the matching objection. The second potential objection follows on from 
the first: if the typology can be shown to meet this condition, does it do so in a way that 
provides an explanation without explanatory deficits? If not, then the explanation that 
results will be no good. Call this the explanatory objection. 
4.4 The Syntactic Typology 
The potential objections presented by the typing challenge are well illustrated by what is 
perhaps the most prominent version of typed representations theory, that owing to Fodor 
(1975, 2008). Fodor claims that Frege cases and associated problems can be explained in 
terms of the formal or syntactic properties of mental representations. Call this the syntactic 
typology. The problem with it is that the notion of a syntactic property is much too thin 
to avoid either the matching or the explanatory objections. 
4.4.1 Mentalese syntax 
Fodor’s most recent treatment (Fodor 2008) is presented as a ‘fresh start’, superseding all 
previous eﬀorts (op. cit.: 57), so I limit my discussion to that attempt. On Fodor’s view, 
mental representations account for a collection of facts about thought, particularly the 
success of psychological explanation by way of attribution of belief and desire. The most 
important of these is the fact that psychology seems to make essential use of such mental 
states; they cannot be eliminated without serious and possibly total reduction in 
explanatory power. This feeds into two claims that provide impetus for typed 
representations theory: explanations involving intentional mental states are causal 
explanations, and the capacity to be in intentional mental states exhibits productivity and 
systematicity. Productivity is the fact that thinkers can be in an infinite or near infinite 
variety of diﬀerent intentional states. Systematicity is the fact that there are non-arbitrary 
links between which intentional states a thinker can be in.  
Fodor claims that these facts are best explained by the idea that thoughts consist of 
relations between thinkers and mental representations with a language-like structure. 
These representations have causal properties, and these causal properties are dependent 
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on those of the constituent mental representations (Field 1978 presents similar ideas). 
Constituent representations can be recombined in productive and systematic ways. In 
addition, Fodor claims that the causal processes that mental representations enter into are 
best understood as computational processes, akin to a Turing machine. In this 
combination of a representational and computational theory of cognition, the parallel 
with words and sentences touched on at various places above is made a feature of the 
proposal. Hence the explanatory hypothesis is known as the language of thought 
hypothesis, or LOT for short. The system of representations posited by LOT is sometimes 
referred to as Mentalese. 
Fodor’s development of LOT has largely taken place through showing opposition to 
alternatives to be inadequate. One alternative is a denial of the existence of intentional 
mental states, as in the eliminativist attitude to intentionality. Another is a denial of their 
theory-independent existence, as in the case of the instrumentalist position, notably 
defended by Dennett (1987), himself a trenchant critic of LOT (cf. Dennett 1991). 
Instrumentalism often comes with a holistic view of mental content, on which the 
smallest unit of mental content is a whole system of beliefs and desires and the inferential 
links between them. This means that the attribution of mental states to an individual 
(say, the belief that it is raining and the desire to not get wet) in order to provide an 
explanation of what she does (say, her grabbing an umbrella before going outside) brings 
with it a much wider system of beliefs, desires and inferences which characterises the 
entire mental life (or at least, the rational mental life) of that individual. A more 
moderate molecuralism contends that, at the very least, no belief or desire comes alone, 
but needs to come with a whole range of other similar states to be had at all; 
schematically, no belief about a that it is F can be possessed without having many other 
beliefs about a and other beliefs about F things.  
Fodor places great stress in opposing both holism and molecuralism. This finds a clear 
expression in his informational atomism. On this view, the smallest unit of mental content 
is a lexical concept, or a word-like constituent mental representation. Debates about 
holism, molecuralism, and atomism mainly concern the metaphysics of intentionality. 
Accordingly, Fodor’s atomism is complemented with an informational theory of 
intentional content on which intentional content is determined by nomic (law-like and 
counterfactual-supporting) relations between representations and what they represent (cf. 
Fodor 1987, 1990). 
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The strategy Fodor adopts to deal with Frege cases is one of divide and rule: distinguish 
diﬀerent sorts of Frege cases, and show that LOT has the resources to account for them 
without needing to appeal to sense theory or a sense-theoretic typology (Fodor’s reasons 
for preferring not to employ sense-theoretic resources are given at op. cit.: 52-7). He 
begins his discussion by distinguishing thoughts whose referential content is a function 
of representations that can be broken down into distinct parts, each of which has its own 
referential content (complex representations or ‘concepts’), and those that cannot 
(primitive concepts). Fodor presents this as analogous to the syntactic diﬀerences between 
simple and complex noun phrases, as in the diﬀerence between the proper name ‘Cicero’ 
and the descriptive phrase ‘the greatest Roman orator’. Syntactic diﬀerences can therefore 
distinguish concepts with the same referential content.  
Syntactic diﬀerences depend on the formal properties of representations. Formal 
properties are those that, at least, account for the way in which representations enter into 
causal or computational processes. Since, as Fodor notes, “some concepts must be basic if 
any concepts are to be complex,” (op. cit.: 66) syntactic properties must be extended to 
the primitive concepts. And, Fodor says, “[i]f there is a Frege problem, it must be about 
how to draw the type/token relation for (syntactically) primitive concepts. But if there is 
a Frege problem about primitive concepts, then it is resolved by appeal to their form, not 
by reference to their content.” (op. cit.: 75)  
4.4.2 Problems 
Whether the syntactic typology avoids the two objections presented by the typing 
challenge depends, as Fodor suggests, on cases where it would need to be primitive rather 
than complex representations at issue. A problem is that the syntactic typology is not 
substantive enough to oﬀer much help. This gets shown by a consideration of the 
‘Paderewski’ variation of Frege cases, to which a large proportion of Fodor’s discussion is 
dedicated. Recall the Paderewski case introduced by Kripke: this sort of case involves 
someone who gets presented with information about the same individual, with the same 
name, but for some reason does not understand the two occurrences of the name to refer 
to the same individual.  
One might expect that LOT would have the implication that the structure of Paderewski 
cases can be as much a feature of cognitive as linguistic representation. The Paderewski-
style case shows how the same word can be understood in diﬀerent ways. LOT 
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representations are like words, so it might be the case that LOT representations of the 
same type can be ‘understood’ diﬀerently, in the sense that they enter into psychological 
processes diﬀerently. But if LOT types are individuated by syntactic properties, and if 
syntactic properties are whatever accounts for computational processes, then it follows 
that Paderewski-style cases cannot occur on the syntactic typology. Fodor (op. cit.: 72-3) 
proposes that we represent what is going on in such cases by means of subscripts; rather 
than distinct tokens of a single type, PADEREWSKI, there are distinct tokens of diﬀerent 
types, PADEREWSKI1 and PADEREWSKI2. 
But what makes for this diﬀerence between the types that the subscripts mark? Fodor’s 
answer is this: 
I don’t care. Type distinctions between tokens of primitive mental 
representations can be distinguished by anything at all, so long as the diﬀerence 
between them is of a kind to which mental processes are responsive. Since, by 
definition, basic representations don’t have structures, type identities and 
diﬀerences among primitive Mentalese tokens are bedrock from the 
computational point of view. Tokens of primitive Mentalese formulas are 
of diﬀerent types when they diﬀer in the (presumably physical) properties 
to which mental processes are sensitive. (op. cit.: 79; emphasis added) 
This is to give up exactly where an explanation is most required. Saying that syntactic 
properties distinguish types is insuﬃcient, because the question is which of those 
properties distinguish types of the relevant sort if type diﬀerences match patterns of 
referential coordination. Saying that tokens are of the same type if they share syntactic 
properties is insuﬃcient for the same reason. So the syntactic typology does not avoid the 
matching objection. Similar objections have been made before (cf. Ayedede 1998 for an 
objection concerning inter-personal typing of LOT tokens), but it does not seem that 
Fodor has much to say in response. We get no indication of what it might be that would 
make two tokens belong to diﬀerent types other than: whatever it is that makes them 
belong to diﬀerent types. 
The matching objection aside, it is worth considering whether the syntactic typology 
could anyway really explain referential coordination. The syntactic typology is based on 
LOT, which is an account of the cognitive mechanism that accounts for the apparently 
causal nature of explanation by belief and desire, and the systematic nature of capacities 
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to be in those states. For a typology to explain referential coordination, it must be such 
that type identity provides an indication of sameness of reference that is adequately 
personal level. But syntactic properties are ill placed to do this, since they are 
paradigmatic examples of things belonging to sub-personal psychology. The only obvious 
way of avoiding this problem, or at least the only obvious way, is to define the relevant 
properties as those that explain referential coordination. This would clearly make the 
explanation viciously circular. That suggests that the reason Fodor’s treatment of what 
distinguishes simple concepts gives out is that there is nowhere else to go without making 
the account manifestly inadequate. In any case, the syntactic typology does not avoid the 
explanatory objection either (Rives 2009: 222-4 presents a similar objection). 
This second issue with the syntactic typology raises a general point about the prospects of 
typed representations explanations. Fodor’s comment, quoted above, that type identities 
of LOT tokens are ‘bedrock’ suggests that he thinks any further questions about how 
LOT tokens work in psychological explanation is misplaced. But they are bedrock, as he 
also says, from the computational, or causal, point of view. The problem presented by 
Frege cases, with which Fodor explicitly engages, and the problem of referential 
coordination, with which he does so implicitly, are not simply a matter of causal goings 
on in the cognitive system. Their being bedrock from the computational point of view 
does not mean that type identities are bedrock from the rational point of view, whatever 
exactly that might mean. One cannot simply appeal to type identities and have done 
with it (similar remarks go for Heck's (2012) claim that formal relations between 
thoughts may be treated as psychologically primitive; Heck’s focus is on explanation by 
intentional states rather than explanation of intentional states, and while his claim may 
be true in the former case, it is false in the latter). 
Fodor seems to miss a fairly crucial point about the problems, one that should not be 
missed if typed representations are going to be of use in dealing with ways of thinking. 
What moved Frege was that someone might be rational in treating things with identical 
referential content diﬀerently. In the first instance, LOT is best understood as a 
hypothesis about the causal and dispositional goings on in the cognitive system. But a 
treatment of Frege cases needs to account for a the rational properties of thought. Fodor 
seems to think that the resources of LOT can be extended to this second task, though his 
attempt by means of the syntactic typology is in the end rather half-hearted. The more 
general lesson is that a typology does not explain referential coordination, or any of the 
other problems of ways of thinking, if it is only in a position to explain the causal or 
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dispositional properties of thought. The resources available to the syntactic typology look 
not to be up to this task. 
4.4.3 Summary 
The syntactic typology provides a way of typing mental representations that is not 
substantial enough to match patterns of referential coordination (which syntactic 
properties are the relevant ones?) and seems to bear only on the dispositional rather than 
rational dimension of those patterns. A typed representations-theoretic explanation of 
referential coordination will need to go beyond typing mental representations in terms of 
syntactic or causal properties if it is to meet the typing challenge. 
4.5 The Originalist Typology 
Sainsbury and Tye (2012) have made a number of proposals framed as a way of dealing 
with a range of ‘problems of thought’, including Frege cases of several varieties, that 
provides an alternative to the syntactic typology. Their proposal individuates concepts in 
terms of origins, rather than anything analogous to formal, syntactic, or otherwise causal 
properties. Call this the originalist typology. The problem with this is that origins either 
fail to match patterns of referential coordination, or else require thinkers to have 
unrealistic cognitive capacities. 
4.5.1 Origins and abstract continuants 
Sainsbury and Tye endorse a number of claims made by Fodor in the context of 
propounding LOT, and recognise agreement with Fodor on the rejection of sense (op. 
cit.: 73), a referentialist view of content, a commitment to mental representations, as well 
as the idea that diﬀerent causal properties may accompany representations with the same 
referential content (op. cit.: 85). However, where the syntactic typology Fodor endorses 
individuates types according to these causal properties, Sainsbury and Tye endorse a 
typology that individuates types according to what they call “originating use.” (op. cit.: 
42) On this view, which they term originalism, mental representations should be 
understood as parts of non-eternal abstract continuants. Types are identified with these 
continuants, and like other continuants, such as ordinary objects, they can be 
distinguished by their origins and can undergo changes in their properties across time. 
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The substance of originalism is brought out by Sainsbury and Tye by exploiting the 
analogy between mental representations (which, as in Fodor’s discussion, are called 
‘concepts’) and words:  
Words, like concepts, are non-eternal abstract continuants. They are 
invented or created, so there are times at which they did not exist.… 
Words are not individuated by their spelling, since the same word can be 
spelled in diﬀerent ways (e.g. UK “colour”, US “color”). Words are not 
individuated by their pronunciation, for the same word can be pronounced 
in diﬀerent ways (e.g. “lieutenant”). Words are not individuated by some 
combination of spelling, pronunciation and reference, for there might have 
been two orthographically and phonetically indistinguishable names for 
the same thing.… Rather, words are individuated by their origin. (op. cit.: 
42) 
The typology for mental representations is explicitly stated later, exploiting this 
analogy: 
Both words and concepts invite the same challenge: what makes a use of a 
word or concept a use of one word or concept rather than another? The 
answers take the same form in both cases: there are originating acts in 
which words or concepts are introduced, and these form the basis for 
subsequent propagation through the linguistic or conceptual community. 
Non-originating uses are actions that are in some way dependent upon 
earlier uses, by the same or other users. (op.cit.: 59) 
Although uses of mental representations are said to be “concrete manifestations,” (op.cit.: 
64) it is left slightly unclear what the tokens are, though one can assume that they are 
things like LOT tokens. The important point (to reiterate something said above) is that, 
while LOT tokens have syntactic properties that explain their role in computational 
processes, those properties do not supply the only typology or the typology that will 
provide the best explanation of various aspects thought. Sainsbury and Tye’s alternative is 
to type representations in terms of the abstract continuants to which they belong. 
Does the originalist typology avoid the troubles of the syntactic typology? Much turns on 
how the relation of dependence tracing back to on original use, which is what constitutes 
 109
Typed Representations Theory
a token belonging to a type, should be understood, and a problem arises from the 
analogy with words on this score. The problem can be finessed by considering the 
matching objection. The idea of original use taken at face value may suggest that 
sameness of type individuated by original use does not need to, nor seem very likely to, 
match patterns of referential coordination between thoughts: two tokens might be part of 
the same abstract continuant, though the thinker does not treat them as referring to the 
same thing. This seems to rule it out as an adequate typology. But the face value of the 
idea of original use may not be the correct one. There is more to be said here, though 
seeing what exactly means going into how the originalist typology fares with the typing 
challenge. 
4.5.2 Problems 
As with the syntactic typology, it is useful to look at what is said in the context of 
Paderewski-style cases to see how and if the proposed typology works. There is some 
diﬃculty in working out what exactly the view is meant to be. There is the oﬃcial 
presentation, which seems to make type identities fail to match patterns of referential 
coordination, and there is a slightly amended presentation which makes the appeal to 
originalist types psychologically unrealistic.  
On their oﬃcial presentation (op. cit.: 131-8), Sainsbury and Tye claim that originalism 
implies that Paderewski cases are those where two tokens are of the same type. This 
contrasts with Fodor’s view that they are of diﬀerent types (as they recognise, op. cit.: 
133n9). As a consequence, Sainsbury and Tye are led to the view that such cases involve a 
thinker with false, albeit rational, beliefs about their concepts (op. cit.: 135), or a second-
order belief about their beliefs that turns out to be mistaken, to the eﬀect that they are 
about diﬀerent things (op.cit.: 137). There is nothing obviously wrong about this, 
though positing such second-order beliefs is not very neat. The problem is that it makes 
the appeal to originalist types redundant. Sainsbury and Tye implicitly recognise this 
when they say “Paderewski examples are consonant with originalism, but finding a 
suitable description of the cases makes little use of details of the theory.” (op.cit.: 138) 
Given the oﬃcial treatment of Paderewski-style cases, Sainsbury and Tye seem committed 
to a typology that hamstrings the typed representations-theoretic explanation. However, 
it should be noted that, though the analogy with words pushed down the originalist 
rather than syntactic path provides a significantly more substantive typology, the crucial 
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part—how particular uses get to have membership of the same abstract continuant—
remains under-specified. Type membership means having the same originating use, but 
what is to have the same originating use? It is surprising that Sainsbury and Tye’s direct 
comments on this are highly schematic (one is reminded of Fodor’s reticence when 
distinguishing types of primitive concepts). They say that uses are ‘R-linked’ (op. cit.: 44, 
86), and that the relation R is that of ‘descent’ (op. cit.: 44), though not much detail is 
given on the nature of R. After a short overview of relations between uses of words, we 
are told that 
[t]here is a concept-originating event, an act of subject S1, in which 
concept C is originated. This generates a C-reproducing mechanism in S1, 
which can create copies or tokens of C. Being produced by this mechanism 
is what makes S1’s later use of a concept a use of C. (op. cit.: 60) 
Perhaps the idea of a ‘C-reproducing mechanism’ gets us a bit closer. But mechanisms of 
this sort are characterised only in terms of what they achieve, the reproduction of C, and 
we wanted to know what this was, so this tells us very little.  
More of a grip on what Sainsbury and Tye have in mind is provided by their idea that the 
non-eternal abstract continuants that constitute types of mental representations are use-
trees (op. cit.: 88). These trees are sets of relations of R-linking, which Sainsbury and Tye 
call ‘deference involving’ (op. cit.: 44), and uses, which as concrete things can be 
identified independently of their types. The obvious suggestion is that referentially 
coordinated thoughts are those employing uses belonging to the same use tree. This 
indicates that the matching objection can be avoided, and that their oﬃcial presentation 
of the Paderewski case, and the face value understanding of original use, is not essential 
to the originalist typology. The originalist need not say that Paderewski cases involve two 
tokens of the same type. If deference is understood as treating as referring to the same, 
then it looks like the thinker is not deferring in her use of two token representations in 
such a case. So it must be the case that there are two distinct use trees in such cases, 
hence two distinct types. 
However, once the notion of deference is given this role in the originalist typology, and 
the abstract continuants are specified as use trees, it becomes clear that the matching 
objection is avoided only at the cost of inviting the explanatory objection. 
Characteristically, what deference involves is left underspecified. We are told that  
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deference takes the form of intending to use the concept as it has been used 
by oneself or others on previous occasions. (op. cit.: 42) 
Later, they write that 
[d]eference can be modelled (rather over-intellectually) as the recognition 
that others already use a concept, together with the desire to use the very 
concept they use, with the very reference it has in their uses. (op. cit.: 70) 
Taking seriously the idea that deference, whatever else it is, involves intentions to use a 
mental representation in a particular way, the problem is that this attributes cognitive 
capacities to thinkers that we have no reason to think they have. The rather over-
intellectual model of deference is not something that can be avoided; how else might it 
be cashed out? Any way of cashing out of deference, at least any that is not simply defined 
as whatever can explain referential coordination (or the various kinds of Frege case), will 
presumably need to attribute such capacities that involve recognition of uses of concepts 
and intentions to use concepts in the same way, and this level of reflective access is not 
something we have any reason to attribute to thinkers independently of the theory. 
The originalist typology therefore faces a dilemma: if types are abstract continuants not 
linked by deference, then sameness of types does not match patterns of referential 
coordination, and so originalism would face the matching objection; if types are abstract 
continuants that are linked by deference, then sameness of type perhaps does match 
relations of referential coordination, but the explanation of this fact is psychologically 
unrealistic, and so originalism would face the explanatory objection. 
4.5.3 Summary 
The fact that the key notion of deference is dependent on thinkers recognising and 
desiring to use their mental representations in particular ways, along with Sainsbury and 
Tye’s oﬃcial endorsement of the same-type rather than diﬀerent-type view of Paderewski 
cases, suggests that the originalist typology is really too closely modelled on how words in 
public language work (compare Millikan’s criticisms of originalism in her 2011). This is 
another demonstration that not any typology will do, and that typed representations 
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theory may not be as good an alternative to sense theory as it promised to be. A more 
radical departure seems called for. 
4.6 The Neo-Empiricist Typology 
The typologies examined in the last two sections both take their cue from an analogy 
between mental representation and words; mental representations are thought of as 
sentential (or quasi-sentential). Prinz (2002) has proposed a theory of mental 
representations that he terms neo-empiricist that stands in contrast to this. It shares the 
classical empiricist idea of cognition as depending on perceptual experience, backed up 
by appeal to developments in recent cognitive psychology, particularly the work of 
Barsalou (1999). On Prinz’s view, types can be individuated by the properties encoded by 
representations constructed in short-term working memory out of perceptual 
representations stored in long-term memory. Call this the neo-empiricist typology. The 
problem with this is that, although diﬀering from the originalist typology in obvious 
ways, it has essentially the same pattern of problems. 
4.6.1 Stored perceptual representations 
One way to express the disagreement between the neo-empiricist and the sententialist is 
over the question of whether mental representation is amodal or modality-specific. The 
modalities in question here are perceptual modalities, such as visual, aural, haptic, and so 
on. On the sententialist view, a given mental representation is not tied to any particular 
perceptual modality; it has its representational properties independently of any 
perceptual inputs into the cognitive system. On the empiricist or neo-empiricist view, by 
contrast, mental representations are “copies of perceptual representations” (Prinz 2002: 
108), and so “are couched in representational codes that are specific to our perceptual 
systems;” (op. cit.: 119) they have their representational properties only in virtue of the 
deliverances of particular modalities.  
Whether or not neo-empiricism in its extreme form is defensible, one might well think 
that the richer resources of modality-specific representations could avoid the problems 
with the syntactic and originalist typologies. The basis of neo-empiricism in the empirical 
psychological literature certainly lends it a significant line of defence against the charge of 
being psychologically unrealistic, and the problems with the sententialist typologies arose 
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due to the diﬃculties of cashing out an account of type-identity made in the image of 
word types suitable for cognition. 
In contrast to the traditional empiricist appeal to mental images, Prinz argues that mental 
representations employed in cognition are proxytypes, so called because they “stand in as 
proxies for the categories they represent.” (op. cit.: 149). Proxytypes are constructions in 
short-term working memory out of bundles of perceptual representations stored in long 
term memory across many modalities that encode properties in modally specific ways 
(op. cit.: 148-152). The properties encoded in the proxytype account for the 
categorisation and identification behaviour associated with a particular kind of thought 
(op. cit.: 161-3). So, for example, thinking about dogs will lead one to think about furry 
animals because one’s perceptual representations of dogs involve the feel of fur and the 
visual look of a medium-sized animal.  
Prinz applies his theory to what he calls ‘cognitive content’ (see Prinz’s list of desiderata 
given in §2.4), though what exactly he means by this is somewhat unclear. He elaborates 
it in terms of Frege cases and Twin earth cases (see op. cit.: 270), and states outright that 
“two people have the same cognitive content, on this proposal, when they have type-
identical proxytypes.” (ibid.) This suggests that Prinz is operating with a typology that he 
takes to be suﬃcient for explaining cases of these kinds. But how are proxytypes typed? 
Along the lines of Fodor’s primitive/complex concepts distinction, Prinz notes that a 
typology needs to provide “a set of primitives that are not type-identified by further 
features.” (op. cit.: 273) He says that there are two ways to type proxytypes: one is in 
terms of their referential content, or what they represent, which Prinz calls a proxytype’s 
real content; the other is in terms of the properties that they encode, which Prinz calls 
nominal content (the nominal/real contrast is meant to echo Locke, cf. op. cit.: 277). 
Prinz proposes that proxytypes can be typed in terms of either kind of content: 
A pair of concept tokens can be identified in virtue of sharing their real 
contents or in virtue of sharing their nominal contents. Call these “real 
types” and “nominal types.” Any given token has both a real type and a 
nominal type. (op. cit.: 279) 
Sameness of either content is suﬃcient for sameness of type; though note that these are 
distinct typologies. A dual typology of this kind is available to any typed representations 
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theorist, though the appeal to nominal types is distinctive because of its reliance on 
properties encoded by stored perceptual representations. The appeal to nominal types is 
what is distinctive about the neo-empiricist typology. 
4.6.2 Problems 
Does the neo-empiricist typology fare better than the sententialist typologies? Not really. 
On Prinz’s oﬃcial presentation, nominal types fail to match patterns of referential 
coordination. Bringing in the only obvious amendment makes the appeal to nominal 
types either circular or unrealistic.  
As before, a test of the neo-empiricist typology is in how it deals with a Paderewski-style 
case. Prinz discusses a case of “a person who fails to realise that Farrakhan the violinist is 
Farrakhan the religious leader.” (op.cit.: 271) What he says there is not much more 
satisfying than what we have seen up to now. Prinz recognises that this case “can arise 
where no diﬀerence exists in the perceptual representations constituting our proxytypes,” 
and  
[H]aving two distinct Farrakhan representations might lead one to say, 
“Farrakhan is not Farrakhan.” The point is that any diﬀerence in 
Farrakhan-directed behaviours is a function of this belief in the existence of 
two Farrakhans, not a function of anything intrinsic to the two Farrakhan 
representations.… Consequently, these two representations can be said to 
have the same cognitive contents. A person in this situation has distinct 
representations in long-term memory (think of two mental file folders 
without any contents), but their cognitive contents are the same. (ibid., 
emphasises added) 
As with the oﬃcial presentation of the originalist typology, the problem here is that 
Prinz’s take on the case looks to make sameness and diﬀerence in types irrelevant, as he 
acknowledges: “In this special case, the fact that one can be surprised to learn that 
Farrakhan is Farrakhan is explained by something other than cognitive contents.” (ibid.) The 
similarity with the originalist treatment of this sort of case is striking; there, we needed to 
amend the oﬃcial presentation so that the appeal to types was not redundant, and the 
same goes here. The neo-empiricist typology looks to be vulnerable to the matching 
objection. Is there a fix? 
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Prinz wants to say that this case is one where there are two representations with the same 
cognitive content, even though the thinker does not treat them as referring to the same 
thing. But that would seem to be a paradigm instance of diﬀerence in cognitive content, 
given that cognitive content is what cuts finer than referential content and can explain 
patterns of rational inference, which is what is at issue in Paderewski-style cases. It is 
possible that Prinz's cognitive content is really descriptive content. The contrast, in his 
terms, is between intentional content, which is what a concept represents, and cognitive 
content, which is the description that concept associates with what it represents. If this is 
right, then it is not clear that nominal types will help with explaining referential 
coordination. If nominal types are individuated by descriptive content, then there seems 
no way to get descriptions to individuate types in a way that matches patterns of 
referential coordination without inviting the explanatory objection. 
This worry can be seen by applying the proposal to the Farrakhan case. We might amend 
Prinz’s oﬃcial presentation of nominal types so that there is a diﬀerence in cognitive 
content in this case. In which case, there needs to be a diﬀerence maker. And as Prinz 
says, the diﬀerence could be the fact that the thinker has the belief that there are two 
people who happen to have the same name, rather than one. That would be information 
that distinguishes two things. We can call this distinctness information. An amended neo-
empiricist typology includes distinctness information to distinguish otherwise identical 
types of mental representations. 
The problem is that including distinctness information in the typology makes the 
account either circular or psychologically unrealistic. A typed representations explanation 
is committed to there being two representations with the same referential content, but of 
diﬀerent types. Diﬀerence in type is being explained by the presence of a belief. Either 
that belief involves representations of these types, or it does not. If it does, we have a 
circle; a belief that two things are distinct is being made use of in the explanation of what 
makes it possible to believe that they are distinct. One would need to employ those type-
distinct proxytypes, as part of an explanation of what makes them type-distinct. If it does 
not, then the account becomes unrealistic. What belief would do? Presumably, only a 
belief about one’s proxytypes, that they are representations of distinct things. In which case, 
the explanation attributes to thinkers beliefs about their stored perceptual 
representations. This is psychologically unrealistic (saying that this might be ‘implicit’ 
belief is no help; recall a similar problem with Peacocke's implicit conceptions theory). 
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Therefore the account avoids the matching problem only by inviting the explanatory 
objection.  
Prinz says the Farrakhan case is ‘special’, and so may wish to say that it does not 
undermine the neo-empiricist typology. This might be right in the sense that it is diﬃcult 
to think of a plausible case where one has no information whatsoever about two distinct 
objects, other than that they are distinct. But there can be closely related cases where a 
thinker has a quite a lot of information about two things, but no information that 
distinguishes them. This would seem to be a lot less special and a lot more common. 
Besides, if the amended neo-empiricist typology is needed to work in the special case, 
then it will always be needed; the peculiar character of the case only strips things back to 
show up the problem clearly.  
The Farrakhan case shows that the neo-empiricist typology faces the explanatory 
objection because it needs to distinguish types by reference to those types, or else by 
attributing to thinkers unrealistic levels of insight into the nature of their mental 
representations. The need for an amendment, and so this pattern of problems, extends to 
cases where there are diﬀerences in encoded property as well. Take the following instance 
of the paradigmatic conjoin-and-generalise inference: 
(1) Earlier, at t, Lucy was wearing a hat. 
(2) Now, at t+1, Lucy is not wearing a hat. 
(3) Therefore, there is something that was wearing a hat then and is not 
wearing a hat now. 
How would the neo-empiricist typology explain a thinker making this inference? On a 
non-sentential typology, there is no distinction in the structure of the mental 
representation between the Lucy-representing part and the hat wearing-representating 
part. The first two thoughts would need to involve type-identical proxytypes referring to 
Lucy. But in the first, she is represented as a hat-wearer. In the second, she is not. So the 
proxytypes in each case would encode diﬀerent properties, and so would be type-distinct. 
In which case, it should not be possible for the thinker to rationally make this inference, 
if sameness in type is what explains patterns of rational inference. And yet the inference is 
clearly one that could be a rational one to make. In which case, the neo-empiricist 
typology does not match the patterns of referential coordination. An amendment is 
needed; in this instance, information that Lucy wearing a hat at t is the same as Lucy not 
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wearing a hat at t+1. Again, the problem is that this either puts us in a circle, or makes 
the account unrealistic. 
It is striking that, though covering thoughts about a number of ‘abstracta’, such as 
democracy, causation, and disjunction (Prinz 2002: 165-188), Prinz dedicates no space 
to a discussion of how time might be represented. Internal awareness of change does play 
a role in his account of thoughts concerning causation, essentially an update of a 
Humean account with the resources of proxytype theory, making use of the awareness of 
past immediately successive events and expectation of future immediately successive 
events (Prinz 2002: 173-177). But we are not told exactly how a thinker is to represent 
one and the same object as undergoing a change over a single period of time and so what 
would make it possible to take anything from an experience of successive events. Given 
the importance of causation, change, and time to our conception of things, the fact that 
they take up a blindspot of the neo-empiricist typology is a problem, and the diﬃculty 
for the explanation of referential coordination simply makes it acute. 
Prinz may want to reply that the neo-empiricist typology is directed at something other 
than what I am insisting presents a problem for him. The explanation of referential 
coordination involves the rationality of inferential dispositions. Proxytype theory and the 
neo-empiricist typology that it supports is informed by investigations into information-
processing mechanisms undertaken by cognitive scientists. This mechanism operates 
according to the dispositions that are grounded in the various components, 
representational and operational, that make it up. Proxytype theory, it might be said, is a 
theory of this mechanism, and so is only bound to give an explanation of how the 
dispositions are grounded. The neo-empiricist typology is a way of accounting for certain 
patterns of these dispositions.  
This reply concedes the point that the neo-empiricist typology cannot explain referential 
coordination. It just tacks on the rider that it is not supposed to, which is not much help. 
But it is not clear that Prinz himself is in a position to make this sort of concession. His 
typology is meant to account for cognitive content, and cognitive content is what is 
supposed to be at issue in Frege cases. That aside, the aptness of the reply can be granted. 
But it raises perhaps the deepest problem with the neo-empiricist typology as an 
explanation of referential coordination: it is unclear how a nominal type, individuated by 
the properties encoded in stored perceptual representations, could by itself provide an 
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adequately personal-level explanation. This is an instance of the general problem I flagged 
at the end of §4.4. 
What the typology can provide, perhaps, is an explanation of the information-processing 
dispositions possessed by a cognitive mechanism, of the kind at issue in psychological 
theories of concepts. But we are looking for an explanation of the reasons a thinker has 
for being prepared to perform a certain kind of inference, and this is a distinct issue. If 
the neo-empiricist typology is to work as explanation of referential coordination, they 
need to be connected. If they are connected, we need some sort of story about how the 
former bears on the latter. And neither the neo-empiricist typology, nor proxytype theory 
more generally, provides resources for doing this. There is no contact with what a thinker 
has reason to do, only with the operations of a cognitive mechanism. Even supposing the 
matching objection could be overcome, and the diﬃculties of circularity and 
psychological realism could be avoided, whatever indication of sameness of reference is 
provided by sameness of nominal type is not one that can function as a reason. 
After eﬀectively admitting that the neo-empiricist typology is not suﬃcient for explaining 
what he calls cognitive content, Prinz adds the parenthetical instruction to “think of two 
mental file folders without any contents.” (ibid.) This remark is made in passing, but 
should be taken seriously. Prinz’s suggestion is eﬀectively that what provides the 
indication of sameness of reference concerns how information is stored or processed, 
rather than some way of typing representations that can be given independently of this. 
Mental files are entities that have a similar role in a cognitive system to proxytypes, 
though they involve making far fewer commitments as to the format of mental 
representation. Coming up with a way of linking information processing dispositions to 
the reasons a thinker has to perform inferences should go via an account of these entities 
rather than the comparatively robust long-term memory networks and proxytypes, or 
indeed any other way of typing mental representations. Doing this means examining 
mental file theory, which will be looked at in the next chapter.  
4.6.3 Summary 
The neo-empiricist typology involves a comparatively rich way of individuating types, 
but even so, it does not avoid the problems raised by the typing challenge. The 
conclusion that we could draw is that typologies of mental representations that match 
patterns of referential coordination do so because they follow those patterns, and not the 
 119
Typed Representations Theory
other way around. Consequently, they will not explain patterns of referential 
coordination. The kinds of properties of mental representations that one could give 
independently of these patterns will not supply a typology capable of the explanatory 
work required. 
4.7 Sameness Markers 
Before moving on to consider the kind of information-processing structure provided by 
mental file theory, I want to consider some related claims made by Millikan (2000) in the 
course of her treatment of what she terms grasping sameness and sameness marking. 
Millikan’s views, and no less her expression of them, are somewhat complex, involving a 
number of sometimes subtly distinct formulations. They do not fit neatly into any of the 
three theoretical approaches, but can rather be seen as advocating the idea that, to explain 
referential coordination, one needs to look at it functionally, abstracting away from how 
it is implemented. This idea is of a piece with the call to look at the properties of the 
information processing mechanism. However, her view on what this involves is 
insuﬃciently sensitive to the fact that sameness of reference figures in thought as a 
rational phenomenon. 
4.7.1 Typing rules and identity sentences 
To begin with, what is sameness marking and grasping sameness? Sameness is grasped 
when a thinker ‘re-identifies’ (or ‘coidentifies’) something, which Millikan glosses at one 
point like so: 
For a perceiver or cognizer to re-identify something JUST IS to be 
disposed, or for some subsystem of theirs to be disposed, to pair 
representations of that thing in perception and/or thought as a middle 
term for mediate inference, or other amplificatory information-processing, 
and/or for guiding action. (op. cit.: 144; emphasis in original) 
Sameness marking is what is used to grasp sameness: 
What makes a marker a sameness marker is that the perceptual/cognitive 
system use it to control the mediate inferences and other content pairings 
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that they make in guiding amplificatory information-processing an action. 
(ibid.) 
Putting aside the involvement of perception, re-identification can be understood as 
eﬀectively equivalent to what I have been calling referential coordination. Mediate 
inferences are those that involve putting together thoughts in inference. Sameness 
markers can therefore be understood as what provides the indication of sameness of 
reference. It will become apparent that this interpretation needs qualification, so I will 
stick with Millikan’s terminology for the time being. 
Much of Millikan’s argument is dedicated to showing the inadequacy of Fregean accounts 
of mental content (op. cit.: 159-176). Her argument against Fregean accounts of mental 
content begins with a discussion of what she calls models of sameness marking, how the 
mind or brain (cf. her revealing remark at 2000: 140) marks sameness, beginning with 
what Millikan variously terms the ‘Strawson model’, ‘dot markers’, or the ‘naive 
Strawson-model’ on which “all those individuals [a thinker] knows of are represented by 
dots, and the predicates the man knows to apply to each are written on lines emanating 
from these dots…” (op. cit.: 136) (these dot markers can be recognised as basic mental 
files, see §5.2). Another model is the duplicates model, that “pictures thoughts each as a 
separate sentence token in a mental language,” (op. cit.: 137), familiar from the 
discussion of typed representations. She also mentions an 'equals sign model’, on which 
“a mental equals sign” uses or “rides piggyback on the duplicates marker, indicating 
examples of two diﬀerent duplicatable types,” the eﬀect of which is “that all tokens of 
either exemplified type are then treated as representing the same.” (op. cit.: 137-8). Along 
with these, she mentions a ‘synchrony model’, a ‘Christmas lights model’, and an 
‘anaphor model’, which we need not discuss. 
The crucial claim that Millikan makes is that the models of sameness marking are 
functionally equivalent to dot markers (op. cit.: 160). This means that they involve the 
brain or mind using something in just the same way as it would a dot marker; what 
matters is the use, not the choice of model. Millikan draws from this the conclusion that 
Fregean treatments of mental content are mistaken (op. cit.: 168-70). This argument 
presents significant interpretative diﬃculties (cf. Lawlor 2005), and can be set aside. 
More important is that, during the discussion of why the functional equivalence of all 
models of sameness marking to dot markers has this consequence, Millikan remarks that 
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the only exception to the functional equivalence of sameness marking to dot markers is 
the equals sign model (op. cit.: 160). Millikan proposes "to explore this model… in its 
most naked form, namely, that in which discursive thinking is analogised to the 
unfolding of a formal system." (ibid.) In such a system, ‘identity sentences' of the form 
a = b 
are the same as what she calls ‘typing rules’ governing the syntax for the language (op. cit.: 
162). When the terms for composing well-formed formulas are given, the individual 
constants are set out as letters, with a rule that all letters of the same type receive the same 
interpretation (op. cit.: 165). This allows for trivial transformations, such as  
F(a) ⊣⊢ F(a) 
Introducing an identity statement allows one to make non-trivial transformations such as 
F(a) ⊣⊢F(b) 
So, as far as a formal system is concerned, identity statements are logically 
indistinguishable from typing rules. They have no distinct role to play in characterising a 
logical language, the only diﬀerence being that typing rules are needed to prevent 
regresses in formulation, for long familiar reasons (Carroll 1895).  
Similarly, Millikan claims, identity judgements are functionally the same as typing rules 
for mental representations: 
For the mind, there… is no distinction like that between an identity axiom 
or postulate, A = B, written at the top of the page, and a typing rule. For 
there is no distinction like that between what is written on the paper and 
what is written in the structure of the reader—in the structure responsible 
for conforming the reader's reactions to a certain typing rule.... Write an 
identity sentence, that is, a structure responsible for producing certain 
coidentifications, in neuronal patterns instead of in graphite, and the 
distinction between identity sentence and interpretation mechanism 
vanishes.... Marking sameness, however that's done, and fixing identity 
beliefs is exactly the same thing. (op. cit.: 167) 
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She goes on to conclude that, “as distinguished from an identity sentence or assertion, 
there is no such thing as an identity judgement.” (op. cit.: 172) Although she does not 
make it fully explicit, the conclusion is that the non-equivalence of the equals sign model 
to the Strawson model does not matter because it requires identity judgements to play a 
distinctive role, which they do not. 
4.7.2 Millikan’s mistake 
Millikan’s discussion raises a couple of points. One is that typed representations oﬀer 
only an implementation of a general functional aspect of cognition (‘grasping sameness’), 
and that a proper understanding of that function can abstract away to a certain extent 
from how it is implemented. This point seems correct, and to some extent, the positive 
account to be oﬀered below will be in this spirit. The other is that we can understand that 
function by means of seeing what follows from an implementation of the Strawson 
model, and dispense with identity judgements. This point is not correct. It involves 
mistaking a rational phenomenon for a merely dispositional one. Grasping sameness 
cannot simply be the use of dot markers and their functional equivalents, for this reason. 
Providing some way of typing representation that is many-one related to referential 
content is not enough. There needs to be some explanatory content provided by the 
typology, and having this explanatory content involved meeting the condition that it 
explain why having the paradigmatic inferential dispositions would be rational. By 
contrast, Millikan does not distinguish between typologies in this way, at least within the 
scope of thinking about what it is for a mind or brain to grasp sameness. It is precisely 
her point to instead claim that, functionally speaking, they are all the same—that is, they 
are all functionally equivalent to dot markers. Grasping sameness, for Millikan, is 
therefore a matter of having a certain set of dispositions towards one’s information, old 
and new. This does not allow for the fact that grasping sameness concerns the reasons 
thinkers have for organising their information in the way distinctive of treating them as 
being about the same thing. This exerts an explanatory demand on theories of grasping 
sameness that naïve Strawson markers and their functional equivalents cannot meet; or, 
perhaps, if they can then this remains to be demonstrated, and we have reasons to think 
they cannot. 
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The dispositions on which Millikan focuses are involved with recognitional abilities, or 
abilities to re-identify, which she terms ‘substance concepts’ (an unhelpful choice of 
words, as Millikan has recognised, cf Millikan 2013: 281). Strictly speaking, Millikan 
denies that abilities are simply dispositional (see her discussion at 2000: 51-63), so it is 
possible to object that she is really only concerned with these. One might also point out 
that the problem cannot be exactly that the functionally equivalent ways of grasping 
sameness are inadequately personal level, which was one of the main problems faced by 
typed representations theory, since they seem to be functions exercised at that level. The 
point still stands that her discussion neglects how the abilities to re-identify, and the way 
that sameness markers structure these abilities, have a rational aspect; there are reasons 
that bear on how they are exercised, and naive Strawson markers by themselves provide 
no account of how this can be.  
Another way to come at the problem here is by considering the point that, while the 
obvious way for identity to figure in thought is as the content of a judgement to the 
eﬀect that one thing is identical to another, this cannot be how referential coordination 
works. Apart from the fact that this merely introduces another step in the inference in 
need of coordination, there is also the plain fact that identity judgements (of the 
informative variety) see past diﬀerences in ways of thinking, which must be diﬀerent from 
whatever sameness in way of thinking might be. The point is that identity judgements 
and whatever accounts for sameness in way of thinking have distinct roles in our 
cognitive lives. Identity judgements can be subject to further inquiry, to be confirmed or 
disconfirmed, and the consequences of either would be of a diﬀerent kind entirely from 
continuing or dissolving a single way of thinking. Identity judgements, therefore, cannot 
be functionally equivalent to typing rules that provide types that reflect relations of 
referential coordination. They have diﬀerent rational—hence functional—roles. 
This diﬀerence between identity judgements and referential coordination is seemingly 
invisible to Millikan because she neglects the fact that grasping sameness, and 
recognitional and re-identificatory abilities, are rational phenomena. 
In light of the fact that Millikan thinks that her claims about sameness marking speak 
against Fregean theories of mental content, it is worth returning briefly to the topic of 
how typed representations theory figures as an alternative to sense theory. Those aligning 
themselves with Frege's reflections on the cognitive value of identity statements, and his 
broader concern with the nature of inference, are often primarily concerned about 
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questions to do with rationality (Burge 1993a, Peacocke 2005). As we have seen, and in 
sympathy with Frege's general lack of concern with the actual psychology of thinking, 
Fregeans tend to be not so concerned about the actual process of thinking, except insofar 
as this helps articulate what it is to grasp a sense. Those opposed to the Fregean tradition 
tend to be less concerned about rationality, and more foundational questions about the 
psychology of intentional mental states, particularly the basis of the capacity to have 
thoughts and the explanation of the properties of that capacity. Hence the criticisms 
levied by opponents of Fregean sense are often unpersuasive, their treatments of Frege 
cases unconvincing, and their views are open to being simply assimilated to the Fregean 
view (that both sides often put their claims in terms of concepts only makes matters 
worse). 
It is possible to think that the idea that there is something to do with rational inference 
that is more fine-grained than reference is suﬃcient for a Fregean view of thought. But 
this is unhelpful at best. It overlooks what is distinctive and substantive about Frege’s 
contribution, and what many have found appealing in it. As I have argued, this 
contribution is ultimately not going to prove satisfactory when extended to explaining 
referential coordination. And that may lead one to think that, if there are problems with 
the Fregean notion of sense, then one can disregard rationality altogether, and simply 
concentrate on dispositions. Millikan’s arguments against Fregean theories of mental 
content can be seen in this way. She rejects modes of presentation—Fregean senses—and 
so is required to deny a distinctive role to identity judgements. The mistake on the latter 
point indicates a mistake on the former, in argument if not in conclusion.  
It is possible both to reject the appeal to sense theory and to allow thought to be more 
than just something that simply happens to us. The problem then is to work out a more 
satisfactory alternative than typed representations theory provides. To follow up on 
Millikan’s suggestion to concentrate on the functional aspects of gasping sameness, it is 
necessary to look at how information is stored and processed in inference, with an eye to 
seeing what form of rationality this might supply. 
4.7.3 Summary 
The problems with typed representations theory might make one think that the right way 
to go is to abstract away from particular implementations, so avoiding the need to 
provide substantive typologies, and instead concentrate on the functional aspects of 
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referential coordination. Millikan makes this point, but takes a one-sided view of what 
that would involve, a view that leads her to overlook the important rational diﬀerences 
between inferences that involve identity judgement and those that do not. Preserving this 
diﬀerence means taking seriously the rational dimension of referential coordination. 
Doing so does not mandate a Fregean approach so long as a more satisfactory 
psychologistic approach can be found. 
4.8 Conclusion 
Typed representations theory provides an alternative to sense theory, but it fails to oﬀer a 
significantly better explanation of referential coordination. A typology is needed that 
both matches patterns of referential coordination and provides an indication of sameness 
of reference of the appropriate sort to do the explanatory work. Neither the syntactic 
typology proposed by Fodor, the originalist typology proposed by Tye and Sainsbury, nor 
the neo-empiricist typology proposed by Prinz negotiate the typing problem without 
falling short on either of these points. These problems need not deter one from pursuing 
the suggestion that a psychologistic explanation will do better than sense theory, but if it 
can, then a diﬀerent conception of the psychological entities and properties involved is 
needed. Millikan’s suggestion to view typed representations in terms of the information 
processing functions they implement points to a means of doing this, but her dismissal of 
identity judgements as playing a distinctive role in inference shows that it needs to be 
suﬃciently sensitive to the rational aspect of how identity figures in thought.  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Chapter 5 - Mental File Theory 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter evaluates mental file-theoretic explanations of referential coordination. 
Mental file theory overlaps with both sense theory and typed representations theory in 
some respects, but deserves independent consideration as it makes available explanatory 
resources that are inessential to or incompatible with those theories. I will examine some 
treatments of mental file theory in the literature, and argue that they fail to provide 
explanations of referential coordination that are both psychologically realistic and 
suﬃciently general. 
The exact nature of explanation by mental files is relatively up for grabs. Mental files are 
psychological entities, and existing treatments of mental file theory tend to tie them 
closely to the explanation of referential content, and so can be considered heavyweight. 
Whether this explanation of referential content involves a more fine-grained notion of 
content depends on particular applications. This puts us here:  
As a way in to seeing how explanation by mental file should go, I consider two worries 
that might be raised about any such explanation: that talk of mental files cannot, or 
should not, be understood literally, and that they can provide only vacuous explanations. 
There are sound reasons to reject both worries. Mental file theory can be understood as a 
literal appeal to a kind of mental entity, one that can be defined in terms of having file 
structure, and these entities can be made the subject of substantive explanatory claims. 
On the latter score, mental files are to be understood in the first instance as (part of ) the 
cognitive basis of the paradigmatic inferential dispositions; they can then be made the 
target of substantive commitments that go towards providing an indication of sameness 
of reference. Although the first part is an instance of theoretical stipulation, the 
substantive commitments are made in the course of the second part (§5.2). 
Psychologism Referentialism Weight
Senses No No Heavy
Typed representations Yes Yes Heavy
Mental files Yes Yes/No Heavy
Coordination functions Yes Yes Light
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Treatments of mental files in the literature divide roughly in to those that make use of the 
basic model of mental files, one that only requires them to have file structure, and more 
elaborate models that impute to them more substantive properties. Examples of the first 
kind of explanation can be found in Lawlor and Schroeter. I will argue they are 
committed to psychologically unrealistic claims concerning the cognitive capacities of 
thinkers capable of referentially coordinated thoughts (§5.3). Recanati’s more robust 
indexical model of mental files holds mental files to be governed by functional restrictions 
on information that individuate types of mental file analogous to types of indexical 
expression in public languages (§5.4). Although Recanati makes clear that he thinks this 
model is adequate to explain facts about rational inference, it is not clear what he has in 
mind. The most plausible application of the indexical model is that the functional 
restrictions that individuate file types supply an indication that the information comes 
from the same source (§5.5). The problem with the indexical model is that it provides, at 
best, an insuﬃciently general explanation of referential coordination, and perhaps none 
at all. The core cases of referentially coordinated thought have no plausible restrictions on 
which information can be associated with the relevant file, and there are arguably no 
mental files with such a restriction (§5.6). 
5.2 Explanation by Mental File 
In one form or another, the appeal to files has been made in a number of areas. In a 
useful summary, Salis (2013) locates the first application of mental files to philosophical 
theorising to Grice (1969), who discusses ‘dossiers’ in the context of making claims about 
empty names and the referential use of descriptions. Strawson (1974), building on 
Lockwood (1971), used files to frame claims about identity statements. Around the same 
time, Donnellan (1970, 1974) used files to discuss the semantics of proper names. Later 
work by Evans (1982), Perry (1980, 2001), Devitt (1989), and Forbes (1989, 1990) 
applied the idea in order to deal with related problems. Talk of mental files is an enduring 
feature of recent philosophical literature on thought and reference (cf. Jeshion 2009; 
Dickie 2010; Friend 2011). Files also figure in work in linguistics, notably in the work of 
Karttunen (1976) and Heim (1983), and in cognitive psychology, notably in the work of 
Kahneman, Treisman and Gibbs (1992). 
Although these are all topics related to the problem of referential coordination, rather 
than go over this literature in detail, it is more useful to come at the question of how 
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explanation by mental files works, or could work, from a slight remove. I will do this by 
considering two general worries about explanation by mental files that can be raised even 
in the absence of any detailed statement. The first worry is that talk of mental files in any 
venue can only be metaphorical. The second worry is that, if they are to be used to give an 
explanation of referential coordination in particular, they seem to be constructions out 
of, or merely reflections of, what is supposed to be explained, and so talk of mental files is 
explanatorily vacuous. Both worries loom large over any appeal to mental files in the 
course of giving an explanation. Since the positive view that I will present in the next 
chapter makes use of mental file theory, it is worth spending some time on this. Saying 
something to ease these worries will help shed light on what mental files, and so what an 
explanation of referential coordination by mental file, will involve. 
5.2.1 File structure 
Salis (op.cit.: ii) notes, though without much emphasis, that talk about files in the mind 
is often taken as metaphorical. Recanati, one of the more prominent mental file theorists, 
says something to this eﬀect (2012: vii), for instance. Even considered entirely in the 
abstract, there is obviously the potential for theorists to diﬀer in how they understand 
talk of files to be useful for thinking about referential coordination, or any other feature 
of thought or language. Files as metaphorical entities could provide a way to model 
certain features of thought. Or else the existence of mental files might be accepted as a 
kind of fiction, though doubts about their genuine existence remain. Perhaps we ought to 
think that this is the right spirit, perhaps the most charitable spirit, to take talk of mental 
files, since the hedge of deeming them metaphorical protects talk of mental files from 
being rejected on the grounds of unfounded speculation about psychology. This 
immediately presents a worry about the suggestion that a genuine explanation can be 
given in terms of mental files. While metaphors are useful for explanation insofar as they 
serve as guides for what can be said if we want to say what is going on, if we want to 
know what is really going on, explanations in literal terms are needed. So if mental files 
are metaphors, then they may be seen as suspect as a means of providing a genuine 
explanation. 
The idea that talk of mental files is best taken metaphorically is not clearly right, however. 
Talk of mental files can be understood as making literal appeal to a category of actual 
mental particulars with a certain structure that make an actual diﬀerence to the workings 
of minds of which they are a feature. For this literal appeal to be possible, a way of saying 
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what a mental file is that does not depend on simply saying that they are like normal files 
with the exception of being mental is needed. The key feature of the occupants of oﬃce 
drawers and filing cabinets is that they are particulars in which one can put various bits 
of information and from which one can take information, and yet they persist even so. 
This key feature as a guide can be used to spell out the notion of a mental file as follows: 
Something is a mental file if it is (i) a mental particular (ii) that is 
associated with bits of information (iii) in a way that organises that 
information, (iv) has persistence conditions that do not depend on those 
associations (i.e. survives gain and loss of associations with bits of 
information), and (v) can enter into causal relations with other mental 
particulars, states, and events in virtue of the information with which it is 
associated. 
Meeting conditions (ii-iv) is suﬃcient for having what we can call file structure. This is 
what mental files have in common with their non-mental counterparts. Conditions (i) 
and (v) say what is distinctive about mental files, that they are things with causal roles in 
the cognitive system, and that these roles are a consequence of their having file structure. 
What I refer to as mental file theory is the idea that there are mental entities with file 
structure. 
File structure can therefore be defined, not just by saying that it is whatever mental files 
have in common with their non-mental counterparts, but by defining a general way for 
things to be that is common across otherwise diﬀerent sorts of things. Perhaps this is a 
kind of metaphor, but it presents no kind of hedge as to the existence of files. Talk of 
mental files can be intended just as literally as talk of non-mental files. Consider the sorts 
of files that can be found on a computer: these are not the same as files that exist in the 
three dimensional world, but they are files all the same. They contain information, can 
exist even when that information is changed, and serve to organise that information, and 
so have file structure. Computer files are not metaphorical; they really exist. Talk of 
mental files can be intended as talk about really existing things in the same way. 
The most interesting way of talking about mental files in the context of an explanatory 
project is this literal way. Explanations in terms of mental files should be taken that way, 
then, at least in the first instance. This remains the case even though the description of 
mental files is incomplete in some ways; there are many diﬀerent ways of thinking about 
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information, association with information, and what the structure of the information so 
associated might be like. There are also diﬀerent ways of understanding the causal 
relations that they enter into, perhaps, computational, associational, or both, or neither. 
File structure is realisable, as it might be put, in multiple ways. But it remains something 
that can be literally instantiated in the mind, however realised. 
5.2.2 Two-part explanations 
This brings up the second worry, that explanation by mental files is vacuous. The basis of 
the worry is the thought that mental files can only be defined in terms of whatever it is to 
be explained. There is some truth in this, though not in a way that makes explanation by 
mental file vacuous. 
Fine gives forthright expression to the worry in the context of his discussion of 
coordination: 
[I]t is hard to know what talk of mental files is meant to convey. Perhaps 
one thing it may reasonably be taken to convey is that certain items of 
information are stored together in a single “location,” while other items of 
information are not. Thus the information that Cicero is a Roman and that 
Cicero is an orator will be stored in the same location, while the 
information that Cicero is a Roman and that Tully is an orator (for 
someone who does not know that Cicero and Tully are the same) will not 
be. 
But we may now ask: in virtue of what will information be stored in the 
same location or in a diﬀerent location? After all, there is nothing intrinsic 
to the idea of co-location which requires that colocated items should be 
related in any particular way. And surely the answer to the question is that 
the location will be the same when the information represents its object as 
the same. (2007: 67-8) 
Fine draws the conclusion that 
mental files should be seen as a device for keeping track of when objects are 
coordinated (represented as-the-same) and, rather than understand 
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coordination in terms of mental files, we should understand the workings 
of mental files in terms of coordination. (ibid., emphasis added) 
If this is right, then talk of mental files adds nothing to an explanation, since it 
presupposes what is to be explained. 
A similar worry exercises Recanati in a related context: 
Integrative behaviour on the part of the subject is a symptom of 
informational clustering, but it is not what constitutes, or accounts for, 
informational clustering. So the question: ‘What is it for two pieces of 
information to occur in the same file?’ cannot be answered simply by 
appealing to the subject’s integrative behaviour. On the mental file 
account, the subject’s integrative behaviour is explained by the 
hypothesised clustering of information. The further question, ‘what 
explains the clustering?’, still awaits an answer, and this is where circularity 
looms.… It is hard to answer that question without appealing to the fact 
that the subject takes the relevant information (that which goes into the 
file) to concern one and the same object. (2012: 95-6) 
Recanati draws the conclusion that the worry that mental file explanations are circular 
is essentially right and should not be resisted; but I also think it is a 
mistake to view the objection as undermining the mental file framework. 
One cannot, without circularity, account for internal co-reference (the fact 
that two pieces of information are taken to concern the same object) in 
terms of the occurrence of that information within a single file. If 
anything, it is the other way round: Two pieces of information go into the 
same file if they are taken to concern the same object. (2012: 101) 
If this is right, then mental files presuppose the referential coordination of thoughts they 
are supposed to explain. Roughly the same idea is endorsed by Lawlor (2001: 80). Fine 
and Recanati’s ways of supporting the worry are slightly diﬀerent, but both suggest that 
there is to a greater or lesser degree a problem with explanation by mental file being 
vacuous.  
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For Recanati, as a proponent of mental file theory, this seems like a less than ideal 
conclusion to reach. Be that as it may, we need not share it. How might talk of mental 
files bear on the explanation of referential coordination? It is possible to answer this in a 
way that shows the circularity worry to be based on a conflation. 
The problem of referential coordination concerns the rationality of the paradigmatic 
inferential dispositions. This combines two diﬀerent things to be explained. One is the 
inferential disposition, the fact that thoughts which are referentially coordinated are those 
with which the thinker is disposed to perform the paradigmatic inference. The other is 
the rationality of the dispositions, the fact that these dispositions do not just happen to a 
thinker, but instead there are reasons to have them. The inferential dispositions can be 
taken as one part of the causal properties of a cognitive system, explained by the sub-
personal entities and processes that account for the make up of a person’s mind. The 
rationality of the dispositions calls for explanation of a distinctive kind, one that says 
what reasons the thinker has. In the case of referential coordination, this is the indication 
of sameness of reference. Our focus is on the rational dimension, but the dispositional 
dimension need not be ignored. 
Separating out the dispositional and the rational dimensions of referential coordination 
in this way provides the possibility for a particular form of explanation: one can 
introduce, by means of theoretical stipulation, some entity (and/or process) as part of the 
cognitive system to account for the dispositions, and then complete the explanation by 
providing substantive claims about those entities addressed to the way in which these 
dispositions are rational, thus giving the theoretical stipulation empirical content. Call 
explanations of this form two-part explanations. Two-part explanations based on 
theoretical stipulations has precedent in other areas; unobserved or ‘hidden’ entities with 
specified causal powers are postulated as what brings about a certain range of 
phenomena, and earn their keep through the substantive claims they can sustain and the 
gain in explanatory power thereby achieved. 
Explanation by mental file, as I will understand it, is a two-part explanation. The first 
part is the introduction of mental entities with file structure by theoretical stipulation as 
the grounds of the disposition to engage in the paradigmatic inferences at issue. The 
inferential dispositions are causal consequences of a particular state obtaining in the 
thinker’s cognitive system, of some bits of information being associated with a mental file 
(one might compare this with the introduction of structured mental representations to 
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explain causal facts about intentional mental states in the manner of the LOT hypothesis; 
I will return to this in §6.2.5). In the second part, these mental particulars are made the 
subject of substantive commitments so that some indication of sameness of reference is, 
at least in part, provided by the fact that the thoughts involve the same mental file. The 
content of these commitments gives the particular character of specific treatments of 
mental file theory. The desiderata on a good explanation of referential coordination apply 
here. 
This two-part form of explanation is not the only way, nor the usual way in the literature, 
for mental file theory to be applied, though Recanati (2012: 96) says something along 
these lines (see also Schroeter 2012). Given this, it is puzzling that Recanati reaches the 
less than hopeful conclusion that he does. His reason, stated in the above quoted passage, 
is that mental file theory needs to say what makes it the case that two bits of information 
are associated with the same file, and that one needs to appeal to the fact that the subject 
takes the relevant information to be about the same thing to do this. We can now see that 
this runs together diﬀerent senses of ‘makes it the case’ that should be kept apart. That a 
thinker has a certain set of inferential dispositions involving two thoughts implies that 
they are referentially coordinated and so, according to the stipulation, involve 
information associated with the same mental file. But it is not what brings it about that 
they are referentially coordinated. According to the first part of the explanation, being 
associated with the same file has the causal consequence that the inferential dispositions 
obtain. So this will be something concerning the implementation of the file structure, 
which can be set aside for the purposes of characterising the functions of mental files. 
Recanati’s conclusion only goes through if these two senses coincide, which they need 
not. 
For the same reason, Fine’s objection that mental files merely track when thoughts are 
referentially coordinated is mistaken. What makes two bits of information ‘co-located’, or 
associated with the same file, is not that they are referentially coordinated, even though 
that is what, on the two-part explanation, implies that they are. Being co-located is a part 
of the explanation of the dispositional dimension of referential coordination. This makes 
use of a theoretical stipulation, but that does not make explanation by mental file 
vacuous. The substantive claims about mental files that provide the explanation of the 
rational aspect will be empirical claims about features of a category of mental particular. 
 134
Mental File Theory
Is explanation by mental file really of the two-part variety? One might think that the 
second part is redundant, or at least, it is obvious what it should look like, and so the 
distinction is only useful to show that the worry about vacuousness is mistaken. If mental 
files are associated with information, it might be said, then they have a topic or subject 
matter, and if they have a topic, then we have enough to say that mental files function so 
as to gather information on the same thing, and this function provides a defeasible 
indication of sameness of reference.  
It is not at all obvious that mental files have the envisaged function in the relevant sense. 
Talk of ‘function’ is ambiguous between factive and normative senses: there is what 
something in fact does, and what it is meant to do. Only a normative function could 
provide the needed indication. Two mental files might in fact be associated with 
information about the same thing, but it is not part of what they are meant to do that 
that is the case. What is needed is an indication of sameness of reference, which would be 
an indication that the non-normative function is being carried out. Nothing about the 
idea of file structure as such bears on this. 
The main point is that we need an answer to the question of how they get to have that 
function, and how it provides an indication of sameness of reference. Providing such an 
answer would just be to provide the second part of the two-part explanation. Making this 
simply a matter of stipulation would be to decline the task of oﬀering a substantive claim 
about mental files to give mental file theory its empirical content. And since diﬀerent 
accounts of how mental files explain referential coordination provide diﬀerent 
comparisons with competing theoretical approaches, whether a positive evaluation of 
mental file theory can be returned will depend on whether any of these accounts supply 
an explanation without recourse to this sort of stipulation. Mental file theorists, 
therefore, would be advised to provide the substantive claims as part of showing why 
such an approach is explanatorily better than the alternatives, and go with the two-part 
form of explanation. 
5.2.3 Summary 
Mental file theory is the literal appeal to a class of mental particulars with file structure. 
Explanation by mental file can be given as a two-part explanation, the first part being the 
introduction of mental files through theoretical stipulation, the second being substantive 
claims about mental files that bear on the rationality of the paradigmatic inferential 
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dispositions. Neither point is compulsory, but they have clear advantages in responding 
to the two general worries about explanation by mental file, and so I will proceed on that 
understanding. 
5.3 Basic Model Explanations 
A mental file-theoretic explanation of referential coordination of the two-part variety 
needs to provide a claim about what feature or features of mental files provides an 
indication of sameness of reference. We can call the basic model of mental files the idea 
that mental particulars with file structure have no further explanatorily relevant 
properties considered in themselves. Basic model explanations employ only the basic 
model of mental files, and so need to bring in some further entities, processes, or 
properties to explain referential coordination. More robust models make comparatively 
stronger commitments, to the eﬀect that mental files have functional properties in 
addition to the possession of file structure. Basic model explanations are at a significant 
advantage so far as discharging the demand on mental file explanations is concerned, 
being comparatively conservative in their commitments. However, as I will argue in this 
section, the weaker set of commitments about mental files seems to require a stronger set 
of commitments elsewhere that make the explanations psychologically unrealistic. 
5.3.1 File management and metasemantics 
How might a basic model explanation work? Some suggestions can be drawn from two 
treatments of mental files in the literature. Although neither treatment is directly 
addressed to referential coordination, they are both developed in response to similar 
problems, and so I propose to apply them to the task of providing an indication of 
sameness of reference. 
According to Lawlor (2001), thinkers are in possession of mental files just in case they 
have file management dispositions (op. cit.: 79-91). By file management dispositions are 
meant dispositions to screen and prune information, i.e. to include only information that 
coheres with other bits of information and exclude information that does not, and to 
revise information on the basis of new information. File management dispositions (or 
perhaps their exercise) are then said to constitute a reliable attempt to maintain an 
intentional relation, i.e. sustain the information associated with the file as being about a 
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particular thing (op. cit.: 72-5). File management dispositions that constitute such an 
attempt therefore provide an indication of sameness of reference. 
Schroeter (2012) argues that the fact that information associated with a mental file is 
treated as being about the same thing means that they are the target for the application of 
what she calls a metasemantic theory (op. cit.: 190). A metasemantic theory in her sense is 
a set of propositions that says that thoughts that meet certain conditions should be 
interpreted in a certain way, as being about one thing or another, or nothing. Part of this 
theory is the axiom is that if a thinker is disposed to treat her thoughts as being about the 
same thing, then all things being equal, they are about the same thing. The ‘all things 
being equal’ clause signals the fact that this is one of several axioms which must be taken 
as a whole. These will presumably also make reference to other facts about the thinker’s 
dispositions, although Schroeter does not provide a detailed treatment of potential 
defeaters for the interpretation. The explanation from this treatment is that the 
indication of sameness of reference comes from the fact that the dispositions and the 
metasemantic axioms combine to make it the case that the information is in fact about 
the same thing.  
Schroeter explicitly emphasises that she is attempting to provide what she calls a 
connectedness model (op. cit.: 190-5), which means that it provides an explanation of the 
rationality of a thinker’s inferential dispositions in terms of relations between thoughts, 
rather than simply resemblances between thoughts that depend on properties that can be 
specified independently. In a similar way, Lawlor’s idea of file management dispositions is 
a relational fact, having to do with what a thinker does with her files, rather than in 
properties of the files considered independently of this. Both explanations therefore 
depend on some cognitive capacity thinkers have with respect to their mental files such 
that information’s being associated with the same mental file is an indication of sameness 
of reference.  
It is important to emphasise that it is not merely the obtaining of the dispositions, but a 
further fact about a thinker’s cognitive capacities that provides the indication of sameness 
of reference on these basic model explanations. On Lawlor’s approach, the exercise of file 
management dispositions constitutes a reliable attempt to make the information bear on 
the same thing. This is important, since it cannot be that the file-management 
dispositions themselves do the work. The thinker must be sensitive to the dispositions as 
constituting the attempt, as Lawlor recognises (2001: 91-95), otherwise it is not clear 
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why file management dispositions would bear on the rationality of the paradigmatic 
inferential dispositions. As Lawlor has it, “sensitivity to one's files is a capacity for 
detection of the presence of one's own characteristic screening and pruning dispositions.” 
(op. cit.: 95) Similarly, if the metasemantic theory does not figure in the characterisation 
of any cognitive capacity that the thinker has, it is unclear how their application to the 
information that the thinker is disposed to integrate should make any diﬀerence to the 
rationality or otherwise of that disposition. 
5.3.2 Psychological realism 
Both basic model explanations rely on a distinctive sort of cognitive capacity, a capacity 
that provides for sensitivity to the fact that information associated with a mental file is 
about the same thing. There is no independent reason to think that all thinkers who are 
capable of referentially coordinated thoughts have these capacities, and there are good 
grounds for thinking that they do not. So the explanations fail to meet the psychological 
realism desideratum. 
Sensitivity to one’s file management dispositions or metasemantic axioms should be 
evinced by the thinker if the explanations are going to work. This awareness need not be 
in the form of something that the thinker could express, and so it is not to the point to 
say that thinkers are not (normally) able to talk about their file management dispositions 
or metasemantic theory. It just means that there needs to be something in the 
dispositions or activities of the thinker that provides evidence for this sensitivity, and it is 
not clear that there is any such evidence. There seem to be a couple of options for what 
counts as evincing this sensitivity, neither of which are good ones. If it is argued that the 
rationality of the paradigmatic inferential dispositions is itself evidence for the role that 
cognitive policies or metasemantic theory play in a thinker’s dispositions, then the 
account becomes circular. If it is denied that there needs to be any such evidence, then 
the explanations become open to the charge that they fail to provide a adequately 
personal-level explanation. If the sensitivity is operative at all, it would not be operative 
at the personal-level, and so it would become unclear how it would provide the thinker 
with reasons to treat her thoughts as being about the same thing. 
So, as has been the case with many of the problems raised against the explanations that 
have been examined, a charge of failing to meet a desideratum or requirement can 
seemingly only be avoided at the cost of failing to meet another. 
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Since neither the file management dispositions treatment nor the metasemantic axioms 
treatment is addressed to referential coordination as such, this should not be taken as 
internal criticisms of either Lawlor’s or Schroeter’s discussions. The basic model 
explanations in terms of file management dispositions and metasemantic axioms are 
extensions of their treatments to a diﬀerent explanatory concern. One might be tempted, 
in light of this, to object that the charge of psychological unreality is nullified by the 
accounts’ explaining other phenomena. Although the explanatory concerns are diﬀerent, 
they are related, and this objection fails as a result.  
Schroeter focuses on coreference de jure, which is stronger than referential coordination, 
but weakens it to make a condition that can be taken as coincident with referential 
coordination; the idea is that the thinker has reason to take her thoughts to be de jure 
coreferential, which is just what referential coordination is. Lawlor sometimes puts her 
explanatory aim in terms of showing what warrant a thinker has for treating her thoughts 
as having the same sense, though it is not clear if she means this to pick out the thicker 
theoretical notion of sense discussed above. If so, then it is redundant. If not, then it is 
just the same as what that thicker notion is meant to explain. Moreover, it is clear from 
Lawlor’s remarks that she takes this kind of warrant to be something that is only had if it 
is rational to treat the thoughts as referring to the same (§6.4.2 below provides related 
discussion on these points). 
5.3.3 Summary 
On the present showing, what basic model explanations gain by using a simpler model of 
mental files, they pay for with a less realistic view of thinkers’ cognitive capacities. One 
could extrapolate from the problem raised for the Lawlor- and Schroeter-inspired 
accounts that any way of spelling out the relationship between mental files and the 
cognitive system in such a way as to give a basic model explanation will face the same 
problem. It is one thing to say that there are such things as mental files, but another to 
say that we have dealings with them that are exercises of certain cognitive capacities, and 
that these exercises are what indicates sameness of reference in core cases. The cognitive 
capacities in question are not something we have reason to think we possess 
independently of the need to provide a basic model explanation.  
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Ultimately, this line of reasoning rests on a conception of how one might employ the 
basic model of mental files that is too narrow, and an idea about the relevant cognitive 
capacities that is too strong. Something similar to, though much less demanding than, 
Lawlor’s view can provide an adequate explanation of referential coordination that avoids 
the charge of being psychological unrealistic. And Schroeter’s idea of a connectedness 
model is essentially correct in its idea that it is not resemblances between thoughts but 
relations between them that depend on what is done with them that matters (a idea also 
to be found in Millikan 2000, see §4.7). For the time being, however, I will treat the 
worry about basic model explanations as motivating more elaborate models of mental 
files. 
5.4 The Indexical Model 
Recanati's (2012) detailed treatment of mental files grasps the nettle and commits to a far 
more robust take on mental files than the basic model. The indexical model construes 
mental files as vehicles of thought akin to indexical expressions in public language. The 
key feature of the model is the idea of functional restrictions on information associated 
with files. This is the central part of a somewhat complex overall view of mental files that 
the indexical model encompasses. I will set out this view in as much detail as needed to 
see how it might supply an explanation of referential coordination, and then argue that 
the most plausible of these is nevertheless not a good explanation of referential 
coordination. The problem with the explanation provided by the indexical model is that, 
while it relies on mental files having functional restrictions on information, the core cases 
of referential coordination need to be understood as featuring mental files without 
functional restrictions, and so the explanation does not apply.  
5.4.1 Functional restrictions and indexicality 
Mental files are understood by Recanati in a way consonant with the definition of basic 
mental files given in the previous section, as things that store information (2012: 33) and 
survive changes in informational association (op. cit.: 35-38). However, he also claims 
that they are vehicles of thought, and that their being such is a consequence of their 
having certain functional properties.  
Recanati’s frames his presentation of the indexical model with the distinction between 
general or merely descriptive thought about things, and singular thought, thought that is 
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not about something because of its satisfaction of a description. The viability of this 
distinction is a matter of some controversy (the papers in Jeshion 2010 provide a number 
of recent interventions in the various debates concerning this distinction), though we 
need not go into this for present purposes. Following Bach (1987: 12), the distinction is 
understood as that between satisfactional and relational denotation; X denotes Y 
satisfactionally iﬀ. there is some condition that X denotes and Y satisfies that condition. 
X denotes Y relationally iﬀ. there is a relation that obtains between X and Y, or 
alternatively, between the producer/thinker/speaker of X and Y.  
The kinds of relations in which one can stand to something in order to have a singular 
thought about it are acquaintance relations, or what Recanati (2012: 20, 34-39) calls 
epistemically rewarding relations (‘ER relations’ for short). These are relations between a 
thinker and an individual such that the thinker can get information about that 
individual. That singular thought depends on acquaintance is a view, often traced to 
Russell (1911), which is widely accepted, though rejected by some (see Jeshion 2009; 
Hawthorne & Manley 2012 for recent discussion in this vein). Recanati’s view is 
comparatively liberal with respect to what counts as an acquaintance relation when 
compared with Russell’s, even to the extent of allowing ER relations that do not rely on 
any particular form of getting information (on which much more below). Because 
mental files are vehicles of thought that are based on ER relations, and because ER 
relations determine the referent of the file, there is some blurring of the content/vehicle 
distinction. Some of Recanati’s critics (e.g. Pagin 2013: 136-7) make heavy weather of 
this, though it is not obvious that an un-blurred version of this distinction is something 
that we should insist upon (cf. Recanati 2013: 213-8). But it is worth noting that the 
indexical model is intended as a theory of the vehicles of thought, and so is heavyweight. 
On the indexical model, mental files are said to be based on ER relations. Being based on 
an ER relation explains why and how mental files are vehicles of (singular) thought. But 
it is not immediately clear what it means. Recanati talks about this aspect of ER relations 
in two ways: first, the information associated with a file should have been gained through 
the relevant ER relation (2012: 61); second, the mental file ought to exist only so long as 
the relevant relation obtains (ibid.). 
According to the first claim, mental files are governed by what we can call acquaintance 
norms. According to the second claim, files are also governed by existence norms. How are 
these claims related? According to Recanati,  
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Since [/if ] the function of a (type of ) file is to exploit a given (type of ) ER 
relation, [then] a token of that type should come into existence only if the 
subject stands in the appropriate contextual relation to some entity, a 
relation in virtue of which it will be possible for him or her to gain 
information from it. Unless there is an information channel of the 
appropriate type which the file can exploit, there should be no tokening of 
that type of file. (op. cit.: 52) 
The idea is that mental files are governed by acquaintance norms because files are created 
(variously ‘opened’, or ‘tokened’) in order to exploit particular ER relations. So 
acquaintance norms are supposed to apply because existence norms apply.  
The first way of taking the idea that mental files are ‘based on’ ER relations, that they are 
governed by acquaintance norms, is the more important for understanding the indexical 
model, and why it is indexicality that is the important property. Acquaintance norms 
specify a kind of ER relation, the norm being that only information got via that ER 
relation can be associated with the mental file. Being governed by an acquaintance norm 
is what I will call a functional restriction on the information associated with mental files. 
Indexical expressions, such as ‘I’, ‘here’, and ‘now’, are expressions with a standing 
meaning that does not vary across occasions of use, and a token reference that is fixed by 
particular contexts of particular use. Functional restrictions supply the analogue of 
standing meanings. The things that stand at the other end of the ER relations are the 
referential contents, the analogues of token reference.  
Recanati sometimes (e.g. op. cit.: 60) makes this claim by saying that files are 
individuated by ER relations. The indexical model appeals to the distinction between file 
types and token files. Since types and tokens are diﬀerent sorts of entity, the 
individuation by ER relations can mean diﬀerent things: either that ER relations 
distinguish types of mental file, or that what type a token mental file belongs to depends 
on the ER relation it is based on. The idea that ER relations ‘individuate’ token files is 
not wholly accurate. Standing meanings do not individuate token indexical expressions 
(two tokens of an indexical expression, for instance ‘I’ and ‘I’, might have the same 
standing meaning, but are diﬀerent) but are individuated by their standing meaning and 
also whatever makes them individual expressions more generally. Similarly, token files 
will be individuated by whatever makes them individual mental entities. This point 
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makes clear that indexical mental files are similar to but not the same as the propositional 
constituents posited by sense theory (Recanati’s discussion sometimes plays down this 
point, cf. 2012: 27-41, 244-6). They are mental entities, and so have a diﬀerent sort of 
individuation condition. In light of the problems that were raised for sense theory, this is 
important. Token indexical mental files might be seen as ‘quasi-senses’; they share some 
properties with senses, in particular that of determining referential content, but are 
diﬀerent most obviously in being mental particulars. 
5.4.2 The hierarchy 
Just as token files are in this way based on ER relations, diﬀerent types of indexical 
mental file are based on diﬀerent kinds of ER relations. There are three broad 
classifications of ER relations germane to this question: basic ER relations, composite ER 
relations, and the higher-order ER relation. The diﬀerences between and details of these 
and the functional restrictions they impose through acquaintance norms are important 
for evaluating the indexical model, and so it is worth going through what Recanati says 
about them. 
Recanati discusses a number of examples of basic ER relations. Perceptual demonstrative 
files are those that exploit present perceptual ER relations, information links to objects 
made available through various sense modalities, normally though not necessarily those 
that are in one’s present surroundings. Diﬀerent kinds of perceptual ER relations can be 
distinguished according to diﬀerent modalities. Memory demonstrative files (op. cit.: 62) 
are those that exploit past perceptual ER relations, those that do not hold at the time the 
file exists storing rather than being updated with information gained through perceptual 
contact. Recognitional files are those that are based on an ER relation Recanati terms 
familiarity, which depend on an ability to recognise an object due to ‘multiple exposure’ 
to it. Familiarity is context-dependent in the same way as past and present 
demonstratives, because “[i]n a diﬀerent environment the very same recognitional device 
in place in the subject would have had the function of detecting another object than 
what it actually has the function of detecting in the actual environment.” (op. cit.: 59). 
Whether this makes it genuinely context-dependent depends on it being the case that 
one and the same recognitional ability could pick out diﬀerent things in diﬀerent 
contexts. 
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Although each is defined to some extent with reference to the others, the basic ER 
relations and the files that are based on them cannot be reduced to any more basic ER 
relations or type of files. Composite ER relations, by contrast, are the result of a file 
gaining information through combining or compounding (op. cit.: 71) basic ER relations. 
Unsurprisingly, the combinations are many and various: one can have a perceptual 
recognitional or memory recognitional, or more generally demonstrative recognitional, as 
well as memory-perceptual ER relations. These count as non-basic recognitional relations 
because they are not based on the basic familiarity relation, but a combination of basic 
ER relations that has a similar eﬀect to the basic familiarity relation.  
A classification of ER relations that cuts across the basic/composite distinction is the 
distinction between stable and non-stable files. An ER relation is stable when the 
individual picked out does not necessarily change given a change in a thinker’s context 
over time, a change in what one can perceive or where one is in the world. Basic 
recognitional files are stable, whereas demonstrative-recognitional files are not, since 
demonstrative files are not. A particular species of stable file is what Recanati terms the 
‘self ’ file, which is based on ways of getting information that one has only in relation to 
oneself, i.e. proprioception, nociception, etc. (op. cit.: 68-75). 
The third kind of ER relation, the higher-order ER relation, is the relation that obtains 
whenever any of the first-order, i.e. basic or composite, ER relations obtain. Recanati 
calls files based on higher-order relations encyclopedia entries. Encyclopedia entries are 
thought of as equivalent to or doing the work in thought of proper names (Recanati 
discusses them in this way in his 1993: 181-187). What is the point of such files? One 
answer is that there are many things we can think about for which the ability to think 
about them does not depend on any perception, memory, familiarity, nor any 
combination of these. Nor does this ability come with any particular restrictions on ways 
that information about them be gathered. Rather, such thoughts exploit whatever way of 
getting information about the object in question are available in an ‘opportunistic’ 
fashion (cf. Recanati 2012: 73).  
Proper names are naturally taken to be quite diﬀerent from indexical expressions; 
similarly, mental files for opportunistic thoughts appear not to have the features of 
indexicals that indexical mental files are supposed to have, there being no obvious analog 
to standing meaning as distinct from token meaning; what is the type of which they 
would be tokens? However, Recanati writes, 
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I think we can fit encyclopedia entries into the indexical model. The only 
thing we need is to make room for a new sort of relation to the referent: a 
higher-order relation which holds whenever we stand in some ER relations 
to it. In other words, rather than say that some files are not based on 
relations to the referent, I draw a distinction between specific ER relations 
and the higher-order ER relation on which encyclopedia entries are based, 
namely 
λxλy[(∃R)(Rx,y)] 
where ‘R’ ranges over ER relations. A subject (or a mental file in the 
subject's mind) x stands in that relation to an object y just in case there is/
are some first-order ER relation(s) in which x stands to y. A file based on 
the higher-order relation hosts any information derived in virtue of that 
relation, that is, ultimately, any information derived in virtue of any of the 
first-order ER relations.… Encyclopedia entries come at the top of a 
hierarchy of files. (op. cit.: 74-5) 
The indexical model therefore provides a type of mental file for cases where the way 
someone has of thinking about something is not dependent on particular ER relations 
she stands in to them.  
5.4.3 Operations 
The hierarchy of which encyclopedia entries form the top is articulated in terms of 
operations on files. One operation in particular is relevant to the explanation of referential 
coordination, that of conversion, “the process through which information stored in a file 
is transferred into a successor file when the ER relation which sustains the initial file 
comes to an end.” (op. cit.: 81) Conversion comes in two sorts: it can involve change 
from one basic ER relation to another, or change from a basic to a composite ER 
relation. Recanati terms the second sort incremental conversion (op. cit.: 87). In addition 
to this, expansion is incremental conversion that operates on what Recanati calls proto-
files: these are mental files that can only contain information gained through one ER 
relation. Incremental conversion turns these into conceptual files, which are those that can 
contain information gained in other ways, and so can be employed in thought more 
 145
Mental File Theory
generally. Recanati’s remarks on how encyclopedia entries relate to proto- and conceptual 
files (i.e. first-order files) are sketchy, though he suggests that the creation of it might also 
be understood as a kind of incremental conversion, albeit one that depends on a thinker’s 
linguistic capacities in some way (op. cit.: 102-3).  
A less speculative suggestion, which is nevertheless consistent with the involvement of 
language, is that, along with incremental conversion, there is also detachment. 
Detachment is a species of conversion of a conceptual file based on a composite relation 
to an encyclopaedia entry by dropping all functional restrictions on the information. 
There will be the requirement that all the information comes from the same thing, but 
this will not impose any specific functional restrictions, like the exclusion of information 
gained through certain sensory modalities. Incremental conversion is a species of 
conversion operation that, unlike detachment, adds to the information about the 
information associated with a file by chaining additional ER relations. Detachment, by 
contrast, takes away information, by dropping the functional restrictions. Whether the 
creation of encyclopaedia entries is a matter of linguistically-mediated incremental 
conversion or not, what is important is that mental files based on the higher-order ER 
relation are not based on any particular first-order ER relation. This may seem like a 
minor detail, but it will play an important role in later discussion. 
Recanati’s treatment of the indexical model involves other operations that are more 
properly understood as incremental conversion, rather than detachment. These are 
linking, through which information contained in two files is shared, and merging, 
through which two files are fused to create one file. Linking and merging capture the way 
mental files relate to judgements of identity. Thinking that one thing is the same as 
another can be understood as relating two files in these ways, either by sharing 
information across them, or fusing the files themselves. These relations describe the 
dynamics of a thinker’s system of mental files on the indexical model, though the general 
idea of operations on files has application outside of that model (see §7.3 for further 
discussion). 
5.4.4 Explanation by indexical file 
What explanation of referential coordination might we get from this? Recanati touches 
on related problems under the heading of ‘integrating information’, and oﬀers this: 
 146
Mental File Theory
Files are a matter of information clustering. Clustering takes place when all 
the information derives from the same source, through the same ER 
relation, and when it takes place, it licenses the integration and inferential 
exploitation of the information in question. The role of the file is precisely 
to treat all the information as if it concerned one and the same object, from 
which it derives. But integration and exploitation of information is blocked 
if the relevant information is distributed in distinct files, for then, there is 
no presumption that all the information derives from the same object. So, 
even if I know that Cicero is bald, and that Tully is well-read, I cannot 
conclude that some bald man is well-read, despite the fact that Cicero is 
Tully: the information ‘is bald’ is in the Cicero file, while the information 
‘is well-read’ is in the Tully file. Informational integration and inferential 
exploitation of information only takes place within files, on this picture. 
(2012: 42-3) 
Although this passage might be read as presenting clustering as something that follows 
directly from the notion of a mental file (“files are a matter of information clustering”), 
clustering as characterised is not something that arises out of the notion of a basic file 
introduced above. Talk of clustering as happening when information derives from the 
same source risks conflating two things that need to be distinguished: that information is 
associated with a file, and how it is that information comes to be associated with a file. 
The idea of clustering therefore must involve the substantive claim that information is 
supposed to be associated with mental files because it was derived from the same source 
through the ER relation specified by the acquaintance norm on the file. This will bear on 
the fact that it is information about the same thing, and presumably this plays a role in 
‘licensing’ the integration. But how exactly?  
A natural suggestion is that it means that mental files themselves have referential contents 
on the indexical model. They are supposed to be vehicles of singular thought. If they are 
vehicles of singular thought, then sameness of mental file implies that either there is 
sameness of reference, or no reference at all. A problem with this is that it seems to 
require an identity judgement, albeit in part regarding the mental file involved in the 
thoughts, and what is wanted is an account of how identity can be represented without 
such judgements, since it would otherwise misdescribe the distinctive sort of of 
inferences that are made available by referentially coordinated thought. The deeper 
problem is that it is psychologically unrealistic, requiring as it does the thinker to form 
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beliefs about the representational aspects of their cognitive system as such. This meta-
representational capacity is one that we have no reason to attribute to a thinker 
independently of the proposed explanation. So the natural suggestion ought to be 
resisted on closer inspection. 
An alternative explanation, and one that fits in more neatly with the overall thrust of the 
indexical model, is one that appeals to the acquaintance norms, not as what confers 
referential content on mental files, but as placing constraints on the information 
associated with mental files. These constraints provide information about the 
information, along the following lines: if there is a functional restriction on the 
information associated with a mental file, then there is an indication that the information 
was associated with the mental file as a result of being derived from the same ER relation; 
if the information was associated with the mental file as a result of being derived from the 
same ER relation, then the information comes from the same thing, since token ER 
relations are individuated in part by their relata; so if there is a functional restriction on 
the information associated with a mental file, there is an indication of sameness of 
reference. This explanation makes use of the fact that the ER relations on which files are 
based serve to identify objects. The indication of sameness of reference that the 
functional restriction provides is defeasible, but it need not be otherwise in order to be 
adequate to explaining referential coordination. 
It is hard to say with absolute confidence that this a fair representation of Recanati’s 
thought, especially since he spends practically no time spelling out how it is he thinks 
clustering licenses the integration of information. But I submit that the reconstruction in 
terms of acquaintance norms presents the most plausible way of joining up the indexical 
model with the idea that clustering has this licensing eﬀect. 
Critical responses to Recanati’s indexical model have largely focused on concerns with 
how well it can be motivated, particularly with regards to comparisons with (what are 
eﬀectively) basic model explanations (cf. Hall 2013; Papineau 2013; Ball 2015; Ninan 
2015), and on whether the indexical model is coherent, particularly with regards to 
whether the indexical typing of mental files coherently maps onto the rationality of 
inferences across diﬀerent ways of getting information or across information gained at 
diﬀerent times (cf. Goodsell 2013; Onofri 2015). Recanati (2013) has responded to both 
sorts of worry, and it is not my intention to press either.  
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It is, admittedly, sometimes unclear exactly what Recanati thinks motivates the indexical 
model. One can grant as highly plausible the idea that files stand in ER relations, but 
reject the move from that to their being based on ER relations and so governed by 
acquaintance norms. But we can grant that the indexical model is well motivated so long 
as it provides a good explanation of referential coordination. On this score, it seems to 
avoid problems that beset other explanations. That there are ER relations, that there are 
diﬀerent sorts of ER relations, and that there are functional restrictions of these diﬀerent 
sorts are all plausible, and so no untoward demands are placed on thinkers in order to 
have referentially coordinated thoughts. What provides the indication of sameness of 
reference on the indexical model, the functional restrictions, are not things that are to be 
analysed, introduced, or explained in terms of referentially coordinated thoughts, so the 
non-circularity desideratum also looks to be met.  
5.4.5 Summary 
On the indexical model, mental files are governed by acquaintance norms that specify ER 
relations between the file and an individual. These functional restrictions are of diﬀerent 
kinds, giving rise to diﬀerent types of file. Files of diﬀerent types can be related through 
various operations. The functional restrictions on files can explain referential 
coordination because the ER relations specified by the acquaintance norms obtain 
between only one individual and a file. This explanation avoids many of the problems 
with competing explanations. 
5.5 The Generality Problem 
Despite its merits, there is room for doubt about whether the indexical model 
explanation is suﬃciently general. One of the desiderata on an explanation is that it 
should extend to the core cases. The indexical model, as the name suggests, is directed at 
peripheral cases, thoughts about ourselves, our present location and present time, which 
Recanati discusses at length. He also discusses cases where a thinker is getting 
information about objects with which she is in perceptual contact, for which the term 
‘demonstrative’ is used (see the discussion of basic ER relations in §5.4.2). These cases are 
apt to be put under the heading of special ways of thinking. But the core cases are not 
like this. They fit into the indexical model as cases that involve encyclopedia entries, 
those at the top of the indexical model’s hierarchy. The problem is that the resources 
needed for indexical explanation are absent from this sort of file. A more radical worry, 
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which I shall sketch but not develop further, is that all cases where referential 
coordination is possible would need to involve encyclopedia entries. Either way, the 
indexical explanation faces a problem with generality. 
5.5.1 Absence of indexical explanations from encyclopedia entries 
Before setting out the problem, a bit of terminology. A mental file featuring functional 
restrictions on the information associated with it, as described by the indexical model, is 
an indexical file; an indexical file has a first-order functional restriction if and only if it is 
governed by an acquaintance norm that specifies a first-order ER relation; a case consists 
of a thinker with the paradigmatic inferential disposition involving two thoughts, and 
who is rational in doing so; an explanation of referential coordination that relies on the 
functional restriction on information associated with a mental file is an indexical 
explanation. An indexical explanation of a case involves the assumption that the thinker 
has an indexical file with which is associated information that is to be exploited in the 
paradigmatic inference, and for the sake of argument, we can grant that this assumption 
is otherwise free of problems.  
The claim that causes problems for indexical explanation is: 
Absence: There is no indexical explanation in cases where the indexical file 
is based on the higher-order ER relation. 
Absence is supported by two principles concerning indexical explanations: 
Dependence: There is an indexical explanation of a case only if there is a 
mental file that has a first-order functional restriction in that case. 
Exclusion: If the mental file in a case is based on the higher-order ER 
relation, then that file does not have have a first-order functional 
restriction. 
The problem is that indexical explanations work through functional restrictions on 
informational association, but mental files based on the higher-order ER relation have no 
such functional restriction. The two claims that imply Absence can be motivated by 
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looking at the details of the indexical model explanation in cases of mental files based on 
ER relations of both the first- and higher-order. 
Exclusion follows from the nature of encyclopaedia entries. Encyclopaedia entries are 
created by the kind of expansion operation that I earlier termed detachment. Detachment 
is the operation of dropping first-order functional restrictions (either through creating a 
successor file or through modifying an existing file; as per the discussion above, this 
diﬀerence can be ignored for the purposes of this objection). In light of the distinction 
between proto- and conceptual files, these first-order functional restrictions will involve 
composite ER relations. Because encyclopedia entries, indexical mental files based on the 
higher-order ER relation, are supposed to be able to include information gained 
opportunistically, from any source, they exclude any composite ER relations that could 
figure in a functional restriction on information associated with the file.  
To see why Dependence obtains, consider the following abstract description of a case. 
Suppose F is a perceptual-recognitional file. Call the functional restriction on the file R. 
Because F is governed by R, information associated with F is gained through a composite 
ER relation involving both a perceptual ER relation (call it P) and a memory ER relation 
(call it M) to the same thing. Information associated with F can be integrated by means 
of the paradigmatic inferences because R is a restriction on the information associated 
with F such that the information is gained through P and M and information gained 
through P or M should be from the same thing. The first-order restriction F involves the 
disjunction of two restrictions involving basic ER relations, which together serve to 
indicate sameness of reference. Without the first-order restriction, there would be 
nothing that would supply an indication of sameness of reference as per the indexical 
explanation. So if we removed those restrictions, we would remove F. And if we remove F, 
then there is nothing to indicate that the information comes from the same thing. Thus 
indexical explanation depends on there being a first-order functional restriction, i.e. 
Dependence. 
Absence presents a problem for indexical explanation because it means it fails the 
desideratum of suﬃcient generality. Cases where we have more than one way, perhaps an 
indefinite variety of ways, of getting information on something, and can integrate the 
information gained in those several ways, are amongst the core cases. Encyclopedia 
entries, the mental files are suited to such cases, are based on the higher-order ER 
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relation. The argument from Dependence and Exclusion to Absence shows that indexical 
explanation does not extend to those cases. 
5.5.2 Responses 
Is there some way for the proponent of indexical explanation to avoid the charge of 
insuﬃcient generality? They might reject Dependence, though it is not clear how there 
could be an indexical explanation that did not depend on a first-order ER relation. 
Although Exclusion follows from the definition of encyclopedia entries, a defender of 
indexical explanation might wish to respond by arguing that, in some way, there is a first-
order functional restriction even in the case of encyclopedia entries: 
Against Exclusion 1: Since the higher-order ER relation was introduced by 
abstracting over first-order ER relations, it follows that when an indexical 
file is based on the higher-order ER relation, there is a first-order ER 
relation in place; if there is a first-order ER relation between an object and 
the indexical file, then there is a first-order functional restriction on the 
file. So Exclusion can be rejected. 
Something like this is quite possibly what Recanati has in mind when discussing the 
higher-order ER relation, for all the little he says in terms of the nuts and bolts of 
licensing the integration of information. 
The first part of the response can be granted. Exclusion does not say that, when a file is 
based on the higher-order relation, there is no first-order ER relation in place. That 
would be in direct conflict with what the higher-order ER relation is. What it does say is 
that there is no functional restriction that specifies a first-order ER relation. The problem 
is that, even if there is a first-order ER relation in place, it is not the case that there is a 
first-order functional restriction. This is a problem with the second part, the idea that if 
there is a first-order ER relation between an object and the indexical file, then there is a 
first-order functional restriction on the file. Since it is not suﬃcient for indexical 
explanation just that there is some first-order ER relation, this is needed for the response 
to work. But it is also false. If there is a first-order ER relation whenever the higher-order 
relation obtains, which there is, then for it to provide an indexical explanation, it must be 
one that figures in a functional restriction. That requires that the file is based on that ER 
relation. An encyclopaedia entry, by definition, is not based on a first-order ER relation. 
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The move from there being the higher-order ER relation to there being a first-order 
functional restriction is incorrect, and so Exclusion can stand.  
The only sense in which there is a first-order functional restriction is the one which is in 
the file’s operational past, prior to the creation of the encyclopaedia entry through the 
detachment operation. This does not provide any reason to reject Exclusion, however. If 
the higher-order relation obtains, and so there is a first-order ER relation in the file’s 
operational past, that first-order ER relation is screened out by detachment, in the sense 
that it no longer supplies a functional restriction on the information associated with the 
file. This is so however the conversion operation, of which detachment is one instance, is 
supposed to work, either as change in a numerically identical file, or change across 
numerically non-identical files. Information can be (that is, it would be permitted by the 
higher-order acquaintance norm to be) associated with that file in a way that would have 
been ruled out by a first-order acquaintance norm, and so it does not even partially 
govern a file based on the higher-order ER relation. A mental file that was once based on 
a first-order ER relation, or a file that is the descendant of a file based on a first-order ER 
relation, is no longer based on a first-order ER relation after detachment. There can, 
therefore, be no way of getting an indexical explanation in virtue of a norm based on a 
first-order ER relation in a file’s operational past. 
The response that denies Exclusion might be pressed in a slightly diﬀerent way: 
Against Exclusion 2: Although it might not follow from Recanati’s 
explication of the higher-order ER relation that encyclopedia entries based 
on it have a first-order functional restriction, we can change how the 
encyclopedia entries are to be understood so that it does follow. So 
Exclusion is false. 
This response depends on making a change to how the higher-order ER relation is 
understood. But what change, exactly, and why make it?  
I take it that Recanati’s explication of the higher-order ER relation takes the form that it 
does for a reason, and so this response implies that that reason is non-conclusive, and 
anyway is shown to be misleading by the problem posed by Absence. Perhaps this is all 
the motivation one needs, though it is apt to seem highly ad hoc. In any case, it cannot 
be made to work. The change would have to make it the case that, when the higher-order 
 153
Mental File Theory
ER relation obtains, there is a first-order functional restriction. There are two problems 
with this. One is that this would be the case only if there were some particular individual 
that the higher-order ER relation picks out as the source of all the information in the file. 
Now, it is true that the higher-order ER relation obtains when there is an individual that 
is picked out by a first-order ER relation, and also that the higher-order relation depends 
on there being at least one first-order ER relation between a file and an individual. This 
does not entail that there is one individual from which all the information associated 
with the file comes. So an indexical file’s being based on the higher-order relation 
provides no indication that the same individual is picked out by any of the ER relations 
in which the file stands.  
The change would therefore have to be that encyclopedia entries are not based on the 
higher-order ER relation, but some other kind of ER relation adequate to the task. The 
obvious suggestion is that they are based on a kind of composite first-order ER relation, 
albeit an open-ended and highly complex one. Call these compendious ER relations. But, 
and this is the second problem, compendious ER relations do not suﬃciently diﬀer from 
the higher-order ER relation in order to show that Exclusion is false. Compendious ER 
relations are disjunctions of indefinitely many first-order ER relations. Compendious ER 
relations would, in that case, supply no diﬀerence with respect to what functional 
restrictions are in place. Eﬀectively, there is no functional restriction supplied by a 
compendious ER relation, since one can always make an exception for any information 
potentially associated with the file. Indexical files based on a compendious ER relation 
and those based on the higher-order ER relation would not diﬀer in any meaningful way 
from the perspective of whether an indication of sameness of reference is supplied. If 
indexical files based on compendious ER relations are functionally no diﬀerent from 
encyclopedia entries, it still does not follow that encyclopedia entries allow for indexical 
explanations. So Exclusion can stand. 
The only other strategy available to the proponent of the indexical model is to deny that 
Absence is really a problem after all:  
Absence Is Not a Problem: Indexical explanation is limited to cases of mental 
files governed by first-order ER relations, as per Absence, but Absence is 
not a problem because (i) there are no encyclopaedia entries; (ii) 
encyclopaedia entries are not that common; (iii) whether or not they exist 
 154
Mental File Theory
or are common, we cannot rationally integrate information associated with 
encyclopaedia entries; (iv) other explanations are no better oﬀ. 
These four diﬀerent ways of denying that Absence is a problem diﬀer greatly in their 
plausibility: (ii) and (iii) are both false, since, ex hypothesi, encyclopaedia entries must be 
common enough and it must also be possible to integrate information associated with 
them rationally, otherwise they would be members of a category of mental entity that 
lack the feature that motivated positing them; the fate of (iv) remains to be decided; the 
next two chapters will refute it; (i) perhaps provides a way of denying the problem 
without falling in to the problems with the second way of rejecting Absence just 
considered, though it needs elaboration. The thought might be that all we really need are 
files governed by (not compendious ER relations or the higher-order ER relation but) 
simply highly complex composite first-order ER relations. While Recanati mentions 
composite ER relations consisting of two basic ER relations, the indexical model itself is 
compatible with far more complex composite ER relations, and these need not be open 
ended. The indexical model can therefore be absolved from the charge of insuﬃcient 
generality if this extension of composite first-order ER relations can be made to do all the 
work. Or so goes this reply. 
There are two points to be made in response, one outright and one more speculative. The 
outright point is that the indexical model gains no advantage by relegating encyclopedia 
entries to being an optional extra. Encyclopedia entries are needed so that the indexical 
model is adequate for the task of describing (never mind explaining) rational thought 
and inference, and the ways we have with dealing in information, which includes the sort 
of opportunistic way of getting information about things that is, after all, why Recanati is 
moved to extend the model to include the higher-order ER relation in the first place. 
There is a way of having information that can only be adequately captured on the 
indexical model by positing the higher-order ER relation, the way that involves no 
functional restrictions on the information because it is not tied to any particular way of 
getting it. What matters is that we have it, not how. As Recanati says, this sort of file is 
needed because, in some cases, we can gather information opportunistically; any ER 
relation will do, and so the opportunistic gathering of information requires the dropping 
of functional restrictions on information. 
In this connection, it is worth noting that Absence says nothing against the coherence of 
the basic idea behind indexical model. Nor does it say anything about the higher-order 
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ER relation as such. If there are ER relations, and it seems hard to deny that there would 
be if there are mental files, then the higher-order ER relation obtains just by definition. 
Moreover, the higher-order ER relation can be used to coherently extend the indexical 
model to the sorts of cases where what information we have about individuals is not 
gained from any specific source, or so we can suppose for the sake of argument. The 
point is that files based on the higher-order ER relation do not bring along with them 
acquaintance norms that can provide indexical explanations, and that is an obvious 
problem for the explanatory scope of the indexical model. Casting files based on the 
higher-order ER relation as optional extras does not avoid this problem, but exacerbates 
it. 
The more speculative point is that there are reasons to think the operation of expansion is 
coextensive with the operation of detachment. Any file that is converted through 
expansion is thereby converted through detachment. In which case, it is not just 
adequacy in covering cases that makes encyclopedia entries necessary, but the nature of 
the dynamics of mental files in all the relevant cases. The reasons are these: 
(1) If an indexical file is expanded, then it can be involved in global 
inference. 
(2) If an indexical file can be involved in global inference, then it may 
include information that was not gained through any particular ER 
relation.  
(3) If a mental file may include information that was not gained through 
any particular ER relation, then it must be detached.  
Indexical files are expanded so that they can be used in gaining information about how 
the world is and to guide our actions in light of that information. One of the ways of 
gaining information is global inference, by which I mean the kind of reasoning wherein 
any information a thinker has is potentially relevant, and potentially in need of update as 
a consequence of reaching conclusions. There is, notoriously, a problem of how this is 
achieved, and even a question of the extent to which it is unrestricted, but that it may be 
rationally undertaken is not open to dispute. Thus (1). If the information in a file is to be 
used in that sort of way, then the file may include a great deal of information in the file 
bearing on the global inferences that the thinker in possession of the file is in a position 
to make. This information will not be gained through any form of acquaintance with the 
individual the file is on, and perhaps not through acquaintance with any particular 
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individual at all. Thus (2). Given that things are not going wrong when this happens, 
there can be no acquaintance norm that gets violated. That implies that there is no 
particular way of getting information that the file is based on. Thus (3).  
From this, it seems to follow that any expanded file is thereby detached. Expansion just is 
detachment. If that is right, then the move to deny the existence of encyclopedia entries, 
and instead claim that expanded files do all the work, is flawed. I stress that this 
reasoning is speculative, though it is reasonably compelling. In any case, the categorical 
point stands, and is enough to rebut the suggestion that Absence is not a problem. I 
conclude that there are good reasons to think that the indexical model explanation is 
insuﬃciently general, and so compares badly with any more general account.  
The indexical model is only one way of providing an account of mental files that goes 
beyond the basic model, but no other suﬃciently well-developed model has been 
provided in the literature, and it is not obvious how any alternative could avoid running 
into problems akin to Absence for the same reasons. Mental files are components of how 
a cognitive system processes information. What feature of files would provide 
information about the information regarding its subject matter that does not involve 
functional restrictions on that information? If there is no other feature, then even if it 
does not work quite as the indexical model does, no alternative robust model could avoid 
the same problem. 
5.5.3 Summary 
Indexical explanation seemingly works well in cases where it is plausible that the thoughts 
involve restricted ways of getting information. It does not work at all in cases where there 
is no restriction. Since these are the core cases of referential coordination, this means that 
the explanation is not suﬃciently general. Much of the indexical model, as a general view 
concerning the nature of mental files, may be correct despite this problem. But it is a 
serious point against the existence of indexical files that it does not provide an 
explanation of referential coordination in core cases. 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the explanation of referential coordination by mental files. An 
explanation of this sort should be given in two stages: the introduction of mental files by 
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theoretical stipulation as what explains the paradigmatic inferential dispositions, and 
substantive claims about mental files that provides an indication of sameness of reference 
adequate for making those dispositions rational. This second stage can be carried out 
either with the basic model of mental files only or with some more robust model. The 
problem with basic model explanations is that they they seem to demand cognitive 
capacities that make the explanation psychologically unrealistic. The problem with robust 
models is that they seem to demand functional restrictions on the information associated 
with files that limits the scope of the explanation and so makes it insuﬃciently general. 
The basic idea behind explaining referential coordination by mental file remains viable, 
however, despite these problems. 
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Chapter 6 - Coordination Functions Theory 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents an explanation of referential coordination that satisfies the 
requirements and meets the explanatory desiderata.  
The theory I propose is a reconfiguration of the sort of basic model explanation discussed 
briefly in §5.3, making use of the distinction between a mental file and its predications, 
by which I mean the associations between a mental file and bits of information, of which 
there can be several per mental file. Predications serve as the basis for the paradigmatic 
inferential dispositions that a thinker can make. Predications of the same file account for 
the thinker’s disposition to put together the information by conjoining and generalising. 
I claim that predications of the same mental file will have normative functions that 
provide an indication of sameness of reference for the thoughts they subserve. These 
functions provide a version of the apparatus of defaults and defeaters familiar from 
entitlement epistemology: coordination functions provide a default indication of 
sameness of reference that is open to defeat by other information. Coordination 
functions can explain referential coordination in a way that is inferentially basic and 
adequately personal-level (§6.2). 
Unlike other basic model explanations, no special cognitive capacities are required, other 
than the capacity to be sensitive to the coherence of one’s inferential dispositions with the 
rest of one’s stock of information, so the account is psychologically realistic. Unlike the 
indexical model explanation, it is not restricted to any particular sort of case, and so is 
fully general. Because no theory of mental content or vehicle is required, no danger of 
circularity or incompleteness in relating coordination functions to patterns of referential 
coordination will arise. These points make the explanation better than the competitors, 
and constitute the main argument in its favour (§6.3). The explanation makes use of 
psychological entities and properties, albeit of a minimal sort, and makes no use of any 
representational property more basic than reference. The normative functional properties 
that it does make use of are not properties of representations, either of their content or 
vehicle. In terms of the three questions, this explanation puts us here: 
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A feature of the explanation is that it makes the rationality of the paradigmatic inferential 
dispositions out as a matter of coherence, rather than conclusive reasons. These latter 
points may be taken as a reason to reject the account, as it provides no support for more 
ambitious projects in epistemology or cognitive science. But I argue that we should 
accept this deflationary consequence, something I will expand upon further in the next 
chapter (§6.4). 
6.2 Predications, Requirements, and Functions 
This section presents the coordination functions explanation in detail. The general idea is 
to give a version of the two-part explanation by mental file that uses only basic mental 
files. It makes use of the distinction between a mental file and its predications, and the 
role of those predications in providing information that can be employed by a thinker. I 
will show how this provides an indication of sameness of reference in that it provides for 
an apparatus of defaults and defeaters familiar from entitlement epistemology. The 
explanation concludes by showing that this apparatus is something to which the thinker 
can be sensitive without extraordinary psychological capacities. 
6.2.1 Outline 
The two basic commitments of the explanation that I want to propose are as follows: 
Coreference Requirements: Predications of a mental file (the associations 
between a mental file and bits of information) are subject to the 
requirement that they are about the same thing; these coreference 
requirements arises from the role of predications in the information-
processing structure, the mechanism that serves processes of gaining, 
Psychologism Referentialism Weight
Senses No No Heavy
Typed representations Yes Yes Heavy
Mental files Yes Yes/No Heavy
Coordination functions Yes Yes Light
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retaining, and exploiting information, that enables the thinker to 
undertake her projects and achieve her goals. 
Coordination Functions: A predication of a file (the base predication) can 
have the normative function of carrying information about the same thing 
as other predications of the same file (the target predications), i.e. have 
coordination functions.  
The two basic commitments can be combined to give a third, which involves a specific 
kind of coordination function: 
Requirement-Based Coordination Functions: If two predications are subject 
to a coreference requirement, then each predication is the base predication 
of a coordination function with the other as its target predication. 
With these three elements in place, we can give an explanation of referential coordination 
as follows: 
Coordination Functions Explanation: If (i) PF and PF* are distinct 
predications of a mental file F, then (ii) PF has the function of carrying 
information about the same thing as PF*, and PF* has the function of 
carrying information about the same thing as PF; (iii) these coordination 
functions are requirement-based; so if (iv) there is no information to 
indicate that PF and PF* are about distinct things (no defeating 
information), then (v) the thinker has an indication that the information 
carried by PF and PF* is about the same thing. 
The key point in elaborating this will concern the rationale for the move from (i-iv) to 
(v). 
If this explanation is adequate, then there is a straightforward extension to the case where 
there is an absence of referential coordination: thoughts are not referentially coordinated 
when there is an absence of a requirement-based coordination function. This points to a 
more nuanced understanding of Frege cases, since there are two possible scenarios for 
them to arise: the absence of referential coordination, and the presence of defeating 
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information. This points to a better understanding of the epistemology of identity, which 
will be covered when the explanation is extended to identity judgements (§7.3). 
6.2.2 Predications and coreference requirements 
The coordination functions explanation makes use of a distinction between mental files 
and their predications. Mental files, for the purposes of the explanation, are simply basic 
mental files. That is, they are mental particulars with file structure, which I earlier (§5.2) 
defined as what something has when it is associated with bits of information, organises 
that information, and has persistence conditions that do not depend on those 
associations (i.e. survives gain and loss of associations with bits of information). The 
notion of a predication is a simple extension of this idea: a predication of a mental file 
consists of a file and a bit of information, where the latter is associated with the former. It 
is what constitutes an entry of the file into the processes of gaining, storing, and 
exploiting information. It is important not to confuse a predication of a file with the bit 
of information; the use of the slightly awkward noun ‘predication’, as opposed to 
‘predicate’, is meant to help keep this clear (compare Recanati 2012: 37-8). 
Predications of a file can be thought of, and for the purpose of the explanation that 
appeals to them need only be thought of, as a compound of a mental file and another 
sort of mental particular that represents having a property. Since a mental file can have 
many predications, and since its various predications are distinct, making use of the 
notion of a predication puts the proposed explanation more in line with sense theory and 
typed representations theory; there are two (or more) entities involved, not just one. But 
where sense theory and typed representations theory had problems with saying how it is 
that these entities bear on the rationality of the paradigmatic inferences, things are a little 
more straightforward where file predications are concerned (§6.3.2 provides more by way 
of comparison). 
The distinction between a mental file and its predications is an extension of the basic 
model, but only a minimal one, in the sense that it does not require files to have any 
properties that are not implicit in the basic model itself. Just by virtue of having file 
structure, a mental file is apt to have predications. Whether all mental files need to have 
information associated with them or not, and so will all have predications in this sense, I 
take no stand. We are only interested in cases where they do. The distinction is therefore 
only as controversial as the existence of mental files in the first place, and that is a matter 
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to be settled by explanatory considerations. Mental files are to be introduced as per the 
first stage of the two-stage explanation I suggested as the framework for mental file 
theories of referential coordination. The reconfiguration of mental file theory, making use 
of predications, takes place at the second stage. Rather than the mental files themselves 
being made the subject of substantive claims that bear on the rationality of the 
paradigmatic inferential dispositions, it is their predications. 
With the distinction between files and their predications in hand, we can now state the 
substantive claims made by the coordination functions explanation. The first such claim 
is that predications are subject to coreference requirements. 
Mental files are part of a mechanism employed in the service of some wider purpose or 
purposes. These purposes can be found in any aims that a thinker might have, the means 
of realising which are, in part, the topic of projects and intentions. The thought behind 
the idea that predications of a file are subject to coreference requirements is that some of 
these aims are, and all potentially will be, served by carrying out inferences that exploit 
the thinker’s information. Information is gained, through various means, retained, in the 
various forms of memory retention, and exploited, in action and inference. The most 
basic way of exploiting information in inference is through the paradigmatic inference: 
one conjoins information one has about something together and existentially generalises 
about things in general. This makes available more information to be retained and 
exploited.  
This sort of exploitation of the information through inference needs to be informative in 
a way that is manifestly reliable if it is to be exploited further in a rational way. This is the 
idea that I glossed in the first chapter as the inferential dispositions making sense to the 
thinker. This is meant to mark a distinct property from those dispositions involving 
inferences that are truth-preserving or valid. The idea of validity is obviously important 
for the purposes of spelling out coreference requirements, however. For our particular 
example, for a thinker to make use of the information that there is something with a 
certain syndrome of properties, that there is something that is a Roman orator, in going 
about her business in a way that makes sense to them, they need a sense of why they 
think that. More to the point, there must be something that points to it being correct 
information. An indiction of the correctness of information is a minimal requirement for 
it to be apt to be relied upon in carrying out projects and plans.  
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Coreference requirements come from the fact that, when a thinker makes use of 
information gained through subsequent inferential exploitation of information she had 
previously, there is a requirement on the initial information so that the new information 
is gained in a way that makes it apt to be relied upon in carrying out her plans and 
projects. The inferences’ being rational, in the relevant sense, means the thinker having a 
reason to treat the new information as coming from old information in a reliable way. 
When inferences provide new information that can further the projects and plans of the 
individual, the new information needs to be manifestly reliably correct in this sense. 
This is hardly news, of course. The hope is that it is all fairly obvious and uncontroversial. 
It perhaps bears emphasising that these are meant to be claims about the rationality of 
information use, that is, about the reasons a thinker has for making the inferences she is 
disposed to make. The point of drawing attention to them is that it means something 
important for the explanation of referential coordination. Referential coordination 
concerns one, albeit central, means by which new information can be derived from old 
information in a reliable way.  
For a thinker to make manifestly reliable use of the information that there is something 
with a certain collection of properties—that there is something that is both Roman and 
an orator, as in the example—in carrying out her projects and pursuing her aims, she 
needs to be sensitive to the basis on which that information was gained, and exercise that 
sensitivity. This is what an inference making sense to a thinker amounts to. The 
disposition to make such inferences is what matters here. The disposition to make use of 
the information that file predications contain in the paradigmatic form of inference is a 
disposition to get new information. Admittedly, the gap between the old and new 
information in this case is not very large. But it is important, because the disposition will 
be present whenever more interesting, more possibility-excluding and more action-
guiding, inferential dispositions are present. And it is distinctive, because reliability in 
this instance requires the old information to be about one and the same thing.  
To be reliable, gaining new information from old by conjoining and generalising requires 
sameness of reference. A file’s having predications is what makes it enter into the 
mechanism that serves as the basis for this, and it is predications that are subject to 
coreference requirements. Because file predications and the disposition to exploit the 
information in the paradigmatic inferences go together, this means that all predications 
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of a mental file, when that file is part of a mechanism that serves the pursuit of projects 
and aims, are required to carry information about the same thing. 
6.2.3 Requirement-based coordination functions 
The second substantive claim is that coreference requirements impose coordination 
functions. To spell this out, it needs to be explained what a coordination function is, and 
then why coreference requirements can be said to put them in place. 
Coordination functions, in general, are properties of file predications that relate them to 
one another in terms of the identity of the thing about which they carry information. 
Coordination functions are functions in the sense that they concern what file predications 
are supposed to do. These are functions in the normative sense, as opposed to the 
descriptive sense that concerns only what something in fact does. Analogies that come 
easiest to hand concern biological entities, like bodily organs, and artefacts, like tools, or 
parts of machines. The heart has the normative function of pumping blood around the 
body; this is true even when a heart is in fact not pumping blood, in which case 
something has gone wrong and medical attention is required. Scissors have the normative 
function of cutting; this is true even when they are blunt, in which case the scissors are 
defective. A crank shaft has the function of converting the reciprocal movement of an 
engine’s pistons to the rotational movement needed to move wheels forward; this is true 
even when the engine is idle. 
Coordination functions, then, are like pumping functions, cutting functions, and 
movement conversion functions. They concern what things of a particular kind 
characteristically do as part of their being instances of that kind, and define a normative 
standard for them. File predications belonging to a mechanism that serves the pursuit of 
projects and aims characteristically carry information. There can be overlap in what that 
information carried is about. In some cases, there will be a standard of success or failure 
to the eﬀect that things are going well when there is overlap, and badly otherwise. Saying 
what these cases are requires bringing in coreference requirements. To say that 
coordination functions can be requirement-based means that they obtain because there is a 
coreference requirement on two predications. The normative nature of these 
requirement-based coordination functions is a product of the contribution file 
predications make to cognitive processes that further a thinker’s projects and plans. 
Things are going the way they should when the information they carry is about the same 
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thing because this enables reliability of new information gained through the conjoin-and-
generalise inference.  
For a given coordination function, we can distinguish between its base and target: a 
predication that has a coordination function is the base predication, and any predication 
that the base predication has the function of coreferring with is the target predication. 
File predications can be both bases and targets. Where there is a requirement-based 
coordination function, all predications of the same file will be bases of coordination 
functions with all other predications as targets.  
Let’s apply this to our original example. Lucy thinks that Cicero is a Roman and that he 
is an orator, and these thoughts are referentially coordinated. This means that she is 
disposed to infer, from these thoughts, that there is something that has both of those 
properties. As per the two-stage explanation, we posit a mental file with two predications 
to account for this disposition. We can diagram this like so (compare the graph-theoretic 
representation of Frege cases given in Pryor forthcoming): 
ɸCICERO 
    A ROMAN   AN ORATOR 
‘ɸCICERO’ is a picture of the file; ‘A ROMAN’ and ‘AN ORATOR’ along with the lines 
connecting them to the file are pictures of the predications. A better representation 
would instead add a further predication, ‘CALLED “CICERO”’, rather than have it written 
into the file, but I omit it to simplify the diagram. 
Because ɸCICERO is associated with the predications A ROMAN and AN ORATOR, Lucy is 
disposed to perform the paradigmatic inference, and because this inference provides 
information that may be relied upon in Lucy’s pursuit of her plans and projects, this 
means that these predications are subject to a coreference requirement Consequently, A 
ROMAN is the base for a coordination function that has AN ORATOR as its target; A 
ROMAN has the function of carrying information about whatever AN ORATOR does. AN 
ORATOR is the base for a coordination function that has A ROMAN as its target; AN 
ORATOR has the function of carrying information about whatever A ROMAN does. We 
could diagram that using directed lines, like so: 
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ɸCICERO 
    A ROMAN   AN ORATOR 
A more realistic representation of the example would involve a great many more 
predications and so more lines for all the coordination functions. Obviously that would 
be a very complex diagram. Hopefully the simplified picture gets the idea across. 
File predications and their coordination functions can therefore be thought of as making 
up a network of normative functional relations based on coreference requirements. 
Thoughts that involve information belonging to the same network of such relations is, 
roughly, how we can think of what it is to exhibit sameness in ways of thinking. What 
puts this network in place is the contribution that inferential dispositions make to a 
rational life, and the grounding of those dispositions in the relevant file predications. 
A worry that might be raised at this stage is that the explanation employs redundant 
elements. Coreference requirements and coordination functions may appear to be just 
the same thing given diﬀerent labels. After all, a requirement on something, and a 
function of something, are both normative properties, and coreference requirements on 
file predications and coordination functions of file predications are both normative 
properties concerning the subject of the information that a file predication carries. 
Coordination functions will obtain whenever there is a coreference requirement on file 
predications. So it is true that they are very close. But they should be distinguished, for 
three reasons.  
Firstly, the latter explains the former. The aetiology of the normative functions needs 
emphasising to make clear how they are based in the minimal information-processing 
architecture outlined above. Secondly, the idea of a coordination function articulates a 
form of rational explanation in a way that the idea of a coreference requirement does not. 
This form will be set out when we see how the presence of a requirement-based 
coordination function provides an indication of sameness of reference. Thirdly, there is 
also at least one other way of grounding coordination functions that supplies this form of 
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explanation, and this will be important for understanding the less basic way for identity 
to figure in thought, identity judgements, as I will argue in §7.3. 
There are some related aspects of coordination functions that are worth being made 
explicit. One is that something can have a normative function to do something because it 
characteristically does do that thing. The point can carry over to explaining why that 
thing exists: that a sub-mechanism is the sort of thing that brings some state of aﬀairs can 
explain its continuing presence in a mechanism. Simply being a predication of the same 
mental file is not suﬃcient, on this picture, for being the base of a requirement-based 
coordination function with other predications of that file as targets. 
The other aspect is that the normativity of requirement-based coordination functions is 
derivative, in the sense that it is not basic from the standpoint of goal-oriented, or 
teleological, phenomena. There are various theories of such phenomena, including 
theories of normative functions, that deal with their metaphysics, particularly concerning 
the possibility of grounding them in non-teleological facts. For the purposes of the 
present discussion, it is not necessary to argue for or even assume such a theory. It serves 
to point out the following is an obvious possibility: something can have a normative 
function as a consequence of there being a requirement on it in virtue of it’s being a part 
of a wider mechanism that serves some wider purpose. The analogy with bodily organs 
illustrates this: because the heart pumps blood, and because it is part of a circulatory 
system that serves the purposes of the body, there is a biological requirement on it to 
pump blood. 
Coreference requirements are something additional to the existence of mental files and 
their predications. One needs a whole thinker—a person, in a very full sense of that word
—with a sensitivity to the reliability of her information and call for exercising that 
sensitivity. Mental files are only a part of a person. The idea that they have predications 
that are subject to coreference requirements brings in things that are presupposed by the 
puzzling phenomenon to be explained. In combination with the two aspects of 
requirement-based coordination functions just noted, this makes for a useful feature of 
any explanation that makes use of them: a commitment to requirement-based 
coordination functions is only committed to purposive cognitive processes that involve 
inferential processes that require sameness of reference. It is not committed to any 
particular view about what these cognitive processes must be like, nor to any view about 
the ultimate metaphysical nature or grounds of normative requirements. 
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This does not mean that nothing additional to basic mental files is brought in, of course. 
The two substantive commitments concern the existence of coreference requirements, 
and the imposition by these requirements of coordination functions. But the extent to 
which this involves moving beyond the basic model of mental files is minimal. The 
addition of requirement-based coordination functions is constrained by the particular 
explanatory use to which they are being put. This does not have anything to do with the 
functional properties mental files have as apart from or more basic than their playing that 
role. Nor does it impute to thinkers any special cognitive capacities with respect to their 
files that we have no reason to think they have. Granting for the sake of argument the 
existence of mental files, and the distinction between files and their predications, if one is 
interested in explaining referential coordination, then it should be relatively 
uncontroversial to hold that, if there are file predications, then they have requirement-
based coordination functions. 
6.2.4 Defaults, defeaters, and rational sensitivity 
Let me briefly rehearse what is to be explained. Thinkers have thoughts that they treat as 
being about the same thing, and the mark of this is the presence of the paradigmatic 
inferential disposition to conjoin the properties ascribed to the things, and to quantify 
over things in general, to the eﬀect that something has both of those properties together. 
This is not simply something that just happens to us, but rather something that makes 
sense to us. It is a rational disposition to have. As such, it stands as the basis of our 
possession of a coherent conception of things. This much is manifest. The diﬃculty is 
that it is not manifest what makes the disposition rational. The fact of the identity of the 
things thought about cannot suﬃce, since there are cases where that identity obtains but 
the rational disposition does not and could not.  
In our example, Lucy thinks thoughts that we could report as her thinking that Cicero is 
a Roman, and that he is an orator. In one sort of case, her concluding that there is 
something that is a Roman orator need not be a rational move for her to make; she does 
not know that Cicero is the guy she is talking to, so it would only be rational if she had a 
belief in the identity of Cicero and the guy she is talking to. In another sort of case, she 
will be rational in making or being disposed to make the inference to the same 
conclusion without needing to have a belief in any identity. The diﬀerence must consist 
in the presence of an indication of sameness of reference that is absent in the other sort of 
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case. Sameness of sense, sameness of type of mental representation, the association of the 
information with the same mental file—explanations of these various sorts fail to provide 
such an indication in a satisfying way. Requirement-based coordination functions provide 
an explanation that does better. Here is how it works. 
There are three components to the way in which requirement-based coordination 
functions connect with and so explain the rationality of the paradigmatic inferential 
dispositions. The first is the presence of a default presumption that something with a 
normative function is carrying it out. The second is the possibility and the absence of 
defeating information, where defeating information provides an indication that the 
normative function is not carrying it out. These components make up what I will call an 
apparatus of defaults and defeaters. This apparatus may be familiar from the 
epistemological study of entitlement. Entitlement is a species of warrant for, or a positive 
epistemic status of, belief. In Dretske’s (2000) way of putting it, warrant is an epistemic 
right to a belief without a corresponding epistemic duty. The epistemic duty is to justify 
one’s beliefs by providing evidence or reasons in support. As per the distinction that 
Dretske draws (Burge 1993b uses the same terminology in a parallel fashion; see Casullo 
2007 for useful critical discussion), a belief to which one is entitled need not be justified. 
One may therefore have warrant for a belief without having evidence for it or reasons to 
take it as true. Nevertheless, the believer may still have warrant for that belief. 
The evident advantage of an epistemology of entitlement is in the lack of inferential 
structure needed to supply warrant, thereby avoiding sceptical arguments. One example 
is the so-called Agrippan trilemma: the appeal to justifying reasons or evidence can 
always be questioned, and so justification must either go on indefinitely, stop arbitrarily, 
or go in a circle; in any case, the status of one’s warrant for one’s beliefs is in doubt. 
Entitlement, by contrast, is simply there in virtue of a belief being held by the kind of 
being that holds it, capable of forming beliefs in certain ways, in the kind of environment 
it is in. The apparatus of default and defeat works along the following general lines: by 
forming a belief in a certain way, there is a default presumption in favour of that belief 
being true. The warrant for that belief can lapse if there is information that indicates that 
that default presumption is false or unreliable, and warrant does lapse if the defeaters are 
themselves undefeated. Entitlement epistemology has been applied to most ways of 
coming to form beliefs, such as memory, testimony, and indeed inference (again, see 
Burge 1993b: 458 for a statement to this eﬀect).  
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The idea that requirement-based coordination functions explain referential coordination 
is similar to this, though is not to be confused with this sort of appeal to the apparatus of 
defaults and defeaters. This is not least because the problem is not one of epistemic 
status, of rights and duties with respect to truth, but one of articulating the reasons that a 
thinker has (as opposed to, we might say, the reasons that there are) for a thinker to form 
beliefs, or extend their knowledge, or extrapolate from known information. The problem 
is therefore orthogonal to the one at which the idea of epistemic entitlement is aimed. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note the similarity between the problem for warrant that 
gets posed by the Agrippan trilemma and the explanatory problem of referential 
coordination. In the former case, the problem is that any step in an inference one could 
make in support of a belief would itself be open to challenge; in the latter case, the 
problem is that any additional step in the inference one might bring in would itself be in 
need of referential coordination. This is what I earlier called the way in which referential 
coordination is inferentially basic. And there is nothing that makes articulating the 
structure of reasons had by a thinker using the apparatus of defaults and defeat 
impossible, despite it often being used to understand epistemic warrant in the absence of 
possession of reasons. 
The first two components make up the indication of sameness of reference. The third 
component concerns how a thinker is sensitive to the presence of a requirement-based 
coordination functions. This is what makes the apparatus of defaults and defeaters work 
in supplying an indication of sameness of reference that is a reason that a thinker has. 
There must be some way in which the presence of a default and the absence of defeat is 
something to which the thinker can be sensitive. That this is indeed in place becomes 
clear when the way in which requirement-based coordination functions work is laid out.  
The idea is that, when something has a normative function, this provides the default 
information that it is being fulfilled. It is subject to an expectation to the eﬀect that it 
does something so long as things are going well, and so the default information can be 
relied upon in the absence of indication that things are not going well. In other words, 
something’s operating under the expectation that it does something is itself an indication 
that things are going well and that it is doing it. So normative functions provide an 
indication that the function is being carried out. There can be a counter-indication to the 
eﬀect what has the function is not carrying it out. In which case, the counter-indication 
overrides the indication provided by the normative function. This is the defeater. 
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Everything I have said so far about normative functions applies also to coordination 
functions. When two file predications are required to carry information about the same 
thing, there is an expectation that they do. Absent defeating information, there is an 
indication that they carry information about the same thing. Since referential 
coordination concerns the possession of information that one thing has two (or more) 
properties, defeating information will consist of information that two properties cannot 
be possessed together, or are suﬃciently unlikely to be possessed together. 
With this said about coordination functions in general, the same applies to requirement-
based coordination functions in particular, which provide an indication of sameness of 
reference in exactly the same way. What is distinctive about them, or what makes them 
particularly suited to our purposes, is that the normative function imposed by a 
coreference requirement does not depend on the possession by the thinker of any 
additional information that bears on the identity of what the information is about. So 
this means that the indication of sameness of reference is inferentially basic. The default 
position, the expectation that file predications carry information about the same thing, is 
not something that needs to be explicitly formulated by the thinker. 
How does defeating information work? The presence of a defeater will over-ride the 
default, and so render it irrational to perform the paradigmatic inference. But it does not 
remove the presence of the indication of sameness of reference provided by the default 
presumption, because it does not remove what put the requirement in place. It therefore 
exerts rational pressure to change something. One is doing well as a rational thinker if one 
is sensitive to the fact that a change needs to be made in such a case, and makes the right 
change. There are various forms that defeating information could take, and various ways 
that the result of any potential change would be a more coherent overall combination of 
information and inferential dispositions. We might distinguish between putatively 
defeating information, and genuinely defeating information. Putatively defeating 
information can take diﬀerent forms. In the relatively uninteresting case, this will involve 
dropping the defeating information and maintaining the set of coordinated thoughts 
(revoking), or maintaining the defeating information and dropping either of the 
coordinated bits of information, so changing to diﬀerent set of coordinated thoughts 
(revising). More interestingly, it may involve dropping the disposition and changing to a 
set of uncoordinated thoughts (reconstructing). This third kind is genuinely defeating 
information. 
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Cases where there is merely putatively defeating information, information that calls for 
revising and revoking, will not be hard to imagine (Lucy is told by an unimpeachable 
authority that oratory was not practiced by Romans; having met Cicero, she realises that 
Romans really did practice oratory). Cases of genuinely defeating information calling for 
reconstructing one’s files, are more interesting and a bit trickier. The sort of informational 
states that would make dropping the inferential dispositions the rational thing to do 
would need to provide an indication that the identity required by the inference to be 
reliable is incorrect, even though the inference does not itself include a mistaken identity 
belief. What might this sort of information state be? In any realistic case, a specification 
of such an information state will be highly complex, as it would depend in various ways 
on more or less the whole of a thinker’s information state. Potentially, any bit of 
information could (which is not to say, will) bear on this. But the following toy example 
shows the principle. 
Take the following case: 
Lucy sees a dog on each day d1…dn, and calls it Fido. She believes various 
things about Fido (he is a dog, he is a labrador, he has fleas, she saw him on 
days d1…dn), and as a result is rationally disposed to infer that there is 
something that is a dog, is a labrador, has fleas, that she has seen on days 
d1…dn. 
We can change the key detail to get a very similar case: 
Lucy sees various dogs that look exactly alike, and is under the impression 
that there is one dog, whom she calls Fido, that she sees everyday; she 
comes to believe various things about him (he is a dog, he is a labrador, he 
has fleas, she saw him on days d1…dn), and as a result is rationally 
disposed… etc. 
These two cases are exactly alike in how we should think of them as per the coordination 
functions explanation, even though from the outside, as it were, quite diﬀerent things are 
happening. The second case could be continued like so: 
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Lucy is told that one of the dogs she saw on day d1…dn was a diﬀerent dog 
to all the others, but is not told which one. 
Suppose that Lucy is told is true, and that there is no way she could rationally reject it, 
and suppose also that she saw no other dogs on those days (one gets a sense of how 
complex a real-life case will be). Now she has a defeating piece of information that means 
her inferential dispositions need to be changed. The default indication does not cohere 
with the rest of her information. As a rational thinker, she will be disposed to shift from 
having one FIDO-file to several files because of receiving that new information and being 
sensitive to how it fails to cohere with the identity required by the inferential disposition 
involving the FIDO-file. The question of how these files relate to each other, of whether 
she should form any identity judgements (about which more in §7.3 below), is then 
open.  
It is important to stress that, just because reconstruction is possible in this way, the 
presence of the original mental file does not depend in any way on there being an 
identity judgement in place, or the thinker needing to recall any explicit acts of 
identification. The reconstruction involves creating new files, and dividing up the 
information in the way that makes the new information state coherent, and this need not 
be guided by any previous explicit beliefs in one thing being identical to another. Cases 
of genuinely defeating information will presumably be relatively rare (we had to stipulate 
that Lucy had no reason to rationally reject the new information). In fact, one would 
expect that to be the case, since otherwise the information processing system—files, 
predications, and the rest—would not be well designed. Presumably, if our environment 
was and had always been one where the potential for such mistakes was very common, 
then our cognitive lives and the mechanisms subserving them would need to be very 
diﬀerent. The point is that there will always be the potential for putatively defeating 
information, and so the potential for genuinely defeating information too, and so the 
default is open to defeat and a matter of rational sensitivity. 
How does the default presumption supported by a coordination function provide an 
indication of sameness of reference that is a reason the thinker has? The answer is that a 
requirement-based coordination function involves things to which a thinker capable of 
referential coordination must be sensitive, namely: the possession of bits of information, 
the disposition to put them together in inference grounded by the information being 
carried by predications of the same mental file, the fact that this disposition contributes 
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to the extension of her stock of information that may be used by her to further her aims 
and projects, and so the potential need for a change in her dispositions in response to 
other bits of information.  
The indication of sameness of reference is adequately personal-level, since it involves a 
thinker’s being sensitive to facts about her inferential dispositions. The explanation is also 
inferentially basic, because the operation of that sensitivity does not require bringing in 
any additional inferential steps concerning identity. Therefore, the requirements on an 
adequate explanation of referential coordination are met. 
6.2.5 Files are inessential but indispensable 
The objection might well be made that, if coordination functions provide an indication 
of coreference in this way, by means of a default presumption that information is about 
the same thing, then mental files and their predications are not really a necessary part of 
the explanation at all. The thought would be that, on the present showing, all one needs 
are the thoughts and the right kind of inferential dispositions, and everything else could 
be said file-free, without any commitment to sub-personal psychology. 
It is true that mental files and their predications are certainly not necessary for the kind of 
explanation of referential coordination being proposed. One could, coherently, run a 
similar account file-free, as suggested. But there are reasons for insisting on including 
mental files as part of a good, and so potentially best, explanation.  
One reason is that, since mental files can be introduced to do the work of explaining the 
relevant inferential dispositions, and since those dispositions put in place a coreference 
requirement that grounds the relevant properties, the coordination functions explanation 
is better oﬀ being formulated in terms of mental files and file predications. The file-free 
explanation would leave these dispositions dangling. Given that there may be multiple 
ways for the dispositions to come about, and given that these diﬀerences may make a 
diﬀerence to how exactly the explanation works, remaining silent on the basis of the 
dispositions would potentially hobble the explanation at the point where including files 
and their predications makes it complete.  
Sceptics about this point are referred to §7.3 for a demonstration regarding identity 
judgements. But they may also be answered by noting the ubiquity of references to file-
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like entities in the literature in philosophy, linguistics, and psychology on topics directly 
related to referential coordination. The obvious thing to draw from the ubiquity of the 
appeal to things that have file structure is that there is an explanatorily powerful idea in 
the oﬃng. A clear and particularly germane instance of this is the appeal to file-like 
entities such as prototypes and exemplars in the psychology of categorisation, mentioned 
in §2.2.6, and the idea of object-files in theories of visual processing and perceptual 
attention. Also related is the appeal to files in dynamic approaches to formal semantics, 
and the use of mental files in the philosophical literature to explain facts about singular 
thought, empty and fictional reference, and so on, mentioned in §5.2. Though seeing it 
through is beyond the scope of this essay, I want to suggest that there is potential for a 
large degree of explanatory unification if we adopt the file-involving rather than file-free 
explanation. 
Articulating what the presence of an undefeated coordination function involves can be 
done by bringing in a (very minimal) theory about what goes on at the sub-personal 
level. This is what mental file theory supplies, and it does so in a way that has 
considerable benefits. One can only say so much at this stage, but it is not nothing. The 
file-free account is not obviously better, so this objection has little force. A reasonable 
conjecture is that, while additions or modifications to the model of mental files may be 
needed once the account interacts with explanatory problems elsewhere, these will likely 
preserve the basic idea that mental files and their predications sustain coordination 
functions suﬃcient for explaining referential coordination. 
A further point against the file-free version is that it is not clear how to make thoughts 
themselves bases and targets of coordination functions without some account of what 
thoughts are. So although one could put the explanation in terms of the thoughts in 
question, rather than the file predications (and so dispense with mental files as well), this 
would bring with it a need for a theory of mental content or the vehicles of mental 
content, and this would be to presuppose something that should be answerable to a 
theory of referential coordination. Moreover, we have seen problems with theories of 
both kinds. One can account for the rationality of thought while remaining silent on the 
question of what thoughts are (to reiterate: mental files are not, pace Fine, bundles of 
thoughts; see §5.2). What matters is that the thoughts in question involve information 
we have about the world. A theory of how that information is stored and processed 
makes available an explanation of why it is rational to treat one’s thoughts as being about 
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the same thing. So though not necessary, making use of mental files (more exactly, of 
basic mental files) presents a path of least explanatory resistance.  
It should also be noted, however, that coordination functions theory is not inimical to 
the idea that thought involves mental representations. A (basic) mental file is a mental 
entity that is associated with and serves to organise information. It is a functional entity, 
in the sense that its nature is exhausted by this functional characterisation. There might 
be several ways to implement file structure. Mental representations can be considered one 
sort of implementation. Suppose a thinker has these Mentalese sentences in her ‘belief 
box’: 
The subject-place concepts in beliefs 1 and 2 are type-identical. All this needs to mean is 
that they are treated as being about the same, so that the predicates with which they are 
concatenated (and so are equivalent to file predications) brings about belief 3 being in the 
belief box. The subject place concept in belief 4 is type-distinct. This means that it is not 
treated as being about the same. This is a way of implementing a system of mental files. 
The file is implemented at a more fine-grained level by distinct though type-identical 
concepts (this is in line with Millikan’s (2000) thought about the functional equivalence 
of duplicates markers and dot markers discussed in §4.7 above). 
Friends of mental representations would be advised to take up this option, as it removes 
the need to provide any more substantive typology to explain referential coordination. 
Type-identities relevant to referential coordination are just those that underwrite the 
paradigmatic inferential disposition. The work of providing an indication of sameness of 
reference is done at the functional level of the mental file, and the coordination functions 
explanation can then be run as above (see §7.2 for further discussion). 
The coordination functions explanation therefore makes indispensable use of both the 
personal and sub-personal levels of psychological description. The point is that this does 
not mean abandoning the personal-level and ‘changing the subject’ in any problematic 
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fashion. In this way, the explanation bridges the two levels. Rationality at the personal 
level has a basis in a mechanism at the sub-personal level. I will expand upon this in the 
next section. 
6.2.6 Summary 
Referential coordination can be explained by amending the basic model to include the 
distinction between mental files and their predications. Predications of the same file are 
required to carry information on the same thing because of the role they have in 
grounding the paradigm inferential dispositions that makes them bear on the fulfilment 
of the thinkers projects and goals. This requirement makes them the bases for 
coordination functions with all the other predications as targets. The coordination 
function linking two predications indicates that they are about the same thing. This 
indication is open to defeat by information that indicates the opposite. Coordination 
functions therefore exert rational pressure on a thinker’s inferential dispositions that 
potentially requires a change to be made. In this way, there is an indication of sameness 
of reference that supplies a reason for the thinker that is inferentially basic and adequately 
personal-level. 
6.3 Evaluation 
In §1.6, I set out five desiderata for an explanation of referential coordination. The 
explanation to be preferred is: 
(1) suﬃciently general,  
(2) non-circular, and 
(3) psychologically realistic, in a way that 
(4) can be extended to providing a plausible account of identity 
judgements, and 
(5) is consistent with general facts concerning special ways of thinking. 
The latter two desiderata have to do with the way in which an explanation of referential 
coordination interacts with other problems of ways of thinking; I will deal with them in 
the next chapter. In this section, I will argue that the coordination functions meets the 
first three without diﬃculty, and provide comparisons with the competing explanations 
to show that it should be taken as the best explanation. 
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6.3.1 Meeting the desiderata 
Taking each desideratum in turn: 
Generality: The coordination functions explanation has no problem with generality, since 
the explanatory apparatus applies without reference to any particular features that might 
diﬀer across instances of the paradigmatic inferential dispositions. They are not limited to 
cases where there is a particular way of getting information from something, since the 
means by which the information associated with the file was gathered does not appear in 
the explanation of referential coordination. In particular instances, there may be 
defeating information that makes reference to some point about where the bits of 
information came from. But this presents no problem of generality for the explanation. 
Circularity: Similarly, the coordination functions explanation does not have problems of 
the sort that undermined sense theory, since none of the entities or properties that it 
relies on are themselves to be cashed out in terms of particular patterns of inference. No a 
priori reflection directed at formulating reference rules or defining epistemic intensions is 
needed to determine the way in which the thought represents its object. Reference is 
treated as a primitive representational property, so no explanatory relationship between 
rational and representational facts enters into the account. 
An objection might be made at this point about the role that the notion of a cognitive 
life, made up in part of a thinker’s rational conception of things and her pursuit of 
projects and aims, is playing in the coordination functions explanation. It must be 
admitted that it does play a role, and so is part of the explanation: referential 
coordination is explained by coordination functions providing a default expectation that 
reference of thoughts is available for defeat, so making the coherence of one’s inferential 
dispositions with one’s broader stock of information available to the thinker’s rational 
sensitivity. That is, it is a matter for her rational sensitivity that her inferential 
dispositions hang together with what other information she has, and if they do not, then 
to the extent that she is rational, she will be disposed to modify something about her 
informational set-up. This presupposes that a thinker has such a rational sensitivity, and 
so is capable of having a cognitive life characterised by the possession (and so the 
maintenance) of a rational conception of things. So much can be taken as given for the 
sake of argument. But, the objection goes, referential coordination is an interesting topic 
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for explanatory theorising because of the role it plays in structuring our cognitive lives by 
making the possession of a rational conception of things possible. So the explanation is 
viciously circular. It takes for granted what needs to be explained. 
In response, I simply deny that this is the case. It is true that referential coordination 
makes having a cognitive life characterised by the possession of a rational conception of 
things possible. And it is true that having a rational sensitivity, being sensitive to the 
coherence of one’s stock information, is presupposed in the coordination functions 
explanation. These points do not mean that the coordination functions explanation is in 
any way viciously circular. Referential coordination is a fundamental feature of thought 
for having a rational conception of things, but it is only a part of what it takes to have 
one. The objection, that the coordination functions explanation is circular, eﬀectively 
assumes that any non-circular explanation must be such as to allow us to comprehend a 
whole cognitive life by explaining its parts without reference to that whole, and this 
assumption is unwarranted. The explanation of how a part of something contributes to 
the workings of the whole can, and in some cases perhaps must, make use of its place in 
the whole, and so help itself to the idea that there is an adequate enough prior 
understanding of that whole. There is no question of an explanation by reduction here 
(those sympathetic to anti-explanationism may perhaps find this congenial, though it 
lends no support to that position). 
The kind of rational sensitivity that the explanation uses is presupposed in the way that 
the explanatory problem was set up. So it is legitimate to appeal to that rational 
sensitivity as part of the explanation, and legitimate to state what the rational sensitivity 
involves by reference to what was presupposed in the explanatory problem. To put things 
somewhat picturesquely, the problem can be restated as the need to explain how 
sameness of reference can be a topic for our rational sensitivity, given that it cannot 
always consist in an explicit judgement of identity. The coordination functions 
explanation is not circular in the way it does this. So the objection can be resisted, 
though it does raise an interesting facet of how the explanation works. And it remains the 
case that rational sensitivity, in the sense I have been using that term, is itself something 
in need of explanation. 
Psychological realism: The coordination functions explanation is committed to properties 
of mental file predications that are based on coreference requirements. Though this may 
seem like a relatively extensive set of commitments, the explanation is really fairly 
 180
Coordination Functions Theory
conservative. Nothing is introduced that we have no reason to think is there anyway just 
in setting up the explanatory problem, other than the theoretically stipulated basic 
mental files. In addition, no demands are made on thinkers other than to have the sorts 
rational dispositions that we are interested in in the first place. The coordination 
functions explanation simply brings out what was, in a sense, already there in the data 
that prompted the problem of referential coordination, with a minimum of theoretical 
novelty. 
In this connection, commenting on Recanati’s comparatively robust indexical model of 
mental files, Hall writes: 
According to an opposing paradigm, the primary function of files is simply 
to group information together in cognition. A special case of this occurs 
when that information is taken to concern the same external object, but in 
general the information stored in files needn’t even be grouped together by 
subject matter. If Recanati is to maintain that the acquaintance-based 
function of his mental files is somehow primary, he needs to oﬀer more by 
way of argument for that claim, especially if he thinks it has certain 
empirical consequences for the evolutionary relationship between 
acquaintance-based files and files with derived functions. (2013: 19) 
Hall’s ‘opposing paradigm’ might as well be the basic model; taken that way, the point 
seems to me correct, and coordination functions theory is perfectly in line with it. We 
have as good a reason to think that mental files have predications with requirement-based 
coordination functions as we do for thinking that there are mental files in the first place. 
And we can go further. The introduction of mental files was supposed to be a sort of 
temporary hypothesis, to be fully justified by the explanatory work that it can do. The 
fact that the basic model of mental files is retained while explaining both the 
dispositional and rational parts of the paradigmatic inferential behaviour means that the 
explanatory advantages of the explanation carry over to mental file theory more generally. 
A virtuous circle, if ever there was one. 
6.3.2 Comparisons 
Comparison with the other explanations discussed so far shows that and why the 
problems they faced do not arise for the coordination functions explanation. 
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The coordination functions explanation contrasts most sharply with sense-theoretic 
explanation. There is no additional notion of content needed, and certainly no range of 
entities individuated by their role in rational inference. Unlike sense theory, therefore, it 
is no part of the coordination functions explanation to provide a way of relating a 
thinker’s cognitive capacities to these special entities. The problems of explanatory 
circularity and incompleteness that that presented do not arise. In place of a theory of 
grasp, as I called such a theory, there is the theoretical introduction of mental files and 
their predications. The relationship between this and a thinker’s thoughts and cognitive 
capacities is a matter of cause, interaction, and consequent normative function; there is 
no analogue of the handles challenge. 
It might be thought possible that coordination functions provide a kind of back-door for 
the introduction of sense theory, perhaps serving as a way of overcoming the handles 
challenge. This would be a mistake, however. The sense-theoretic explanation works by 
attributing sameness of sense to referentially coordinated thoughts, which constitutes an 
equivalence between thoughts. But there is no reason for thinking that referential 
coordination involves an equivalence between thoughts that would cause problems for 
the coordination functions explanation. Insofar as coordination functions theory does 
introduce a kind of equivalence, it is one that is dependent on a thinker’s inferential 
behaviour, or disposition to engage in inferential behaviour, with respect to her thoughts, 
and does not demand explanation by the presence of an equivalence relation at some 
deeper explanatory level. To be treated as the same does not presuppose that something is 
the same in some further way, and nor does it require explanation by positing some 
deeper equivalence. 
Relations of sameness and diﬀerence in ways of thinking are primarily to be found in the 
patterns of inferences that the thinker is rationally disposed to make. The sense theorist 
deals with the problem of explaining these patterns by reifying ways of thinking, in the 
form of senses. She then supposes that there is an interesting explanatory relationship 
between these reified ways of thinking and the inferences involving the thoughts in 
question. Quite apart from the fact that this explanatory move faces problems with 
circularity, ways of thinking need not, and should not, be reified in this way, and the 
coordination functions explanation does not do so.  
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It perhaps bears repeating that sameness of mental file does not suﬃce for sameness in 
way of thinking (that is, for referentially coordinated thoughts). A lot more is required, 
including coherence with the thinker’s broader stock of information. This reflects the fact 
that the rationality of the paradigmatic inferential dispositions need only amount to it 
being coherent for the thinker to treat her thoughts as being about the same thing, rather 
than there being a once-and-for-all demonstration that they are about the same thing. 
The sense-theoretic explanation, by contrast, imposes this stronger condition. This marks 
a diﬀerence in approach to the problem that is really fundamental where the comparison 
with sense theory is concerned. I will go into this in more detail below in §6.4.2. 
Moving on from sense theory, the contrast between coordination functions theory and 
typed representations theories is, perhaps, less pronounced because of the shared 
referentialist and psychologistic character. But the fact that they necessarily make use of a 
theory of mental representation, and are obliged to say why their favoured typology 
should match patterns of referential coordination between those thoughts in an 
explanatorily satisfying way, makes it no less acute. Coordination functions theory faces 
no such obligation. Again, there should be no question of coordination functions 
providing a back-door to a typed representations-theoretic explanation. Though sets of 
target-base pairs can be seen to constitute a kind of typology, it is not itself a typology of 
mental representations, at least not in the relevant sense. The way in which typed 
representations can implement the mental file part of the coordination functions 
explanation shows that typed representations might play some role in the best overall 
theory, but the typology will not be what explains referential coordination. 
The fact that the coordination functions explanation bridges the personal and sub-
personal levels of explanation provides a further explanatory advantage over typed 
representations theory. Problems of psychological realism that we saw in the case of the 
originalist and neo-empiricist typologies cannot arise. There is no need for extraordinary 
capacities of introspection or extraordinary sensitivity to the mechanisms subserving our 
information gathering and processing capacities. As I have already mentioned, the theory 
remains neutral on questions as to the nature of thought, especially as to whether it 
involves mental representations or not, and if it does, whether they are amodal, 
perceptual, sentential or non-sentential in format. This is all consistent with there being 
mental representations, and with their being typed in a way that maps on to patterns of 
referential coordination, but the explanation makes no commitment on either point. 
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The contrast between the coordination functions explanation and the sorts of 
explanations of referential coordination to be gleaned from extant treatments of mental 
file theory will be less pronounced still. While the contrast between the coordination 
functions explanation and the indexical model explanation is pronounced, there are some 
clear similarities with the two basic model explanations that I briefly examined in §5.3. 
This is particularly true of the account drawn from Lawlor’s (2001) proposal concerning 
file maintenance dispositions. This proposal runs very close to what I said earlier about a 
thinker being sensitive to the coherence of her paradigmatic inferential dispositions. In 
some ways, Lawlor’s treatment and the coordination functions explanation share several 
elements. They diﬀer in how these elements are put together, and these diﬀerences are 
important. 
One diﬀerence between Lawlor’s account and the one defended here is that she takes files 
to be constituted by the presence of file maintenance dispositions (op. cit.: 79-91), which 
dispositions are exercised in the course of carrying out ‘reidentificatory aims’ (op. cit.: 
75-79), whereas on the present account, files are mental entities that bring about the 
paradigmatic inferential disposition, and they have predications that are subject to 
coreference requirements in virtue of properties of the thinker that are independent of 
those dispositions. The dispositions to revise, revoke, and reconstruct are contingent on 
mental files subserving the dispositions of a thinker who is rational in a broader sense, 
rather than essentially tied to the existence of the file as such. Though important for the 
character of the two explanations, this diﬀerence can be set aside.  
The more crucial diﬀerence between the two accounts can be summarised by saying that, 
for Lawlor, they constitute an upstream attempt to maintain an intentional relation (op. 
cit.: 72-5), whereas on the coordination functions account, they constitute a downstream 
attempt to maintain a coherent state of information. Lawlor’s file maintenance 
dispositions include recognition and reidentification, which are upstream in the sense 
that they concern how information gets associated with a mental file. These bear on 
referential coordination because they make that file intentionally related to something, so 
the information is information about the same thing. On the coordination functions 
explanation, the parallel dispositions (to revise, revoke, or reconstruct) are downstream in 
the sense that they deal in information associated with the file with no reference to where 
it comes from, and involve other bits of information not associated with the file. 
Coherence kicks in because of the presence of the paradigmatic inferential disposition 
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and the need to make changes as a result of it. Both accounts therefore tie referential 
coordination to dispositions to make changes to one’s files, but in quite diﬀerent ways. 
The problem with Lawlor’s account was that appealing to file maintenance dispositions 
involves the explanation in some loss of psychological realism (we do not in general have 
or need to have extensive awareness of the epistemic status of our information in order to 
have referentially coordinated thoughts). This is not the case for the dispositions involved 
in the coordination functions explanation. These demand much less than being sensitive 
to what bears on the epistemic properties of one’s information, including things perhaps 
in the irretrievable past. Referential coordination can be a feature of a thinker’s thoughts 
even if she is lax in her epistemic self-monitoring. Coordination functions involve only 
what a thinker must have if she is to be capable of referentially coordinated thought at all. 
6.3.3 Summary 
The coordination functions explanation of referential coordination meets the first three 
desiderata where the competing explanations fail in various ways. In particular, the 
explanation avoids the pitfalls of alternative treatments of mental files, and so can 
preserve the comparative benefits of that approach in a satisfying way. This provides a 
strong argument to adopt it as the best explanation going. 
6.4 The Character of the Coordination Functions Explanation 
If we do adopt the coordination functions explanation, then what view of thought does it 
supply? I will begin by showing how it answers the three questions set out in §1.4. It will 
be seen that it supplies a lightweight, psychologistic, and referentialist view, and that as a 
consequence it provides a deflationary understanding of referential coordination that 
speaks against more ambitious philosophical claims that might be thought to be 
supported by reflection on rational inference. 
6.4.1 Lightweight psychologistic referentialism 
The coordination functions theory makes no use of a representational property more 
basic than reference (referentialist); it does make use of psychological properties and 
entities (psychologistic); and it does not require there to be any substantial relationship 
between what explains referential coordination of thoughts and what explains the 
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referential content of thoughts, or in other words, it makes no use of either side of the 
content/vehicle distinction as applied to thought (lightweight). As for the first two 
points, I take them to be obvious: coordination functions are properties of file 
predications, which are psychological entities, and their role in the theory does not 
require them to determine reference in any sense. I want to concentrate on the last point, 
though it may be obvious how the first two work towards supporting it. 
The coordination functions explanation is lightweight because no part of the explanation 
bears on the nature of mental content, or on whether there are mental representations 
and if so, what they are like. That is why it makes no use of the content/vehicle 
distinction. It could be objected that, while one should grant as obvious that no use is 
made of the content side of the content/vehicle distinction, nevertheless use is made of the 
vehicle side, and so the view is not really lightweight at all. Why think this? On the one 
hand, it is common to see mental files spoken of as being files ‘on’ something, as having 
topics, as we might call it. On the other hand, there is the fact that file predications are 
said to be subject to normative requirements concerning the information that they carry. 
Having a topic and carrying information seem to be intentional properties. So there 
might appear to be a problem with seeing the view as lightweight. 
That there is no problem can be shown by first dispensing with the idea that files have a 
topic, or rather, with showing how it can be accommodated. There seems to be 
something highly plausible about this idea. It is natural to suppose that the idea behind 
mental file theory must be that there is a mental file that is on the reference of the 
thoughts, and that their having that reference in common goes hand in hand with having 
the file in common, and the file being on that referent. It is natural to suppose that 
mental files are intentional vehicles of a sort. If it is granted that mental files have a topic, 
then their having a topic is a sort of intentional property. It answers to the way that 
intentionality is normally introduced: something has an intentional property if it is about 
something else, and having a topic seems to be a way of being about something else. 
Mental files have intentional properties, if we grant the natural way of talking to have 
this consequence. But if they do, they do not do so in just the same way that thoughts 
are intentional. There is only a problem if we ignore the following point: the content/
vehicle distinction that heavyweight explanations make use of is a distinction applied to 
thoughts. Mental files are of course not contents of thoughts, but nor are they vehicles of 
thought, at least so far as the basic model that is employed by the coordination functions 
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explanation goes. The intentionality of files, whatever exactly that comes to, does not 
mean that the coordination functions explanation is heavyweight. 
The diﬀerence can be shown by noting a diﬀerence between the roles played by vehicles 
of thought and mental files. To be a vehicle of thought, at a very general approximation, 
is to function as a representation in whatever way is necessary for the content of that 
representation to have the distinctive role in a thinker’s life that thought contents have—
to be the content of beliefs, to have logical implications that are brought out in inference, 
to be expressed in attempts at communication, to be preserved in memory, and so on. 
That formulation is banal enough to be acceptable to all, or is meant to be. The tricky 
part is to say exactly what it might mean, in particular to say what those functions are 
exactly. But even so, it is clear that file predications do not fit into the representation slot 
of that formulation. Mental files do not function in that way. They are mental entities 
that enable some of those functions only. This goes for file predications in just the same 
way. Although they carry information, by being associated with a mental file, it is no part 
of the theory that makes use of them that they have the psychological role of thoughts. 
This remains the case even if, as was discussed at §6.2.5, mental files are implemented at 
a diﬀerent functional level by things that do function as representations.  
Put simply, the point is that no theory of mental representation is or needs to be upheld 
in the theory of referential coordination that I am recommending. This is a strength of 
the explanation, insofar as it represents the path of least explanatory resistance. 
A question may remain about how the intentionality of mental files and their 
predications should be understood, if not as vehicles of thoughts. One way, of course, is 
to take them to be robustly intentional in the way that thoughts and sentences are 
normally taken to be. This attitude can be seen in Prinz’s claims concerning the 
intentionality of long-term memory networks (see his 2002: 249-260). But given the 
diﬀerence I have been insisting upon, this option may seem unavailable, or at least 
unattractive. We might instead want to say that mental files are not used as 
representations in a way suﬃcient to make them vehicles of thoughts, but nevertheless 
have their uses, and have topics because of these uses. 
There are a couple of ways of elaborating on this idea. One is to say that files having a 
topic is a way of keeping track of facts about how the cognitive system interacts with 
things in the wider world; being ‘on’ something is a handle for the mental file theorist, a 
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sort of courtesy term oﬀered in recognition of the important work that mental files do 
that adds no more robustly intentional facts into the world. A diﬀerent elaboration is to 
view files as components of a sort of informational model, a model that mirrors the 
structure of information (or misinformation) that a thinker has about the world, the 
individuals that inhabit it and the properties that they have; being ‘on’ something is a 
product of interpretation. File topics are something that we, as theorists of the mind, can 
interpret according to how it maps on to the world that it models. This makes the 
intentional properties of files more robust than being merely by courtesy, at any rate as 
robust as the interpretation that we can place on them.  
The idea that mental files have their uses in this way should not be confused with how we 
interact with non-mental files. These are objects of purposive actions (searching for and 
through them, organising them, placing documents inside, and so on), and serve as tools 
for keeping track of information about things. Mental files are not tools used by the 
thinker in this way. As I emphasised above, they are elements in the cognitive mechanism 
at the sub-personal level. They thus clearly have an information gathering function, but it 
is not a function that consists in their being used, as tools in purposive action, as non-
mental files are. But they do have such a use for the theorist, and this theoretical use can, 
perhaps, sustain intentional properties despite their not being vehicles of thought. 
All three views on file topics are consistent with maintaining that an explanation of 
referential coordination that makes use of mental files can be lightweight. So the 
coordination functions explanation, as a lightweight explanation, can happily allow that 
files have topics. It also, perhaps, represents the beginnings of a novel path to conciliation 
between the diﬀerent positions on the problem of intentionality taken by 
interpretationists and more straightforward realists. One could accept an interpretative 
view of intentionality at the level of mental files while also holding to a strongly realistic 
view of intentionality at the level of a person’s thoughts: intentional facts at the sub-
personal level are interpretational, and pertain to the grounds of non-interpretative 
intentional facts at the personal level. For the sake of completeness, I note that it is also 
consistent with eliminativism about intentionality, of the sort that is meant to be found 
at the level of thought, though this would remove the motivation for the theory, which 
was precisely to explain a feature of thoughts. Going into these points any further would 
take us well beyond the remit of the present essay, so I leave the topic there. 
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6.4.2 Coherence and connectedness 
In the comparison with sense theory in §6.3.2, I said that the rationality of the 
paradigmatic inferential dispositions need only amount to it being coherent for the 
thinker to treat her thoughts as being about the same, rather than a once-and-for-all 
demonstration that they are about the same, and commented that this marks a 
fundamental diﬀerence between the two theories. I want to expand on that idea by way 
of elaborating on the character of coordination functions theory. 
Any explanation of the rationality of the paradigmatic inferential disposition to conjoin 
and generalise that marks referentially coordinated thoughts will come with a view of 
what we might call the mode of rationality that they exhibit. By modes of rationality, I 
mean to pick out the diﬀerent ways for the reasons that bear on inferential dispositions to 
be structured. Rationality in general can consist of diﬀerent forms in which reasons make 
something rational. Reasons can be such as to decisively exclude certain possibilities. They 
can also be such as to allow some possibility or possibilities to be entertained. 
Accordingly, we get at least two diﬀerent ways for the paradigmatic inferential 
dispositions to be rational. They may be so because there is something that conclusively 
demonstrates, or anyway appears to, that reference is the same, so as to exclude the 
possibility it is not; call this the exclusionary mode of rationality. On the whole, this is the 
mode of rationality that the explanations criticised in previous chapters go in for. 
Heavyweight explanations have the result that whatever indicates sameness of reference 
does so in virtue of being linked to what makes it the case that reference is in fact the 
same. So the indication of sameness of reference they provide is a reason in the 
exclusionary mode. 
By contrast, the coordination functions explanation makes the rationality of the 
inferential dispositions belong to the coherence mode of rationality. Coordination 
functions, as properties of file predications, indicate sameness of reference by making the 
coherence of one’s inferential dispositions with one’s broader stock of information a 
matter of rational concern, something to which a thinker with the right capacities can be 
sensitive. Being sensitive will manifest in a disposition to make changes in one’s 
inferential dispositions in response to putatively defeating information in the three ways 
mentioned above (§6.2.4). To reiterate a point made above, this explanation bridges what 
is going on at the personal-level and at the sub-personal level: what is coherent or 
incoherent is something that lies at the personal-level; what accounts for that coherence 
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being at issue at the personal-level lies at the sub-personal level. This bridging of the two 
levels makes available the lightweight nature of the explanation, and, consequently, the 
fact it belongs to the coherence rather than exclusionary mode of rationality. In light of 
the evident advantages that this sort of explanation has over the competitor explanations, 
the bridging of the two levels is a crucial feature of the account. 
It is important, in saying all of this by way of characterising the explanation, to keep in 
view exactly what it is that was to be explained. Insofar as referential coordination, as a 
sort of inverse of what goes on in a Frege case, has received philosophical attention, it is 
largely under the guise of coreference de jure. I want to reemphasise the point that 
referential coordination and coreference de jure are distinct, because the characteristics of 
the coordination functions explanation of referential coordination will, at least at first 
appearance, be simply ruled out if what is being sought is an explanation of the stronger 
condition. 
The coherence mode of rationality exhibited by the indication of sameness of reference 
provided by coordination functions does not look adequate as an account of the 
epistemic side of coreference de jure. The presence of a coordination function does 
nothing to secure anything along the lines of sameness of reference as a representational 
requirement. Whether or not something like the conjunction of representational and 
epistemic properties discussed under the rubric of coreference de jure really is exhibited in 
thought (or, for that matter, the conjunction of semantic and epistemic properties in 
language) must be a moot point. As far as understanding how identity can figure in an 
inferentially basic way, we can at least say that this notion does no useful work for us, 
regardless of the fact that some theorists have taken it as a starting point in their 
proposals about the nature of thought. 
There is a revealing point of contact between this and how the basic model treatments of 
mental files owing to Lawlor and Schroeter are framed. In the course of their discussions 
of mental files, both direct their sights initially towards accounts of the stronger 
condition, combining epistemic and semantic/representational properties. Lawlor, 
following a discussion of Campbell's (1987/88) treatment of trading on sameness of 
reference in terms of sameness of sense, proposes to account for apparent sameness of 
sense. Since sameness of sense requires sameness of reference, this amounts to the same as 
apparent coreference de jure. Schroeter frames the inquiry into “the first person 
perspective of the individual on what’s picked out by her own words and 
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thoughts” (2012: 179) as an inquiry into “apparent de jure sameness: the subjective 
appearance of obvious, incontrovertible and epistemically basic sameness of subject 
matter.” (op. cit.: 182)  
Both Lawlor and Schroeter therefore frame their discussion in terms of the stronger 
condition plus a qualification so as to make it weaker: apparent coreference de jure, 
apparent sameness of sense. This qualification (which is not really commented upon by 
Schroeter, but plays a more important role in Lawlor’s discussion of warranted inference) 
puts the topic of investigation much more closely in line with referential coordination, in 
the sense that what is to be explained is a condition weaker than coreference de jure. 
Putting matters in terms of the stronger condition plus qualification does very little 
except express some negotiable assumptions about the nature of thought, and combine 
these with a more realistic view of what is actually required. Instead of approaching the 
phenomenon as we find it in our thinking in terms of a qualification on the stronger 
condition, coreference de jure or sameness of sense, my suggestion is that the stronger 
condition be simply swapped out for the weaker condition of referential coordination, so 
dropping the qualification with no loss of descriptive adequacy and no shortage of gain 
in clarity. 
The point can be reinforced by noting a further overlap between the coherence mode of 
rationality adopted by the coordination functions explanation and what Schroeter calls 
‘connectedness’ models of apparent coreference de jure. A connectedness model “appeals 
directly to the relationship between diﬀerent token representational states established by 
the subject’s psychological dispositions.” (op. cit.: 191) The contrast is with ‘resemblance’ 
models, which Schroeter gives the general gloss of the idea that “[t]wo token 
representations are held to express the same meaning only if they resemble each other in a 
specific respect: each token must be associated with the very same pattern of 
understanding.” (op. cit.: 187; this distinction also finds expression in Fine 2007: 2-3) 
An adequate model, on Schroeter’s view, needs to account for accessibility (“the 
appearance of de jure sameness should aﬀord reliable access to sameness of subject 
matter,” op. cit.: 184) and should allow for flexibility (“must be flexible enough to allow 
for the kind of variation in understanding we tolerate in rational inquiry and debate,” op. 
cit.: 186). Schroeter’s argument is that resemblance models cannot meet both demands at 
the same time, whereas a connectedness model can (op. cit. 189). 
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The lightweight explanation of referential coordination provided by coordination 
functions can be seen as a version of or variation on the ‘connectedness’ model that 
Schroeter recommends. It depends on the dispositions a thinker has with respect to her 
mental files and the coherence of those dispositions with her broader store of 
information, rather than resemblance in content or vehicle. The argument for this does 
not depend on bringing in considerations of flexibility, but rather in showing that there 
are explanatory deficits that come with cashing out accessibility in resemblance terms. 
The advantages of views of thought that support a connectedness model over a 
resemblance model are much clearer when put forward as a way of explaining referential 
coordination, rather than apparent de jure coreference. 
Coreference de jure without qualification is naturally seen as a component of a rationalist 
conception of inference, and epistemology more generally. If rational thought requires de 
jure coreference, and if coreference de jure involves immediate and incontrovertible access 
to the fact that two thoughts refer to the same thing, then there is a sort of epistemic 
foundation, or at least epistemic ingredient, to our conception of things that is not up for 
confirmation or disconfirmation by empirical evidence. Not surprisingly, the coherence 
mode of rationality adopted by the coordination functions explanation of referential 
coordination does nothing to support this kind of epistemology, and it provides reasons 
for rejecting this way into it. This presents one strand of the deflationary character of the 
explanation, the consequences of which I will go into further in the next chapter. 
There is no good reason, once referential coordination is made explicit as a distinct 
condition, to think that coreference de jure is a feature of thought. One would perhaps 
need to argue that, as it is a feature of language, it must be a feature of thought also. 
There can only be any philosophical pressure to treat thought and language as being on 
all fours in this way on a view of mental content that sees an essential role for something 
akin to the Fregean notion of sense. The explicitly articulated rationalist ambitions of 
sense theorists (see Chalmers 2012: xvii and Peacocke 2008: 150-159; also Peacocke 
2003; for a view of Frege himself as a rationalist, see Burge 2013) may be laudable, but 
they find no support in considerations concerning the ways in which identity figures in 
inference. We may ideally want a kind of certainty, a ‘cognitive home’ in Williamson’s 
(1996) phrase, that can be had based on our rational capacities alone. But we may have 
to make do with coherence based on our fallible information-gathering capacities, with 
all the uncertainty and complexity that that entails. 
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6.4.3 Summary 
As a lightweight explanation, the coordination functions explanation views referential 
coordination on the lines of the coherence rather than demonstrative mode of rationality, 
and does not suﬃce to support the stronger epistemic-cum-semantic notion of 
coreference de jure, or rationalistic ambitions in epistemology.  
Combined with the earlier point about the lack of a theory of mental presentation or 
content, these points give content to what I meant, when introducing the coordination 
functions explanation, in saying that it is has a deflationary character. On this view, 
referential coordination requires very little by way of theoretical novelty or location in 
broader philosophical ambitions. When one is disposed to treat one’s thoughts as 
referring to the same thing, one is, with the addition of some fairly straightforward and 
theoretically minimal conditions, rational in doing so. The apparatus of defaults and 
defeaters provided by file predications, coreference requirements on file predications, and 
requirement-based coordination functions based on those requirements, is simply a way 
of saying what these minimal conditions are. Far from giving rise to a need for a theory 
of mental content, or a theory of mental representation, with the epistemological or 
psychological commitments these inevitably bring in, referential coordination requires 
only just enough theory to give an explanation, no less and certainly no more. 
6.5 Conclusion 
Coordination functions theory extends mental file theory by drawing a distinction 
between a mental file and its predications, noting coreference requirements on file 
predications, and applying the apparatus of defaults and defeaters from entitlement 
epistemology. This supplies the materials for an explanation of referential coordination 
that meets the requirements and desiderata on an explanation much better than 
competing explanations. It oﬀers a view of thought that is psychologistic, referentialist, 
and lightweight, and a take on referential coordination as a matter of coherence that 
bridges the personal and sub-personal levels. As such, it provides a relatively deflationary 
view, backed by strong explanatory considerations, of one part of how thought works. 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Chapter 7 - Applications 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter addresses some matters left open from earlier chapters: the fate of concept 
theory, the extension of the explanation to identity judgements, and special ways of 
thinking. The deflationary character of the explanation is consequential on all three 
topics. 
As a lightweight approach to thought, the coordination functions explanation speaks 
against the existence of concepts as theoretical entities introduced for the purpose of 
explaining conceptual capacities. This conclusion is complicated by the fact that there are 
some ways of cashing out what concepts are that are compatible with the coordination 
functions view. It helps to capture this by adapting the distinction between concepts and 
conceptions. A conception can be understood as a collection of beliefs and other attitudes 
that a person has concerning something. Conceptions thus contrast with concepts in the 
non-explanatory sense that captures the capacity to think about something in a 
coordinated way, and in the explanatory sense of what explains that capacity. Taking 
conceptions as bodies of referentially coordinated thoughts, it is possible to comprehend 
much of what goes under the title of the theory of concepts as concerning the nature of 
conceptions, such as their structure and cognitive role (§7.2). 
Referential coordination can be applied to the problems of identity judgements and 
special ways of thinking by means of conceptions. I argue that coordination functions 
that are not requirement-based but rather based on information can articulate the 
empirical significance and rational role of identity judgements. The notion of a conception 
link is introduced to capture this. A conception link imposes a disposition to treat the 
information contained in two mental files as referring to the same, thus overcoming the 
fact that they would not otherwise do so. Conception links are introduced by theoretical 
stipulation, much like mental files themselves, and also made the target of substantive 
commitments (§7.3). Conceptions also provide a way of comprehending special ways of 
thinking. On what I call the deflationary view, they are not special because of the 
presence of a special representational mechanism, but and only insofar as they involve 
conceptions that play a special role. The deflationary view diverges from the more 
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orthodox view, but deserves consideration due to its being the upshot of the best 
explanation of referential coordination (§7.4). 
7.2 Concepts and Conceptions 
As I argued in §2.3, concept theory posits entities to explain what makes thoughts that 
are exercises of the same referential capacity also exercises of the same conceptual 
capacity. These are capacities that are exercised in thoughts that are referentially 
coordinated. Because they explain both the referential content of thoughts and the role of 
thoughts in inference, concept theory posits heavyweight entities. If the coordination 
functions explanation is correct, then heavyweight theories are incorrect. So we should 
conclude that concept theory is discredited, and eliminate concepts from our theorising 
about thought. This provides a useful way to think about the main consequence of the 
argument for the coordination functions explanation. Many theorists of thought accept 
that there are concepts, but the coordination functions explanation indicates that this 
commitment rests on shaky foundations. Some nuance is called for, however. 
Concept theory says that there are things that answer the job description of concepts. 
Concept theories consist of answers to the question (the identification question, as I 
called it) of what answers to the job description. Answers to the identification question 
diﬀer, at the most fundamental level, over which side of the vehicle/content distinction 
concepts are held to fall. Concepts as contents, that is, as Fregean senses, serve no purpose 
on the present showing, and can be eliminated. By contrast, vehicles of thought, mental 
representations the presence of which account for a proposition being the content of a 
thought, are not shown to be redundant. Nor is their being typed in systematic ways that 
reflect the exercise of conceptual capacities. In fact, the coordination functions theory 
could be used to provide a typology for this purpose. One could call these representations 
‘concepts’, though it is not at all essential and, I would suggest, rather misleading: it is 
not their presence that explains why thoughts are exercises of the same conceptual 
capacity. 
Two further clarifications are worth making. The first is that concept theory is to be 
distinguished from the idea that there are concepts in a non-explanatory or descriptive 
sense, as when we attribute concepts in order to capture a thinker’s conceptual capacities, 
the exercises of which are referentially coordinated thoughts. Doing this is not to posit 
the heavyweight entities of concept theory. These are brought in to explain what makes 
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for thoughts being exercises of the same conceptual capacity. Moving from talk of 
concepts in the descriptive sense to concepts in the explanatory sense is easy to do, but is 
nevertheless a substantive move, and one that should be resisted if my argument here has 
been correct. 
The second is that psychological concept theory remains untouched. The relationship 
between the rejection of philosophical concept theory and psychological concept theory 
bears more discussion than I can give it here. The immediate point is that although 
coordination functions theory speaks against philosophical concept theory, it is broadly 
complimentary with psychological concept theory. As I suggested in §6.2.5 above, 
coordination functions theory can be made more firmly based in the empirical 
psychological literature by relating it to the study of information used in categorisation 
tasks, in the form of prototypes, exemplars, theories, and so on. The extent to which the 
basic model of mental files might be usefully illuminated is an interesting line of further 
inquiry that may provide a way of reinforcing the appeal to mental files. It may also have 
implications for whether the corresponding position of eliminativism about psychological 
concepts, of the kind advocated by Machery (2009), is defensible.  
These two points can be brought out in a way that will prove to be of use in showing how 
the coordination functions explanation can be addressed to the two desiderata 
concerning identity judgements and special ways of thinking. Adapting some 
terminology given psychological currency by Rey (1985; see also his 2010 comment on 
Machery 2009), we can distinguish between concepts and conceptions. Rey’s original 
concern was to criticise what he saw as the mistaken idea that theories of prototypes are 
theories of concepts, which, roughly, he takes to be the entities posited by philosophical 
concept theory. By contrast, Rey takes conceptions to be how people ‘access’ concepts 
(1985: 260). Whatever this means exactly need not concern us. The distinction as I 
intend it is between concepts, understood either in the explanatory or descriptive senses, 
and conceptions as bundles of referentially coordinated information. A conception 
therefore corresponds to the networks of information linked by requirement-based 
coordination functions. 
Adopting this notion of a conception makes clear how coordination functions theory is 
complimentary to psychological theories of concepts. Such theories concern the structure 
and content of conceptions, or of the various forms that conceptions may take when 
employed in given cognitive tasks. Another benefit is that topics usually taken as apt for 
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concept-theoretic explanation may instead be transposed into conception-theoretic 
explanations. That is, one can explain facts about the way that cognitive capacities make 
use of and depend on diﬀerent bodies of information, while rejecting any role for 
heavyweight entities in these explanations. This has particular relevance to the application 
of coordination functions theory to related problems, including the problems presented 
by Frege’s puzzle about identity and special ways of thinking, as the remainder of this 
chapter will demonstrate. 
On a related topic, the reader may recall the earlier discussion of Fodor’s informational 
atomism (§4.4). This view holds concepts simply to be expressions in a language of 
thought whose referential contents do not depend on their role in any inference or 
pattern of categorisation. Many critics of Fodor’s theory of concepts have argued (e.g. 
Peacocke 2000, 2004; Prinz & Clark 2004) that it makes concepts psychologically 
nugatory; concepts are needed to explain things like rational inference and categorisation 
behaviour (there is, I note, quite a big diﬀerence between these things), and so atomism 
about concepts must be wrong, or at any rate much worse than competitors that do not 
have this consequence and so are more explanatorily powerful. 
I would like to suggest that the critics are correct, though for the wrong reasons. What 
Fodor’s atomism eﬀectively does, we can now say, is to provide a lightweight theory of 
concepts in the descriptive sense in terms of a theory of concepts in the explanatory 
sense. Fodor is right in at least implicitly holding that a theory of concepts in the 
descriptive sense should be a lightweight theory, because the explanation of referential 
coordination should be a lightweight one. But his critics are right that one should not tie 
that to a theory of concepts in the explanatory sense. The ‘conceptual’ part of conceptual 
atomism is the problem, not the ‘atomism’ part. Jettisoning the commitment to concepts 
in the explanatory sense allows us to the preserve the lightweight spirit of atomism while 
avoiding the charge of being psychologically nugatory. The work thought to be done by 
concepts can be done by conceptions, and the existence of conceptions is perfectly 
coherent with atomism (cf. Margolis & Laurence 1999: 72-5). 
One final point before moving on. One might have the suspicion that the rejection of 
concept theory being recommended is not wholehearted, because one can make out a 
concept-theoretic interpretation of the coordination functions interpretation. Such an 
interpretation would view conceptions understood as the bundles of information linked 
by coordination functions plus whatever it is that makes for intentionality as suﬃcient for 
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an explanation of conceptual capacities. In which case, these agglomerations would be 
concepts. So even if not by itself a theory of concepts, coordination functions theory is 
not incompatible with such a theory.  
The problem is that these agglomerations would not be concepts. As gerrymandered 
entities, they do not have the kind of explanatory unity one would require of a class of 
entities to serve as an answer to the identification question; concepts would not be a 
genuine kind of thing. And identifying these agglomerations as concepts would ignore 
the point that there is no explanatory relationship between the parts of the 
agglomeration, something on which traditional theories of concepts place a great deal of 
importance. In other words, it would ignore the diﬀerence between heavy- and 
lightweight approaches to thought. In fact, this interpretation demonstrates the point of 
the foregoing remarks about conceptions, that they can do the work that many take to be 
done by the sort of entities posited by concept theory. The fact that one could give this 
the somewhat absurd title of a non-concept-theoretic explanation of concepts just goes to 
show what a tangle it is possible to get into here. The lightweight notion of a conception 
based on coordination functions provides a way out; I recommend taking it. 
7.3 Identity Judgements 
Referential coordination is a way for identity to figure in thought in an inferentially basic 
way. Identity can also figure in a less basic way, as the topic of belief. Such beliefs will 
reflect a discovery (or apparent discovery) of an identity. One can find out that 
something one already has thoughts about satisfies some description that can only be 
satisfied by one thing (as in when one discovers that, say, Cicero is the most famous 
Roman orator), and one can find out that what one thought was two things are in fact 
one. Having done so, one can rationally make new inferences. The problem about this 
less basic way in which identity figures in thought and inference finds expression in the 
form of Frege’s puzzle about identity (see §1.4.2). This puzzle has two parts: 
How can identities have empirical significance? Everything is self-identical, 
and so we know automatically that one thing is identical to itself, and not 
identical to everything else. But then how is discovering an identity 
possible, as it evidently is?  
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How is there a diﬀerence in the rational role of identity judgements? Trivial 
identity judgements are obvious, perhaps knowable a priori, whereas 
informative identity judgements can only be knowable on the basis of 
empirical discovery. What accounts for this diﬀerence? 
A good explanation of referential coordination should ideally extend to giving answers to 
these questions, since the capacity to form identity judgements, at least in the form 
recognisable in the case of human thought, can be seen as depending on the prior 
capacity to have referentially coordinated thoughts. This section shows how the 
coordination functions explanation provides satisfactory answers. 
7.3.1 Conception links 
Identity judgements can be understood as imposing a kind of coordination function, 
what I will call information-based coordination functions. An identity judgement has the 
eﬀect, at the information-processing level, of creating a link between conceptions. 
Conception links are like mental files: theoretical entities given a role by stipulation, which 
are then made subject to substantive commitments. The role they have is to put in place 
dispositions to make the inferences similar to the paradigmatic form (similar in that they 
conjoin and generalise, diﬀerent in that they include an identity premise) across 
conceptions, rather than within conceptions as in the case of referential coordination 
proper. These dispositions impose coordination functions with target and base 
predications belonging to diﬀerent mental files. These are information-based 
coordination functions. Information-based coordination functions exploit but are 
distinct from requirement-based coordination functions, as they do not have a basis in 
coreference requirements imposed by the dispositions brought about by the presence of a 
mental file and its predications. 
The questions of empirical significance and rational role of identity judgements can then 
be answered like so: 
The empirical significance of identity judgements consists in the establishment 
of a conception link. Conception links impose information-based 
coordination functions; these make the coherence of the newly created 
inferential dispositions with respect to the stock of information a matter of 
rational sensitivity. Empirically significant judgements create inferential 
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dispositions not previously had, and so present the possibility of 
inconsistencies not previously in need of resolution. 
The rational role of an identity judgement corresponds to whether it can be such 
as to impose an information-based coordination functions or not. Trivial 
identities correspond to cases where all the predications that would be 
referentially coordinated already belong to a single conception. Informative 
identities correspond to cases where some predications that would be 
referentially coordinated do not already belong to a single conception. 
Both answers are supported by the same extension of the general idea behind the 
coordination functions account of referential coordination. Empirical significance, and 
hence rational role, of identity judgements depends what a thinker’s informational set up 
is like, and not on any representational mechanism. This account therefore concurs with 
Almog in holding that 
informativeness does not rest in the absolute internal informativeness of a 
proposition we do grasp; it lies in lack of information.… None of this 
impinges directly on semantics. It is a question in cognitive psychology and 
human information processing: what information we do have in the head 
and what it can settle. (2014: xi-xx) 
The lack of information is to be understood as the absence of an information-based 
coordination function drawing together the information that a thinker has. Information 
can be gained so as to make such a lack incoherent, and in cases where a thinker is 
rationally sensitive to this, she will form a judgement with the eﬀects just sketched. 
The answers to the two questions are not meant to be a radical new departure. The basic 
idea will be in common to any reasonable account of identity judgements. The basic idea 
is that empirically significant identities work by bringing together, in some way, what are 
otherwise distinct ways of thinking, so leading to a change in the overall information 
state, and diﬀerence of rational role consists in whether or not they are apt to be 
empirically significant in this manner. Empirically significant identities operate on our 
ways of thinking, and the rational role of identity judgements reflects how this interacts 
with what inferences we can rationally make. Conception links and information-based 
coordination functions simply provide a way of substantiating this basic idea. They show 
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that one can do so without anything like the apparatus of Fregean sense, which might be 
taken to be mandatory when addressing the role of identity judgements in thought—or 
at least, to be adopted for want of a better alternative. But a better alternative there is 
indeed. 
There is an obvious similarity between the conception links account of the empirical 
significance of identity judgements and other treatments of identity judgements in terms 
of mental files. The idea of links between mental files is a feature of Recanati’s discussion 
of identity judgements within his indexical model of mental files, Recanati refers to the 
idea, found in Lockwood (1971: 209) and Strawson (1974: 51-6) that identity 
judgements can be thought of as merging mental files, creating one where previously there 
were two. The diﬃculties faced by this as an adequate approach are not inconsiderable, 
not least insofar as it fails to explain how identity judgements can be made with less than 
absolute certainty, and by extension how they interact with a thinker's with subjective 
probabilities (Recanati refers us to Lawlor 2001: 62-5 and Millikan 2000: 147-9).  
As for Recanati, himself, he holds that there is 
an operation on files whose role is precisely to overcome that architectural 
limitation [i.e. that information associated with distinct files cannot be 
integrated in inference], by licensing the integration/exploitation of 
information distributed in distinct files. That operation, following Perry, I 
call linking. When two files are linked, information can flow freely from 
one file to the other, so informational integration/exploitation becomes 
possible. Thus if I learn that Cicero is Tully, this allows me to put together 
the pieces of information in the two files.. 
To accept the identity ‘A=B’ is to link the two files corresponding to the 
terms on each side of the equals sign. It would be incoherent to accept the 
identity ‘Cicero = Tully’, and not let the information in the respective files 
get together and breed. (2012: 43-44) 
Putting aside for a moment whether Recanati-Perry linking is the right way to think 
about the empirical significance (and also that Recanati does not explain why linking 
allows one to perform the inference, compare §5.5), it must be seen as distinct from 
conception linking. For one thing, nothing about conception links implies that 
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information can flow freely. That is, for any predication of a file P that is in a conception 
C, if there is a conception link between C and a distinct conception C*, there will not 
necessarily be a predication P* in C* that carries the same information as P. A deeper 
diﬀerence is that, whereas Recanati-Perry linking is what we might call a file operation 
(much like the expansion, detachment, and so on discussed in §5.4), changing as it does 
the functional profile of mental files, conception links make no such changes to mental 
files, but rather to the functional properties of their predications. So although there is 
some similarity, Recanati-Perry linking and conception links to create an information-
based coordination function are quite diﬀerent. 
Recanati does not elaborate much further on the topic of linking, other than saying that 
is is “a quite fundamental operation… involved, for example, in the phenomenon of 
recognition (which involves linking a perceptual file and a file based on memory)—or at 
least, in some forms of recognition.” (op. cit.: 44.) Recanati-Perry links can be treated as 
causal primitives, much as mental files and their predications are. This goes for 
conception links as well. We can say that conception links are whatever they need to be 
so as to create dispositions of the paradigmatic kind across conceptions (on Recanati’s 
view these links are between files rather than conceptions, though they can be treated as 
more or less the same thing). It might be objected that this is to leave things much too 
underspecified. Even though it is legitimate to bring them in as primitives, just as mental 
files are, they need to be made the target of substantive claims that allow them to be open 
to assessment as part of our overall best theory of the mind. 
It might seem unclear how this could be done. I suggest a focus on the point made about 
merging made above, that it fails to take into account the fact that identity judgements 
can be made with less than absolute certainty. This point can be captured in terms of 
conception links, like so: 
Strength: The strength of the conception link between two conceptions C 
and C* tends to reflect the subjective probability function P (>0) assigned 
to the proposition that C and C* are conceptions of the same thing. 
The strength of a conception link is how likely it is that a thinker will revise it in the face 
of new evidence. The subjective probability function P will, as usual, deliver values 
between 0 and 1. One conception link is stronger than another if the value of P is higher, 
weaker if the value of P is lower; hence the strength of the conception link reflects P. 
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Values of P less than 1 correspond to the subjective probability that there are 
inconsistencies between the information in C and the information in C*, modified by 
the probability that the contradiction can be resolved consistent with the other 
information. A value of 1 will therefore be eﬀectively the same as merging, and represents 
the extreme case of it being excluded that a thinker’s information indicates that there are 
two things rather than one. In such a case, there is a more profound shift in the 
informational state, wherein two conceptions are fused into one. There will be no 
rational way back to the previous information state without reconstruction, in the sense 
introduced in §6.2.4. Whether a conception link with strength reflecting P=1 is ever 
obtained in actuality (or for that matter, whether there are uninformative identity 
judgements, about which some scepticism is warranted; what would be the point in 
them?) can remain a moot point. 
Strength can be extended to the claim that coordination functions based on information 
indicating identity interact with a thinker’s broader stock of information in line with the 
Bayesian calculus. The extent to which this is so will be modified by the heuristics and 
rules of thumbs employed in updating this information. This is why Strength says that 
conception links will tend to reflect P, rather than reflect it without qualification. There is 
no point pretending that there will be any simple account of the exact nature of the 
cognitive links in question. But the basic idea, that identity judgements having empirical 
content can be cashed out with an application of the apparatus of subjective probability, 
finds a neat fit with coordination functions theory. Touching again on a moral drawn at 
the end of the last section, the coordination functions account of the empirical 
significance and rational role of identity judgements allows for a high degree of 
complexity. The nature of conception links will be at least as complex as global 
probabilistic information update, which is very complex indeed.  
7.3.2 Advantages 
If we assume that a mental file approach to identity judgements must be on the right 
lines, then which model should we prefer, conception linking or Recanati-Perry linking? 
An advantage of conception links as characterised by Strength is that they oﬀer a more 
realistic picture of how explicit judgements of identity work, both in how they interact 
with both requirement-based coordination functions, and so with the referential 
coordination of thoughts, and in how facts about identity can be discovered and 
integrated into a thinker’s rational conception of things.  
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One way in which this shows up is in what we might call the pondering problem. This 
problem is nicely brought out by Papineau and Shea’s critical notice of Millikan (2000): 
We have attitudes to propositions of identity other than acceptance or 
rejection. We can entertain such a proposition, and wonder about it. (Is 
Cary Grant the same person as Archie Leach?) […] Am I quite sure that Jim 
was the man I saw robbing the grocery store? Maybe water isn’t H,O after 
all. (Papineau & Shea 2002: 463-4) 
The problem is to allow for the fact that one can also entertain identity judgements, 
presuppose them for the sake of argument, ponder them, and so on. The pondering 
problem is therefore to account for the rational role of merely entertained identity 
judgements, and constitutes an extension of the rational role question. 
Conception links can handle the pondering problem neatly, by bringing in the idea that 
conception links can be simulated. Such simulations simply involve computing the 
subjective probability assigned to the proposition that the information in two 
conceptions is information about the same thing, without actually changing that 
subjective probability. Entertaining an identity judgement is computing these changes. 
By contrast, file operations such as Recanati-Perry linking leave this aspect of the rational 
role of identity judgements untouched without an adaptation, but also potentially render 
them problematic.  
Suppose we apply the same simulation idea, which is the most obvious adaptation. 
Instead of computing changes to subjective probabilities about information, a file 
operation account would need simulations of wholesale changes to the whole mental file 
system. If two files are linked so that information can flow freely, then this could 
potentially lead to a wholesale change in a thinker’s information. Simulating these 
changes would need to include assessing all such changes for plausibility. This would 
require a potentially massive computational eﬀort (compare Lawlor 2001: 56-7). This is 
another instance of the problem presented by global inference. Merely entertained 
identity judgements would be far more drastic and costly than they need to be. In the 
first instance, only one proposition should be entertained, not potentially the whole of a 
thinker’s store of information. Simulated conception links do not have this consequence, 
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and Recanati-Perry linking does. Conception links should therefore be preferred over 
Recanati-Perry linking. 
A related diﬃculty faced by heavyweight explanations more broadly concerns how the 
explanatory entities they employ should be individuated so as to allow for a smooth 
explanation of referential coordination before and after information concerning identities 
has been gathered. Before, there are two such entities, but after making a judgement that 
the two things are in fact one, the thinker is now disposed to treat her thoughts 
previously treated as being about diﬀerent things as being about the same thing. What 
then happens to the two entities? Do they remain distinct? If so, then it makes the 
prediction that the thinker is not disposed to treat the thoughts as being about the same 
thing, which is false to the rational role of identity judgements. If not, then it makes the 
false prediction that the information concerning identity becomes trivial, which is false to 
their empirical significance.  
The import of this problem is shown in some diﬃculties raised for Recanati’s indexical 
model (see Goodsell 2013; Onofri 2015), to which he has responded (Recanati 2013) by 
accepting that the model needs additional elements, which he calls ‘referential indices’, 
complicating an already elaborate ecosystem of mental files to account for change in ways 
of thinking. Sense theory has related diﬃculties (cf. Kripke, 1979; Speaks 2014), and 
parallel problems will arise for mental representation typologies (recall the problems faced 
by the neo-empiricist typology regarding inferences involving change over time; see 
Millikan 2011 for related problems addressed to the originalist typology). 
The point is not that these problems are insurmountable, but rather that heavyweight 
theories seem to require additional resources to provide an account of the rational role of 
identity judgements (the fact they are often addressed to identity judgements in the first 
instance makes this rather awkward). The cornerstone of a lightweight approach is that it 
provides a basis for referential coordination that is not tied to the epistemology and 
psychology of identity judgements. This allows these latter problems to be subsumed 
under models of probabilistic global informational update, and implementation 
proposals subject to requirements of descriptive adequacy and psychological realism 
(perhaps involving heuristics, biases, mental models, and so on, of the sort discussed by 
Nickerson 2004, and recently in more popular format by Kahneman 2011). This is 
perhaps counter-intuitive, but it means that the coordination functions explanation 
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needs no additional resources to account for how discovering identities can interact with 
our attempts to gain reliable information.  
The fact, considered above as a potential problem, that lightweight explanations do not 
make patterns of referential coordination transitive helps rather than hinders in this 
regard. It also means that the epistemology of identity and the actual psychological 
processes that implement it can be held apart, as neo-Fregeans motivated by anti-
psychologistic inclinations generally insist, while at the same time avoiding the problem 
that comes with a blanket anti-psychologistic approach that leaves it obscure how they 
can be related. 
7.3.3 Summary 
The coordination functions explanation of referential coordination can be extended to 
identity judgements in a way much like the introduction of mental files: conception links 
are introduced by theoretical stipulation as what impose inferential dispositions, that 
ground a particular form of coordination function; they are then made the topic of 
substantive commitments, in this case, regarding how they interact with a thinker’s 
subjective probabilities. The basis of this account in a lightweight view of thought gives it 
some advantages over contrasting accounts. I conclude that the coordination functions 
explanation meets the fourth desideratum. 
7.4 Special Ways of Thinking 
The idea of a conception can be applied to the problem of special ways of thinking. More 
accurately, it can be used to show that there is not so much of a problem there at all. I 
propose a deflationary view of special ways of thinking, on which they involve 
conceptions that are special only in that they play a special role. There are reasons to 
prefer this to the more orthodox view of special ways of thinking, one that sees them as 
tied to special contents or representational mechanisms. The deflationary view might be 
seen as unsatisfactory by those who hold that demonstrative thoughts in particular have 
an indispensable role to play in our having thoughts about the world at all, but I argue 
that the extent to which there is a problem for the deflationary view on that front is 
minimal. 
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7.4.1 The deflationary view 
What I earlier called special ways of thinking are the rational relations between thoughts 
that are employed in certain cognitive capacities. These thoughts concern things or 
properties other than oneself in one’s immediate environment that figure in one’s 
perceptual experiences, and first personal or de se thoughts concerning oneself. Such 
thoughts are often categorised as demonstrative or indexical, and are often understood in 
terms of indexical and demonstrative concepts. The precise characterisation of these 
thoughts and/or concepts, and how or whether they relate to each other, is a controversial 
matter. What is generally not taken to be controversial is that there are such things. And 
it is usually supposed that there is a close link between them and particular classes of 
referring expressions, such as indexical and demonstrative referring terms, adverbial 
expressions, and inflections such as grammatical person and tense.  
These two claims—that there are these classes of thoughts or concepts, and that 
understanding them goes hand in hand with understanding the semantics of these classes 
of referring expressions—go together to make up what we might call the semantic view of 
specials ways of thinking.  
I propose a conception-based alternative to the semantic view. On this alternative, special 
ways of thinking can be understood by employing the idea of a conception like so: 
The deflationary view: Thoughts exhibiting special ways of thinking are 
ordinarily referentially coordinated thoughts (i.e. involve file predications 
that are target-base pairs for coordination functions) that belong to 
conceptions used for special purposes, for example, recognition of 
perceptually salient objects, action guidance, the sustenance of a rich self-
concept, patterns of emotional response, and so on. 
I call this the deflationary view because it finds the specialness of the thoughts that 
exhibit special ways of thinking only in the role played by information that makes up a 
single conception; the fact that these thoughts exhibit sameness in ways of thinking, that 
it is not enough to account for the rationality of inferences involving them to simply 
advert to their referential content, is to be explained in the same way as any other group 
of thoughts that exhibit sameness in ways of thinking. 
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The deflationary view therefore contrasts with the semantic view because it denies any 
role to special representational mechanisms, and does not link special ways of thinking 
with anything to do with the semantics of indexicals, demonstratives, and the rest. What 
is special about special ways of thinking is that the bundles of referentially coordinated 
thoughts play special roles, not what makes them bundles. This compares with Cappelen 
and Dever's (2013: 58) proposal to see the alleged phenomenon of essential indexicality 
as instead the more general feature of referential opacity or non-substitutability, and 
Millikan’s claim that “what makes [indexical thoughts] special is not their semantics but 
their functions, their psychological roles, their impacts on my behaviour.” (1990: 733) 
As rational creatures, with projects and values that motivate action that requires 
sensitivity to our surroundings in the broadest sense, these uses are special because 
essential to our lives. The ways of categorising thoughts on the semantic view correspond 
to these basic ways of interacting with things. So-called demonstrative thoughts concern 
information gained and stored in short-term memory for purposes of recognition and 
guidance of immediate action. First personal thoughts concern information about oneself 
needed to guide action in both the short- and long-term, information that interacts with 
one’s intentions and practical abilities to make certain courses of action rational. First 
person thoughts are clearly essential to the idea of a self-concept, taken from social 
psychology, consisting not just of beliefs about one’s characteristics, but beliefs 
concerning one’s place in broader social narratives, and one’s self-worth and competences 
in relation to those narratives, within which one can make sense of one’s actions (cf. 
Oyserman, Elmore & Smith 2011). Emotional response, and particularly self-conscious 
emotional response (cf. O’Brien 2011), is not obviously reducible to action or belief 
about the self, but is no less a part of how we respond to our surroundings. Though 
perception and action are often taken to be central in the philosophical literature, it is 
hard to imagine a realistic picture of an actual human life lacking social narrative and 
emotional response, and they deserve their place in the account of special ways of 
thinking as much as the more mundane tasks of self-location. 
7.4.2 Against the semantic view 
Are there reasons to prefer the deflationary view over the semantic view? It helps first to 
say a little more about what the contrast involves. 
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Seen as an approach to the psychology involved in special ways of thinking, the semantic 
view models thoughts with these roles on the meaning and use of indexical and 
demonstrative expressions and other syntactic forms. Not surprisingly, proponents of the 
semantic view divide along lines familiar from debates about meaning. One wing is 
represented by those, taking their cue from Frege (1918/1956), who seek to extend the 
notion of sense in some form. This extension has often been developed in response to 
critics from the other wing, which, following Kaplan’s (1989) seminal treatment of 
indexical and demonstrative expressions, finds expression under the slogan of ‘direct 
reference’. The direct reference wing makes no appeal to special propositional contents. 
Instead, it posits special non-propositional ways of determining truth-evaluable items of a 
non-Fregean sort (usually Russellian propositions, composed of objects, properties, and 
relations themselves rather than combinations of Fregean senses, though propositions as 
sets of possible worlds also feature). Along with Kaplan’s (op. cit.) character/content 
distinction, the direct reference wing of the semantic view has been developed by, for 
example, Lewis’ (1979) proposal to see attitudes as self-ascriptions of properties regarding 
ones location in ‘logical space’, and Perry’s arguments against the neo-Fregean account of 
demonstratives (1977). 
As for the neo-Fregean rejoinder, Perry’s arguments against Frege’s treatment of 
demonstratives was the target of Evans’ (1980) vigorous defence, in which he introduced 
the idea of demonstratives as expressing ‘dynamic modes of presentation’, subsequently 
developed in his (1982). Evans suggests that the core of the Fregean notion of sense can 
be preserved, with some modifications: dynamic modes of presentation are said to 
depend on a thinker’s perceptual tracking of objects through time and space (on which 
more presently). Despite their diﬀerences, when applied to the case of thoughts, the neo-
Fregean and direct reference wings are united in the idea that there are reproducible 
‘templates’ of how information is processed, and these templates serve to both determine 
a reference and explain facts about the rationality of information processing. Either these 
templates are held to serve as something akin to Fregean propositions, or they are not, 
but the basic idea remains in place either way. 
Aside from Boer and Lycan's early expression of scepticism about the specialness of first 
person thoughts (“attitudes de se are simply attitudes de their owners.” 1980: 432), 
opposition to the semantic view has been confined to the more recent (as of 2016) 
literature. The general tenor of these interventions is primarily negative, mainly 
concerned to deny that there is any particular phenomenon worthy of attention. This 
 209
Applications
typically takes the form of taking issue with Perry’s claim concerning ‘the essential 
indexical’ (Tiﬀany 2000; Millikan 2012, somewhat recapitulating her 1990; Magidor 
forthcoming). A radical example of such opposition is in Cappelen and Devers’ book 
length treatment (title: The Inessential Indexical), the purpose of which, they write, is to 
argue that the terms just mentioned denote nothing—there is no such 
thing as essential indexicality, irreducibly de se attitudes, or self-locating 
attitudes. Our goal is not to show that we need to rethink these 
phenomena—that they should be explained in ways diﬀerent from how, 
e.g. Lewis and Perry explained them. Our goal is to show that the entire 
topic is an illusion—there’s nothing there. (2013: 3) 
The deflationary view as I have outlined it is obviously of a piece with this, though it 
comes with some distinctive credentials; it is the most simple extension of the 
coordination functions explanation, which is the best theory going of how our thoughts 
are referentially coordinated. It is thus founded on a positive proposal, rather than simply 
a negative reaction to the semantic view. 
How exactly the deflationary view is formulated is a matter for terminological decision. 
On the one hand, the point of categorising thoughts as indexical or demonstrative, or 
first-person or what have you, might be just to provide a way of picking out the roles 
played by special conceptions. The point is that, on the deflationary view, the 
categorisations are of no significance when it comes to explaining what makes those 
thoughts belong to those conceptions, nor of what gives those conceptions their role. For 
the purposes of processing perceptual information and forming intentions, some 
conception has to be employed, and the question of why a particular conception plays 
that role is misplaced. If, on the other hand, the point of categorising some thoughts as 
indexical, demonstrative, or first-person is to mark that they are of significance in this 
way, then the fact that there is no need for a special explanation of how thoughts get 
referentially coordinated can be expressed as the claim that there are no demonstrative or 
indexical thoughts. 
Weight of philosophical opinion is on the side of the semantic view. There is, however, at 
least one good reason for thinking that the semantic view is likely false, independent of 
considerations to do with the best account of referential coordination.  
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One of the distinctive functions of indexical and demonstrative expressions is to allow for 
the fact that utterances and inscriptions are often made to express to an audience how 
someone, the speaker or inscriber, sees things, both literally and figuratively. These 
expressions help to coordinate diﬀerent points of view, or perspectives: 
When we represent the world in language, in thought, or in perception, we 
often represent it from a perspective. We say and think that the meeting is 
happening now, that it is hot here, that I am in danger and not you; that the 
tree looks larger from my perspective than from yours. (Cappelen & Dever 
2013: 1) 
In these cases, for example, the grammatical first person provides a simple and quick way 
for reference to the speaker to be eﬀected, in a way that supplies any potential audience 
with an easy knowledge of what, or who, the subject of the sentence is, without 
presupposing their possession of any further information about the speaker (such as her 
name). Similarly, demonstrative expressions provide a simple and quick way for reference 
to salient items in the environment to be eﬀected, against a shared background of 
assumptions about what, in the circumstances, would be salient. The fact that these 
assumptions can be highly complex and open ended makes the game of coming up with 
proposals about what this salience involves an interesting one, though I suspect 
ultimately fruitless (cf. Mount 2008). 
When it comes to thought, however, the question is why anything like these semantic 
mechanisms for coordinating diﬀerent points of view should be needed. Thoughts 
occupy a single point of view. They are thought by the thinker with that point of view. 
One does not need to coordinate diﬀerent points of view because one is not 
communicating anything in having a thought. The same goes for thoughts that are 
involved in perception and action. Thought represents a distinct engineering problem, 
one that has no call for semantic shortcuts. What work would analogues of the semantics 
of these expressions need to do?  
That there is a need of this kind is usually simply assumed by proponents of the semantic 
view. As Cappelen and Dever (2013) suggest, actual arguments for this tend to be thin 
on the ground. Perhaps it is based on the assumption that thought and language are 
merely diﬀerent vehicles for what must be the same contents, together with the view that 
indexicals and demonstratives express special contents. This is unavailable if we go with 
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the direct reference wing of the semantic view, and we have seen reasons to suspect that 
the neo-Fregean treatment of thought is explanatorily lacking. There is perhaps also a 
pervasive idea that thought is something like one’s internal monologue, in which we 
internally utter words, including words like ‘I’ and ‘here’, and these internal utterances 
are as much in need of interpretation, and so call for the same semantic analysis, as 
ordinary utterances made out loud. But internal monologue is imagined speech, 
imagined expression of thought. Thoughts do not stand in need of interpretation by the 
thinker or anyone else. They only need to be thought. Semantic shortcuts don’t get a look 
in. 
7.4.3 An inflationary objection 
Many proponents of the semantic view do not just hold that there are indexical, 
demonstrative, or first person thoughts as a matter of psychological fact, but rather take 
their existence to be crucial for our cognitive lives. This may seem to provide a decisive 
objection to the deflationary view, to the eﬀect that a more inflationary account is needed 
for them to do this. I want to suggest in response that this can be made consistent with 
the deflationary view, so long as one allows that the work can be done by the conceptions 
that play the special roles. 
Demonstrative thoughts, or more exactly, demonstrative concepts employed in those 
thoughts, are the most clear case of the more inflationary role given to thoughts 
exhibiting special ways of thinking. Proponents of the indispensability of demonstrative 
concepts argue that, just as we can say something about an object in virtue of employing 
a semantic mechanism that makes some salient thing the subject of an utterance, so we 
can think about an object in virtue of employing a representational mechanism that 
makes some salient thing the subject of a thought. That we can do this explains how we 
can have a rational conception of things at all. Without such thoughts, our rational 
conception would make no meaningful contact with the world, populated as it is by 
particulars located and related to each other in space and time. Perhaps all we could have 
otherwise are descriptive thoughts, employing descriptions which particular objects may 
or may not satisfy. Perhaps we could not have even that. A theory of what the 
representational mechanism is, and how exactly it serves to fix reference, is held to answer 
to this explanatory aspect of demonstrative thoughts. 
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The classic expression of the idea that demonstrative thoughts, or more exactly so-called 
perceptual demonstrative thoughts where perception is what makes objects salient or 
‘available to thought’, are crucial to understanding how we have a rational conception of 
the world as populated by particulars located in space and time can be found in 
Strawson’s Individuals: 
We think of the world as containing particular things some of which are 
independent of ourselves; we think of the world’s history as made up of 
particular episodes in which we may or may not have a part; and we think 
of these particular things and events as included in the topics of our 
common discourse, as things about which we can talk to each other… 
(1959: 15) 
[T]here are many cases of identification falling under this condition. An 
expression is used which, given the setting and accompaniments of its use, 
can properly, or at least naturally, be taken, as then used, to apply only to a 
certain single member of the range of particulars which the hearer is able, or 
a moment before was able, sensibly to discriminate, and to nothing outside 
that range. Cases of this kind are the cases, par excellence, for the use of 
demonstratives.… I shall say, when this first condition for identification is 
satisfied, that the hearer is able directly to locate the particular referred to. 
We may also speak of these cases as cases of the demonstrative identification 
of particulars. (op. cit.: 18) 
Evans (1982: 141-191) stresses the need to go beyond Strawson’s account to make 
explicit the rational dimension of perceptual demonstrative thoughts. Campbell (2002) 
has argued that demonstrative thought specifically requires sensory attention; Dickie 
(2011) and Smithies (2011) extend this to the idea that demonstrative thought needs to 
be understood in terms of the epistemic role of perception. Related views can be found in 
Peacocke (1981; 2008: 48-51) and McDowell (1990; 1994). 
The idea in common across these advocates of the importance of demonstrative thoughts 
is that they supply the knowledge of reference necessary for reference to particulars. 
Knowledge of reference is held to require knowledge of what individuates the particular 
in question; that is, to know the condition suﬃcient for making it diﬀerent to all other 
things. A thing’s location in space and time individuates it, and perceptual demonstrative 
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thought provides the contact with things needed to have such knowledge (this is what, as 
I understand it, is meant by the expression ‘perceptually-based thought’, frequently used 
to gloss the idea of perceptual demonstratives). Such knowledge therefore bears on the 
identity of what is thought about, and so can explain for instance, why we might think 
something about a perceived object, yet not know that that judgement concerns some 
thing we had only ben told about. Or, conversely, it can explain how one can put 
together information about a perceived object and rationally judge that it is the same as 
something one has heard about. And it can explain how we can rationally treat multiple 
thoughts as being about the same thing, when one and the same object is made salient 
through several perceptual episodes. The claim that demonstrative thoughts are 
indispensable therefore has a distinctly neo-Fregean character, and indeed the proponents 
of this view named above often express it in terms of Frege’s notion of sense.  
Granting the claim that, if we did not have demonstrative thoughts, our having a rational 
conception of things that makes genuine contact with how things are would be 
impossible, the result seems to be that special ways of thinking are special in a way that 
the deflationary view cannot encompass, as it involves nothing that could supply 
knowledge of reference of the sort held to be provided by demonstrative concepts. 
Should we grant the claim? It is not at all clear that there is a way to critically assess 
something so profound on its own terms (the fact that arguments for the existence of 
demonstrative thoughts tend to be thin on the ground makes things more diﬃcult on 
this score). But it is possible to assess it by bringing it into slightly more familiar territory, 
by dint of assessing the more general approach to ways of thinking that the more 
inflationary role is held to entail. We should ask whether it is really the case that, were 
identity relations concerning what we think about separated from facts about perceptual 
salience, then we would have no way of accounting for the rationality of our conception 
of things. 
The answer we are now in a position to return is a simple no. In fact, coordination 
functions theory is an adequate theory of referential coordination, and this is wholly 
independent of anything along the lines of perceptual demonstration. The conditions 
suﬃcient for thoughts being referentially coordinated make no reference to perceptual 
experiences. ‘Perceptually-based thought’, in anything stronger than the fairly banal sense 
of ‘thought involving information that was in fact gained through perception’, is a 
category without work to do.  
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This may seem simply incredible to proponents of the semantic view for whom 
demonstrative thought represents the meeting point of mind and world. Again, the 
disagreement is deep enough that the prospect of settling it by seeing out the 
consequences of mutually agreed-upon premises is dim. This does not mean the issue 
cannot be settled at all. So long as it is agreed that the issue is one of better or worse 
explanations, this must tell somewhere. The idea is that it tells most keenly where things 
turn on the explanation of referential coordination. On that score, the tradition that sees 
demonstrative concepts as playing a crucial role comes oﬀ worst, due to its adherence to 
the semantic view. 
We should also ask whether this inflationary objection really presents a problem for the 
deflationary view. The inflationary objection presupposes that the crucial knowledge of 
reference is supplied by perceptual contact with things in the world. This only presents a 
problem if such knowledge cannot be accommodated by the deflationary view, which is 
not clearly the case. The deflationary view can accommodate this, albeit as part of a 
piecemeal approach to the rational, epistemic, and intentional properties of thoughts that 
exhibit special ways of thinking, rather than the unified approach premised on the neo-
Fregean view of mental content.  
The deflationary view is consistent with the claim that the semantic content of some, 
perhaps even most, of our thoughts depend on information gained through perception, 
in such a way that they could not be had were the thinker not to have undergone some 
perceptual experience. And, more importantly, it is consistent with the claim that there 
are instances where perceptual experience provides information that makes for knowledge 
of reference. The obvious suggestion is that it is in the content of conceptions that such 
knowledge should be located. Rather than demonstrative concepts, one has otherwise 
ordinary conceptions put to special purposes. These special purposes can include their 
providing the materials for knowledge of reference. No commitment to demonstrative 
concepts is thereby incurred. 
A more satisfactory treatment of this topic would need to address in significantly greater 
detail how exactly to interpret the claim that thought requires knowledge of reference 
supplied by perceptual experience, or indeed whether there is any viable interpretation of 
it to be had (cf. Hawthorne & Manley 2012: 71-92). Providing answers to either 
question lies well beyond the scope of the present discussion. For the time being, we can 
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conclude that there is no reason to think that the inflationary objection points to any 
clear problem with the deflationary view. 
7.4.4 Summary 
The coordination functions explanation supports a deflationary view of special ways of 
thinking, on which they are special only in that thoughts that exhibit them make up 
conceptions that play a special role in our lives. This view of indexical and demonstrative 
thoughts by itself oﬀers no explanation of the capacity to think about the world, as some 
have taken demonstrative thoughts to do. This may be taken as a reason to reject the 
deflationary view, but the notion of a conception may be used to do much of that work, 
and so such a reaction would be unwarranted. I conclude that the coordination functions 
explanation meets the fifth desideratum. 
7.5 Conclusion 
The coordination functions explanation of referential coordination undermines the 
commitments of philosophical concept theory, although the distinction between 
concepts and conceptions provides a way of preserving some of what goes under that 
heading within the scope of a lightweight approach to thought. Conceptions can be 
linked, so allowing the explanation to be extended to identity judgements. Conceptions 
also provide the materials for a deflationary view of special ways of thinking. On all three 
topics, there is a trade-oﬀ to be made between the relative adequacy of an explanation of 
referential coordination and the extent of the theoretical ambitions that can be supported 
by it. Particularly in the case of special ways of thinking, this trade oﬀ may seem rather 
severe. But it is no less attractive once one considers the problems with alternatives. 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Conclusion 
This essay has explored how we should think about referential coordination. Chapter one 
set out the problem as one of giving an account of an inferentially basic though personal-
level indication of sameness of reference, suﬃcient for making rational the disposition to 
engage in a paradigmatic form of inference. Chapter two related this problem to debates 
in the theory of concepts. Chapters three, four, and five evaluated some prominent 
theories of thought in relation to the problem, and found them wanting. Chapter six 
presented the coordination functions explanation, and showed how it does better than 
the competitors. Chapter seven showed how coordination functions theory can be 
applied to some closely related problems. 
The conclusion in favour of the coordination functions explanation is contingently 
correct if correct at all. The argument given does not pretend to be conclusive. 
Explanations can always be improved upon, and that goes for the one recommended here 
no less. Even so, I submit that the case is a compelling one.  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